Stealing Signs:  How Broken Rules Structure Identity. by Jakle, Alexander Dunning
Stealing Signs: 
How Broken Rules Structure Identity 
by 
Alexander Dunning Jakle
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in the University of Michigan
2014
Doctoral Committee:
! Associate Professor Anna R. Kirkland, Co-Chair
! Associate Professor Mariah A. Zeisberg, Co-Chair
! Assistant Professor Sandra R. Levitsky




 who have always told me that I could do whatever I set my mind to, 
who have supported me at every step of my long journey to this point, 
without whom I could never have become the scholar I am – much less the person – 
and whom I love with all my heart. 
ii
Acknowledgements
! Nothing like this is ever accomplished by oneself; in fact, more often than not the 
number of people who have helped along the way is far too high to list them all. For 
instance, I have had countless conversations with dozens of friends over the four years 
I have worked on this project, some substantive, some merely an opportunity for me to 
vent. I can’t thank each friend for each conversation, so let me just issue a blanket but 
heartfelt “thank you” to each of you who allowed me to prattle on about baseball and 
social norms.
! My parents, my brother, and my sister, however, bore much of my monologic 
tendency, and never failed to greet it with interest and support. Without the four of you, I 
cannot imagine that I would have gotten through this in one piece. My godmother also 
deserves a special “thank you”; not only did she listen to and help sharpen my many 
ideas over two summers of fieldwork, but that fieldwork might never have been possible 
without her kindness and generosity. Aunt Joan, I will always treasure those two magical 
summers we shared on the Cape. 
! Many people gave helpful comments on many versions of this project and its 
subcomponents. I had the opportunity to present several times at the University of 
Michigan Political Theory Workshop, the participants of which I owe a considerable 
intellectual debt. I also benefitted enormously from comments given at several Law and 
Society Annual Meetings, which always succeeded in achieving that rare combination of 
improving my work and my spirits at the same time. 
! Pam Brandwein and Mika Lavaque-Manty were incredibly helpful in pushing me 
early on to sharpen my analytical frame and find a way to approach the work in a sound, 
interesting, and unique way. Though they are not listed as members of my committee on 
this dissertation’s title page, their impact on the project was substantial, and is 
appreciated more than they know. 
! Sandy Levitsky, too, helped to sharpen my focus while providing a sociological 
perspective on work that plays with the boundary between my discipline and hers in 
iii
more than a few places. The day I convinced her to serve on my committee was a very 
good day for the project. Andy Markovits has been an intellectual guide and a role 
model, and he has done much to shape this work for the better. As a tireless supporter 
of the work, and as a fellow traveler in the world of sports and society, he always shown 
me how to do serious work about people who play. 
! Anna Kirkland and Mariah Zeisberg have spent more time on this project than 
anyone other than myself. To say that this project would be far worse had they not been 
involved would be an adventure in understatement. I can never begin to repay them for 
the countless hours they have spent reading my work, talking to me about where to go 
with it, thinking about how to improve it, and putting up with my tendencies to stray from 
the concise points they kept wisely encouraging me to stick to. Where this dissertation 
is sharply focused, it is because I listened to their advice; where it wanders to tangential 
topics, it is because I failed to. Anna, Mariah, you have done more than anyone to 
shape the young academic I have become; any success I may achieve is at least partly 
yours. I can never thank you enough.
! Ultimately, though, the group to whom I owe the most thanks is the Cape 
Crusaders. The men and women who comprise that organization showed such 
enormous generosity of spirit in inviting me into their lives, their homes, and their world. 
In allowing me to be a part of their lives for the summers of 2010 and 2011, they gave 
me so much more than data. They gave me friendship, wisdom, camaraderie, 
entertainment, and a chance to live out some childhood fantasies of sitting in a big-time 
dugout and riding a team bus. The debt I owe the players, coaches, parents, hosts, 
administrators, scouts, and agents who agreed to talk to me for this study is staggering. 
Though I cannot use their real names here, I hope they know who they are, and I hope 
they know how grateful I am for the opportunities they gave me, 
! I finished editing the penultimate draft of this dissertation on September 4, 2013. 
By fate, coincidence, or serendipity, that day was also the first time I saw one of this 
study’s subjects wear a Major League uniform. Jerry Lee – as he is known in these 
pages – made an ESPN highlight reel for a spectacular throw from second base to beat 
the runner to first. I can hardly imagine a better end to this work than to pair it with my 
first glimpse of one interview subject whose boyhood dream has finally come true. Many 
iv
of the players featured in the pages that follow are out of baseball, many others are 
working their way through the minor leagues – perhaps towards a chance at the Bigs, 
perhaps not. But wherever you are now, guys, and whatever you are doing, thank you. 





List of Appendices! vii
Abstract! viii
Chapter 1 – The Playing Field! 1
! Puzzle and Theory
Chapter 2 – Inside Baseball! 53
! Methodology
Chapter 3 – Leading Off! 57
! Welfarist Norms and the Porous Boundaries of “In-Crowds”
Chapter 4 – Casey at the Bat! 81
! Cues and Narrative Identity: Being and Becoming Elite
Chapter 5 – The Hidden Ball Trick! 103
! Confidence and Self-Deception: The Protective Lies Players Tell Themselves
Chapter 6 – A Spot in the Order! 131
! Performances Unperformed: Culturally Proscribed Behaviors and Relationships





Appendix A: Interview Questions...! 162
Appendix B: Concept Memos...! 174
Appendix C: Codebook...! 185
vii
Abstract
! I investigate how individuals’ identities and social networks shape not only their 
knowledge of the law, but their tendencies to obey or disobey it. Using elite amateur 
baseball players and their illicit relationships with agents as a case study, I reveal a 
complex social structure that ties agent use to elite status, while at the same time hiding 
the NCAA rules violations associated with it. I create a dialog between political 
heuristics (cue theory) and legal consciousness to examine the ways that cultural 
structures create the conditions for individual cognitive shortcuts to replicate their social 
world.
! Many players mimic rational behavior by elites despite differing incentive 
structures. This dissertation argues that players’ narrative identities shape who they 
think of as relative peers and encourage them to act in ways that replicate the norm of 
agent use despite a cost to those who perpetuate it. Baseball’s embedded practices of 
self-confidence and self-deception affect both the existence of cues and the ways those 
cues are taken. The cultural roles that players and coaches perform with each other 
abjure the business of baseball, forcing players into the pattern of agent use and hiding 
from them alternative ways of playing their social role. 
! Legal consciousness and cue theory offer each other ways to enrich their 
inquiries. Cue theory gives legal consciousness a new, productive way to think about 
how people navigate social structures and act in ways that replicate them, while in 
return getting a way to think about how cues are constructed in the first place, and how 
identity and culture can shape how we take them. What happens in amateur baseball 
shines a light on the ways we all try to find our way through complex rule-bound 
systems, and on how those systems push us along predefined paths. 
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Chapter 1 
The Playing Field: Puzzle and Theory
Steve Mott’s Dilemma 
! Steve Mott1 has played baseball for literally as long as he can remember; he has 
dreamed of playing professionally for nearly as long. However, unlike so many of our 
childhood imaginings, Steve’s still have a firm basis in reality. He was the best player on 
his Little League teams and the best player on his high school teams. He was drafted to 
play professional baseball during his senior year of high school, but chose instead to 
accept a scholarship at a university with a consistently excellent Division 1 baseball 
team – on which he is still one of the best players. In fact, until the summer of 2010, 
Steve Mott had been one of the two best players on every team for which he had ever 
played. Steve’s lifelong dream may well come true.
! During the summers of 2010 and 2011, Steve played for the Cape Crusaders, 
one of ten teams in the prestigious Cape Cod Baseball League, widely considered to be 
the best amateur league in the country. Summer leagues like the Cape’s are an 
enormous opportunity for college players like Steve. The packed schedule of games, 
the use of wooden bats,2 and the extraordinary top-to-bottom talent make the Cape Cod 
League one of the best places to evaluate professional prospects. By midsummer, 
twenty to thirty professional scouts aim their radar guns from behind the backstop, and 
it’s not unusual to see a Major League general manager checking out a game. Steve 
and his teammates are playing in front of decision-makers in professional baseball, as 
their pitching coach Billy Jameson tells them. 
1
1 All names of interview subjects are pseudonyms. The name “Cape Crusaders,” too, is pseudonymous.  
2 Wood bats make for a fundamentally different game than is played in college with aluminum, a style of 
game far closer to that played in professional baseball. If a pitcher throws to the side of the plate on which 
a batter stands – “inside” – a wooden bat will most likely break if the batter makes contact. Aluminum 
won’t break; a batter may well be able to bloop the ball just out of the infield for a hit. As a result, college 
pitchers rarely pitch inside, which can radically change strategy for both pitcher and batter. 
! Scouts and general managers aren’t the only signs of looming professionalism 
that lurk around the ballparks among Cape Cod vacation-goers. Agents, too, frequent 
the stands at Cape Cod summer games. Agents – often themselves former players – 
are professional representatives who serve as a go-between for players and Major 
League franchises for a cut of player contracts as their fee. Players are still amateurs 
under the purview of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), which 
prohibits them from having an agent; an agent is considered a hallmark of 
professionalism. The relevant NCAA rule – Bylaw 12.3.2.1 – defines an agent as 
anyone making contact with a professional team on a player’s behalf.3 Getting caught 
can have serious repercussions: in 2011 Logan Ehlers was suspended for 60% of his 
college season because his “advisor”4 made contact with the Toronto Blue Jays (while 
at a game in the Cape League).5 
! Having an agent is illegal, but a vast majority of players taken in Major League 
Baseball’s enormous amateur draft – more than 1,500 players are taken over 50 rounds 
– illicitly retain the services of an agent while still amateurs. Some coaches estimate 
that as many as 98% of such players have broken this rule.6 Our eyebrows ought to 
arch a little when we see such a substantial portion of a population breaking a rule,7 
especially in a group like baseball players where conformity is the norm. Players are 
used to rule-bound practice schedules, strict team guidelines, and detailed eligibility 
2
3 This includes players’ parents; players are allowed to contact and discuss terms with professional teams 
on their own. It is exceedingly common for players with one remaining year of college to be drafted to 
negotiate with a professional club on contract terms (either by themselves or with the illicit use of an 
agent), and to turn down the offer and return for a senior season. 
4 Players don’t call the professional agents with whom they develop relationships “agents” while they are 
still amateurs; they call them “advisors.” This is a practice born of the prohibition against agents, but 
players know changing the nomenclature won’t help them if they get caught. As sophomore pitcher Mark 
Beloit put it: “An advisor is an agent that you call an ‘advisor.’”
5 See also, inter alia, Crasnick 2009, Fitt 2008, 2009a, b, c, 2010a, b, c., and Oliver v. NCAA.
6 This is the highest of the estimates that various players, coaches, scouts, and agents gave me, which 
ranged from 75% up. I did not conduct a systematic survey of players, but it’s worth noting that of the 
many estimates I asked for, the lowest was 75% and, at most, 20% of the players in a given draft see 
monetary benefit from agent use. 
7 Of course, some legal literature – most notably positivist theories of law – would hold that rules that fail 
to guide behavior are not rules or laws at all. See, for example, Hart 1961, and text below on page 6.
requirements, all under public scrutiny. They know well and scrupulously follow other 
NCAA provisions such as the prohibition against accepting gifts. This is not a situation 
where rule-following in general has broken down. Nor, to reemphasize the point, is it 
one of minor “slap-on-the-wrist” sanctions. The revocation of NCAA eligibility not only 
rips a player from a lifelong practice, but it can have serious financial implications; not 
playing the year before a draft can cripple a player’s attractiveness to a professional 
team. In such a compliant group and with such high stakes, what explanation might 
there be for this puzzling behavior?
! It would be nothing new to suggest that perhaps players are simply rationally 
breaking a rule because the expected benefits of breaking it exceed the expected costs 
of getting caught.8 But the complicated economics of agent use deepen rather than 
ameliorate the complexities of the puzzle. The most highly touted picks have significant 
leverage and can extract higher dollar values and other contractual perks from the 
teams that draft them, but these material benefits accrue to only a small percentage of 
the players drafted each year. Once a player falls out of the first five rounds or so – 
certainly out of the top ten – the monetary benefits of having an agent evaporate 
completely.9 Players in the later rounds are far more easily replaced or discarded, and 
as a result are almost always offered take-it-or-leave-it contracts with dollar amounts 
based exclusively on the round and pick used to take the player, so-called “slot money” 
contracts.10 For players who are offered slot money, there will be no negotiation of perks 
or higher signing bonuses, agent or not. Scout Tim Smalls puts it bluntly: 
There is NOTHING an agent can do to get a player drafted, and 
NOTHING an agent can do to get that player drafted any higher, 
3
8 E.g., Becker 1968; Cornish & Clark 1986. 
9 According to Michael Lewis, sometimes teams don’t even know who they’re drafting in the late rounds. 
Most people I spoke to agreed that this representation in Moneyball (the book) was spot on. Lewis 2004. 
10 Teams are under pressure to sign contracts with their top picks; if a third round pick walks away (to play 
a final year in college, perhaps), the team loses not only the rights to sign him that year, but the 
opportunity cost of a very high pick in the draft. By contrast, a team loses much less if its thirty-fifth round 
pick decides to go back to school; such a player has virtually no walkaway power, no leverage. As player 
financial advisor Andy Erickson puts it: “In the first three rounds, teams take guys they assume will play in 
the big leagues. In rounds four through ten, they take guys they hope will play in the big leagues. In 
rounds eleven through fifty, they take guys for those first ten guys to play with in the minors.” 
and NOTHING an agent can do to get any more money for that 
player!!!!!!!!11
! Though material benefits dissipate,12 an agent will still take four to ten percent of 
the money a player was going to get anyway, and the signing bonus amounts decrease 
radically outside the top ten rounds. By the thirtieth round, they’ve dropped from the 
millions to the thousands, and those thousands must sustain a player for a long time.13 
! Why do so many players have agents? It’s against the rules, at least a little risky, 
and it’s costly to the tune of four to ten percent of a player’s bonus. The material 
benefits realized by a few are not realized by most. It could be that players are 
misinformed or mistaken about the benefits an agent can provide, or to whom they can 
be provided. No doubt some are so misinformed, but my research reveals that players 
are, by and large, knowledgeable and sophisticated actors who understand draft 
dynamics, slot money, their likely place in the draft, and the relationship between agents 
and draft economics. It could be that players just act irrationally, but it hardly seems that 
widespread intellectual hysteria is the most likely explanation. It’s certainly not one we 
can accept without doing pretty serious violence to Ockham’s Razor. 
! Steve Mott doesn’t appear to be in the grips of wild irrationality when we sit down 
on a warm Cape Cod summer’s day, but his outlook does represent the puzzle. He 
knows roughly where he’s likely to go in next year’s draft,14 he knows having an agent is 
against the rules, he knows that an agent won’t be able to negotiate more money for 
him when he’s drafted next year, but he also knows that an agent will take his cut of the 
4
11 All emphasis is from the original email from Tim Smalls. 
12 As I will discuss later, this is not exactly the same as saying agents hold no benefit for players 
whatsoever. Having someone to talk to about an unfamiliar process – from amateur to professional – 
should certainly count as a benefit, but the question then becomes why players pay 4% to 10% for 
something they could easily get from coaches or former players. 
13 Players make little money in minor league baseball. At the top of the minors it is only about $50,000 a 
year, but for most players it is measured in the hundreds per week, and for only five or six months a year. 
In the lower tiers, many players work menial jobs in the offseason just to make ends meet. The glamour 
seen on television masks the distinct lack of glamour that marks the lives of the vast majority of 
professional players, very few of whom will ever see even a glimmer of the limelight.
14 Such information is remarkably easy to come by. A lightning-quick search of www.perfectgame.com 
readily discloses where scouts, sportswriters, and other talking heads currently have any top-tier college 
player slotted to go in the next draft.
money anyway. Steve ultimately has to cut our interview short to have lunch with a 
potential agent/advisor.
! Most players in the draft know what Steve knows, but will end up with an agent 
anyway. Again, unless mass insanity has stricken the ranks of elite college baseball, 
there must be other reasons players have agents. They readily enumerate some of 
them: it’s a confidence booster, it lets someone else deal with the business so you can 
focus on baseball, it makes you feel more like a professional (or like you’re on your way 
to being one). It may not be a status symbol in the classical sense of something shown 
to others to demonstrate your own rank or position; the risk of being found out 
recommends against such public displays, and locker room culture eschews business 
for “the game” and the standard camaraderies of young athletes. Nor do professional 
teams draw inferences from whether or not a player has an agent – it is not operating as 
a signaling mechanism for them; it is not a “stolen sign.”15 Public or not, though, players 
seem to like having agents. 
! But Steve doesn’t sound like someone weighing potential costs and benefits.16 
He hasn’t researched pros and cons much, certainly not exhaustively. He seems – 
almost reflexively – to be doing something because it’s simply what one does. One thing 
he does know, however, is that it’s what elite players do. His Crusaders teammate Peter 
Wrass describes his reaction to knowing that the top players have agents: “It makes me 
believe that [agents] are helpful, more helpful, just because if guys of this caliber have 
them, I feel like they wouldn’t have them for no reason.” Though Peter skates over the 
fact (or seems not to know) that agents can’t do for everyone what they can do for the 
guys at the top, his response opens a window onto the fascinating process by which 
players learn about the complex interplay between NCAA rules and baseball’s cultural 
practices. Agents are established as something baseball players simply have as a 
matter of course; the cream of the crop establishes the practice and other draft-eligible 
5
15 “Stealing signs,” for the less-than-avid baseball fan, is the practice of one team employing on-field 
espionage to read and decode the signs coaches and catchers give to tell batters and pitchers what to 
pitch, or what pitch might be coming. 
16 The fact that almost nobody ever sounds or acts like the utility maximizers that populate cost-benefit 
analyses is, of course, one of the long-standing and well-trod criticisms of that paradigm. See, for 
example, Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur 2009. 
players take notice, taking their cue as to how elite players behave from others. In other 
words, the cultural norms and attitudes surrounding the official rules affect how people 
interact with them. If individuals learn how to interact with laws by looking to peers for 
cues rather than experts, how might that affect their propensities to follow or break 
them? 
! The NCAA is a formal institution purporting to govern the behavior of those under 
its purview, with its own set of promulgated rules and procedures.17 Infractions of the 
rules set forth in the NCAA Bylaws are either self-reported (minor infractions are 
relatively common and schools tend to be fastidious about reporting them)18 or 
independently discovered by the NCAA’s enforcement staff (commonly attorneys). If the 
infraction is determined to be a “major violation” (as illicit agent us always is), the 
enforcement staff issues a Notice of Allegations. If the offending school agrees with the 
underlying facts, the school and the enforcement staff issue a joint report to the 
Committee on Infractions with agreed upon self-imposed sanctions. If the infraction is 
especially egregious or, more commonly, if the school and the enforcement staff cannot 
agree on the underlying facts, both sides present evidence at a hearing before the 
Committee on Infractions. After the Committee rules and issues sanctions the school 
has an opportunity to appeal to the Infractions Appeal Committee, though the grounds 
are fairly narrow. 
! The NCAA has rules, a fact-finding process, and sanctioning procedures agreed 
upon by both the governing body and the schools it governs. As such, it should be 
considered as a legalistic or “law-like” institution from which we can learn lessons about 
legal institutions more generally. While legal positivism might claim that rules like Bylaw 
12.3.2.1 that fail to guide behavior aren’t really rules at all (Hart, 1961), sociology of law 
and law and society more generally have generated new, rich veins of research and 
analysis by expanding the scope of what is considered law. The increasingly expansive 
view of what law is has allowed for more creative investigations of how formal rules and 
6
17 See both the NCAA Bylaws themselves and Stu Brown’s work on the aid attorneys can provide to 
schools going though the process, “The NCAA Infractions Enforcement Process - Role of Counsel,” 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/
yld_annual_demystifying_the_ncaa_materials.authcheckdam.pdf (Accessed January 11, 2014). 
18 This according to a Big Ten faculty representative to the NCAA. 
the informal norms that surround and interact with them orchestrate our daily lives. As 
Austin Sarat put it, the task for law and society is “regularly to challenge its own 
doggedly conventional assumptions about what is worth studying, about theories and 
methods that we use, and about what counts as sociolegal scholarship” (2000: 41). 
Treating the NCAA rules as a formal legal structure (and baseball culture as legal 
consciousness constituting the lived experience and reality of those rules) engages my 
inquiry with two of the broad questions with which public law scholarship grapples. 
! For one, the NCAA regulations are just one of several overlapping institutions 
with which players grapple. The occasionally conflicting dictates of the NCAA and the 
informal rules that guide players’ social behavior are a form of legal pluralism from 
which lessons about the conflict of legalistic systems can be drawn. The NCAA rules 
also provide insight to public law’s longstanding curiosity about the role of law as a 
system of social control. Both the formal rules and the informal practices that surround 
them make demands of player behavior and, as such, are a form of social control. By 
examining the result when these two systems clash, we learn about conflict in a legally 
pluralistic culture as well as about the efficacy (or lack thereof) of official rules in 
attempts at social control. 
! Public law’s interest in legal pluralism has most often focused on the intersection 
of two competing legal systems, whether between indigenous Hawaiian law and 
colonially imposed Anglo-American Law (Merry 1999), a national legal system and 
international human rights law (Merry 2006), or an ascendent national system and 
traditional authority structures (de Sousa Santos 2006). Henrysson and Joireman, too, 
look closely at how the interplay between formal structures and traditional modes of 
dispute resolution in Kenya conspire to exclude women from the protections of law 
(2009). 
! Increasingly, however, scholarship in the field is examining the intersection of 
formal legal institutions with informal means of dispute resolution. Van Gelder’s study of 
informal land tenure arrangements in Buenos Aires explores the outcome when such 
agreements collide with formal law (2010); it does not make sense to cast such 
arrangements as either compliant or non-compliant, he argues, but to conceptualize the 
system as overlapping with formal law and coinciding or conflicting with it to varying 
7
degrees. Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld interrogate the overlaps between a state-
sponsored death penalty and a cultural tradition of vigilantism – which is itself a 
structured system of sanctions and control (2006). Slade’s study of the mafia in post-
Soviet Georgia treats the internal rules of the mob as one set of rules that overlap with 
formal state institutions (2012); in fact, it is through intersection with and disruption of 
the mob’s rules that the state was able to exert control over the mafia. Similarly, Varese 
argues that mafias emerge as quasi-state actors – a parallel system of rules and 
sanctions in modernizing economies to fill in gaps in the formal law’s ability to protect 
property rights or resolve business disputes (2006). Both Thornton, Kagan, and 
Gunningham (2009) and Perez, Amichai-Hamburger, and Shterental (2009) explore the 
overlap between the formal structures of a regulatory regime and the informal cultural 
rules of individual firms, finding that the dictates of the latter influence conformity with 
the former. Even Macauley’s pioneering study of non-contractual relationships among 
businessmen could be considered one of a legally plural environment, with contract law 
playing the role of the formal structure, business norms the role of an alternative, 
informal system of dispute resolution (1963). 
! Macauley’s study also points us to another of the field’s big, overarching 
questions: the role of law in social control. Pound’s 1942 work may have first articulated 
the question solely in terms of how individual, social, and public interests combine to 
shape state-sanctioned legal structures, but public law now takes a broader view of 
exactly what legalistic structures count as law, writ large. Gunningham and Sinclair’s 
study of internal corporate regulation combines questions of legal pluralism and social 
control (2009). The authors contrast the law-like structures of formal, internal corporate 
regulation with the informal subcultures of individual offices, finding that the conflict 
between the two often complicates or negates hierarchical imposition of corporate 
control. In fact, the explication of organizational rules and culture as private law has 
been an exceptionally rich vein for sociolegal analysis (Edelman 1992, 1995; Edelman 
& Suchman 1999; Fuller, Edelman & Matusik 2000).
! Hoffman takes a similarly capacious view of “law” as a mode of social control in 
her study of dispute resolution procedures in a cooperative workplace (2005). Even 
within formal institutions, among the “agents of social control” like police officers, 
8
internal cultural norms can affect actors’ tendencies to adhere to the institution’s official 
rules and regulations (which, in the case of police, are the same as formal legal rules 
and regulations; Tyler, Callahan, & Frost 2007). Emerson has looked outside of formal 
rules altogether in his work on informal control among roommate pairs, arguing that it 
teaches us much about legal reactions beyond the typical acts of naming and 
claiming,19 and about the vagueness and breadth of the concept of a legal 
“injury” (2008). Ellickson, too, has recently made the case that careful study of 
domestic, household norms, controls, and institutions has broader application to the 
efficiency of informal, legalistic agreements (2010).20
! While sociology of law and law and society have, as I noted above, opened rich 
veins of analysis by expanding the scope of what counts as law or legal research, 
political science has been somewhat slower to embrace this expansion. But this is a 
opportunity the field should seize. The informal rules and norms that guide our everyday 
decision-making have implications for political behavior and how we interact with more 
formal or traditional rule structures. The gains made in other fields by widening the 
definition of “the legal” could readily pay dividends in political science; part of my 
objective in this work is to demonstrate the power this research has to explain political 
behavior (here, broadly understood as relationships to rules and rule-structures). Both 
the subject matter and this qualitative sociolegal approach can provide important 
insights for the field. 
! The NCAA rules, as formal institutional controls, intersect with baseball’s cultural 
norms and practices in ways that implicate both legal pluralism and social control. The 
conflict between official rules and informal norms pulls players in different directions, 
creating a discrepancy between two systems, a form of legal pluralism. How the conflict 
resolves itself, in turn, speaks to questions of how or why formal and informal systems 
are efficient or inefficient at controlling social behavior. 
9
19 See Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat (1981). 
20 We needn’t even necessarily constrain ourselves to real-world norms or institutions. Kamir persuasively 
argues that the norms of honor and dignity in the film Unforgiven have far-reaching lessons for 
contemporary western legal systems (2006). 
! I reach these questions through the twin frames of heuristics literature – cue 
theory – and legal consciousness. Agents are part of a cultural framework that players 
replicate through the choices they make participating in the system, even though they 
reproduce a system of norms that seems not to serve their material interests; a risk of 
NCAA sanctions and a monetary cost attach to the perpetuation of agent relationships. 
Cast in these terms, the practice raises the same questions Silbey does about the 
tendency for legal consciousness to reproduce hegemonic legal structures (1992; 
2005). If we consider NCAA rules as a form of law,21 the norms of amateur baseball are 
not simply behavioral guides, but rather “conceptual categories and schema that help 
construct, compose, communicate, and interpret social relations” (Silbey 2005: 327; see 
also Edelman & Suchman 1997). Agent relationships are a way of participating in 
culture, part of a durable set of predispositions that allow players to construct meaning 
in the world around them, thereby reproducing hegemonic ideologies while keeping 
those they may harm from confronting them.
! But what exactly are these predispositions that lead players to reproduce cultural 
frameworks without confronting them? By what cultural mechanisms are they 
transmitted? How do they embed themselves in a player’s consciousness and affect his 
decision-making? Players certainly don’t carefully examine the details of NCAA rules, 
nor do they take the time to exhaustively research the pros and cons (economic or 
otherwise) of having an agent. Rather, they learn about the rules that constrain them 
and the informal practices surrounding them by observing the behavior of others. We 
learn from others how to act in relation to the rules around us, which themselves weave 
in and out of individual identity formation and how we determine who is relevantly “like 
us.” Personal narrative and the vagaries of self-deception impact how actors interpret 
information, and the roles and norms of a culture can channel, limit, and inflect that 
information in the first place. I will show how looking to others in their sub-culture – and 
to that culture itself – shapes how players think about their relationship to a rule and 
impacts their tendency to behave in ways that break it.
10
21 I will use “rules” throughout to describe the official regulations and “norms” to describe the informal 
practices around them that invade and interpret them. 
! Asking questions about how we use observations of others to learn about the 
surrounding culture, our role in it, and how to best navigate it inches us up to the edge 
of another intellectual framework. Cue theory, perhaps most systematically advocated in 
The Democratic Dilemma, theorizes, models, and experimentally verifies that 
democratic citizens can reach reasoned political decisions despite their lack of political 
knowledge (Lupia & McCubbins 1998). By using high-quality cues from others as 
proxies, citizens can sometimes reach reasoned decisions without the knowledge that 
many have assumed they would require. Some schematic similarity to the amateur 
baseball players at this work’s heart is immediately apparent: where the actors in Lupia 
and McCubbins use shortcuts to make political decisions without researching the 
relevant topic, baseball players make career decisions they know are tangled up with 
NCAA rules and sanctions without carefully examining the attendant pros and cons. The 
mere fact that they make their decisions based on the observation of others mirrors the 
logic of a cue, and the fact that they use these cues to navigate a complex framework of 
rules, sanctions, and informal norms ought to suggest that the root logic of cue theory 
can apply more broadly than it does in The Democratic Dilemma. 
! The richness of cue theory itself (or at least our understanding of it) can be 
enhanced if we are able to apply it outside of the binary political decisions to which it 
has limited itself. A broad but I hope trenchant question emerges: how do we use cues 
from others to learn about and navigate complex socio-legal situations? This question, 
at least as I will try to answer it, puts legal consciousness and cue theory into 
conversation with each other. Cue theory can offer legal consciousness literatures a 
way to examine specific mechanisms and cognitive structures by which individuals 
replicate the cultural structures in which they participate. Legal consciousness, in return, 
broadens the analytic possibilities open to cue theory, offering ways to address not 
simply binary political decisions, but complex multi-dimensional decisions as well. 
Furthermore, it opens up questions that are analytically prior to an actor’s taking a cue. 
How does a cue come to have a particular place in a social structure? How do 
individuals come to think of some cues as applying to people “like them,” while rejecting 
others? How and when do the cultural frameworks in which we operate affect how we 
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interpret informational cues? In what ways do our social roles channel and block 
information before it ever reaches us in the first place?
! These are, as I say, analytically related – even prior – questions, but they fit 
awkwardly within the constraints that cue theory’s leading proponents have tightened 
around it. To put cue theory into rigorous conversation with broader socio-legal 
questions, these constraints will have to be shed (or at least loosened). Before doing 
that, however, a critical examination of cue theory itself is in order. 
Cue Theory Unmodified 
! Cue theory explains how and when we can get the information we need through 
the observation and words of others rather than through extensive research and data-
gathering ourselves. To best understand the structure of a cue as Lupia and McCubbins 
elucidate the concept (and to understand why they place on them the constraints that 
they do), consider the long-standing problem in democratic theory that the authors aim 
to overcome: can democracy function if the people making democratic decisions seem 
to have little idea what they’re talking about? (And how does a legal system function if 
individuals’ reactions to laws are embedded in their subculture and identity, rather than 
the law itself?)
! Democratic theorists have worried about common people’s paucity of wisdom for 
longer than there have been common voters. Cicero said the common people had “no 
wisdom, no penetration, no power of judgment.” Two millennia passed, but still Dahl 
worried that widespread political ignorance would lead voters to over-delegate to a 
“tyranny of experts” (1967: 21). Schumpeter fretted that the average citizen’s “infantile” 
analytical depth “may prove fatal to the nation” (1942: 262). Abramson’s narrower 
concern that a juror’s abject legal illiteracy leads to “trial by ignorance” is certainly 
related (1994: 3).22 
! Such wailing relies on the assumption that citizens cannot make a reasoned 
choice without the comprehensive knowledge they lack. And since Berelson, Lazarfeld, 
and McPhee discovered that voters in the 1948 presidential election did poorly when 
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22 Posner is similarly vexed: 1995: 52. 
asked factual political questions (1954), scholar after scholar has found new ways to 
measure the American voter’s ignorance. Some have continued to measure factual 
(un)awareness (Barber 1969; Nunnally 1978; Thorndike 1982; Neuman 1986), while 
others take that unawareness as a proxy for engagement, sophistication, or exposure 
(Luskin 1987; Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh 1989; Smith 1989; Fiske, Lau, & Smith 1990; 
Krosnick & Milburn 1990; McGraw & Pinney 1990; Price & Zaller 1990; Zaller 1990, 
1992; see also Carpini & Keeter 1993, 1996). 
! But is this necessarily true? If “the common voter” could reach reasoned and 
reasonable decisions without weighing all the evidence as an expert would, then 
perhaps much of the fretting over the future of democracy has been overwrought. And in 
fact, Lupia and McCubbins conclude exactly that: in certain contexts citizens are 
capable of making the same reasoned decisions they would if they were experts by 
using cues from others as information shortcuts (though cues can fail, as well). The 
authors hasten to add that the idea of shortcuts is not new. The same 1954 work that 
first quantified voter ignorance revealed that they use party identification as a proxy for 
a “correct” vote (Berelson, Lazerfeld, & McPhee 1954). Since then, many authors have 
shown that voters can use simple cues on topics ranging from nuclear energy 
(Kuklinski, Metlay, & May 1982) to insurance reform (Lupia 1994a).23 Lupia and 
McCubbins want push this established line of thinking further; they aim to show the 
specific conditions under which a citizen can make reasoned choices despite limited 
information, which requires determining the particular circumstances under which 
simple cues are sufficient (1998: 5). 
! For Person 1 to rely on Person 2 for information about a political choice, it is 
axiomatic that Person 1 must believe that Person 2 knows what he or she is talking 
about (at least when it comes to a particular topic). Perceived knowledge is a necessary  
condition – though certainly not a sufficient one – for Person 2’s viewpoints to be 
persuasive (Lupia & McCubbbins 1998: 50-51).24 Person 1 must also believe that what 
13
23 See also Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Calvert 1985; Grofman & Norrander 1990; Popkin 1991; 
Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock 1991; Lupia 1992, 1994b.
24 Note that actual knowledge is not necessary for Person 2 to be persuasive, just the belief that Person 2 
is knowledgeable.
Person 2 is saying is true, which is to say that he or she must be perceived as 
trustworthy. Trustworthiness can be achieved through the perception of common 
interests, or through the influence of external forces such as observable costly effort or 
a penalty for lying (Lupia & McCubbins 1998: 53-59, 90). When Person 1 believes 
Person 2 to be more knowledgeable on a particular topic and believes he has reasons 
to trust what Person 2 says, Person 2 is persuasive to Person 1. 
! However, the conditions for persuasion are not sufficient for what Lupia and 
McCubbins call “enlightenment,” roughly defined as the ability for Person 1 to actually 
learn from Person 2. Two additional conditions must apply. First, Person 1 must not 
simply perceive Person 2 as knowledgeable; Person 2 must actually be knowledgeable 
in order to impart accurate information. Second, either external forces – again, such as 
penalties for lying – or actual common interests must induce the speaker to reveal what 
he or she knows (1998: 69-71). When they have conflicting interests and external forces 
do not force honesty, conditions are ripe for deception (1998: 70-74). To clarify:
1) IF external forces act on a speaker OR the listener perceives common interests with 
the speaker, THEN the speaker is perceived as trustworthy. 
2) IF the speaker is perceived as trustworthy AND perceived as knowledgeable, THEN 
the speaker is persuasive. 
3) IF the speaker is persuasive AND knowledgeable AND the speaker either has actual 
common interests with the listener OR external forces motivate the speaker to reveal 
his knowledge, THEN the conditions for enlightenment are met. 
4) IF the speaker is persuasive AND knowledgeable AND the speaker neither has actual 
common interests with the listener NOR external forces motivate him to reveal his 
knowledge, THEN the conditions for deception are met.25
! The authors use the logic of their model to generate testable hypotheses and 
demonstrate the validity of their theory through a series of experiments. They find, for 
example, that when the conditions for both persuasion and enlightenment are met, there 
is a high incidence of reasoned choice (1998: 144); conversely, when the conditions for 
persuasion were met but the conditions of enlightenment were not, there was a high 
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25 These propositions are illustrated in very helpful graphic form in The Democratic Dilemma; Lupia & 
McCubbins 1994: 90. 
incidence of deception, but low incidence of reasoned choice (1988:148).26 Lupia and 
McCubbins also use survey experiments to test hypotheses about how people choose 
whether or not to follow a public figure’s advice or cue. Unsurprisingly, the authors 
determine that respondents are much more likely to follow the advice of someone they 
believe to be both knowledgeable and trustworthy (1998: 192-194, 201). Somewhat 
more unusually, they find that people do not necessarily ignore advice from figures they 
believe ignorant or whose trustworthiness they find suspect (1998: 192-194). Rather 
than dismissing such persons’ beliefs out of hand as so much nonsense, respondents 
occasionally used them as cues – granted, as a cue that they should do the opposite of 
whatever the speaker suggested.
! For cue theory as these authors articulate it to answer the specific question they 
ask, they must hem in the idea of a cue with fairly strict boundaries. A true/false 
distinction is needed to empirically measure knowledge versus deception, so actors in 
this model make binary choices. Candidate A or Candidate B? Policy 1 or Policy 2? 
More complicated, multivariable decisions are excluded. Lupia and McCubbins also 
require that actors are in fact able to gather correct information, leaving largely unturned 
stones covering reasons we think we’re getting good information when we’re not. A third 
requirement the authors impose (and a related one) is that actors make the same 
choice by using a cue that they would if they had encyclopedic information. These 
constraints help Lupia and McCubbins achieve their particular goal – knowing the 
conditions under which voters may reliably use cues from others to reach “reasoned” 
decisions – but they starkly limit the range available to cues considered more abstractly.
! The basic logic of a cue as a shortcut, however, needn’t be so limited. The idea 
that we might learn what actions to take by looking to the behavior or beliefs of others 
can apply whether we are trying to maximize our preferences, learn how to navigate a 
social or political structure, or simply gather information. I leave behind questions about 
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26 The authors define a choice as reasoned “when it is based upon an accurate prediction about a 
choice’s consequences” (1998: 18). The word “accurate” does an immense amount of work here. A 
person who is being deceived may think he has good reasons for making a particular choice, but since 
his prediction about the outcomes is inaccurate, he cannot be making a “reasoned” choice.  Strange as it 
seems to me to exclude a thought process that rationally follows premises to logical conclusions from a 
“reasoned” category because the thinker is mistaken about the premises, this is the definition Lupia and 
McCubbins operationalize. 
whether an individual would reach the same conclusion by using shortcuts as he would 
through exhaustive research. I leave undisturbed, however, the basic idea that we use 
such shortcuts to make decisions. I’m interested less in the results of cue-taking than in 
the processes by which we come upon, understand, and take cues. To the extent that 
cues result in agent use, the outcomes frame the puzzle, but I will focus on how cues 
are culturally framed and articulated, interpreted, and (mis)understood. 
! Focusing on the results of cue-taking lead the socio-legal questions I articulated 
above to all but bounce off of The Democratic Dilemma. As one reviewer put it, “Those 
who work within this paradigm and are comfortable with its taken-for-granted 
assumptions should find the Lupia and McCubbins effort a useful extension. For the rest 
of us, there are nagging, unaddressed questions” (Gamson, 1998: 1580). Some of 
these broader questions bubble to the surface even among those who study voter 
acquisition of political information. Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn analyze the 2004 
National Election Survey data with an eye to the effect that one’s social circles have on 
political knowledge (2004). They find that citizens who, for example, interacted primarily 
with Bush supporters could well articulate reasons to like Bush and reasons to dislike 
Gore (the converse being true for Gore supporters); citizens with heterogenous 
networks, however, could far better articulate reasons for liking and disliking both Bush 
and Gore (2004: 91-92). The types of cues that were socially available to the different 
populations affected what they were able to learn. 
! Lupia and McCubbins focus on the conditions of knowledge, trustworthiness, and 
deception that enable cues, but Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn point to the fact that 
our social circles can be the source of our information and can inflect and block the 
information we receive (or don’t) from others; even among heterogenous circles, some 
topics are off limits. We try to keep things within the confines of decorum to prevent 
disagreements or discussions from escalating too far. These conversations are bounded 
and governed by all the little norms and niceties that constrain and constitute our 
conversations with friends and acquaintances.27 The same is true of political 
environments: they not only influence what information we receive, but impact what we 
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27 I will spend far more time on this below, and ask the reader’s patience with this gloss of an enormous 
topic. 
do with our information (see Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, & Rich, 2001). As we investigate the 
processes by which cues are constructed, interpreted, and taken, these influences will 
have the potential to shape cues and how people understand them. 
! Lupia and McCubbins’ actors know what their ideal positions are; they are static 
givens, not subject to change or alteration. But new information has the potential to 
change what we think, or at least this is what Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell argue (2002). 
By asking participants repeated questions while exposing them to more and more 
information and discussion, the authors find “on average, our participants emerge 
looking more like ideal citizens than they did beforehand” (2002: 484; emphasis in the 
original). Sturgis, Roberts, and Allum are less convinced that deliberative polling’s 
findings truly represent informational advantages of deliberation (2005), and Lupia is 
quite skeptical himself (2007a, 2007b). Lupia’s work suggests that people are not only 
unlikely to take the time to educate themselves, but that there is limited reason to do so 
because they can reach the same decisions with significantly less effort (1992: 398). 
Whether some version of the Athenian ideal is obtainable or not,28 these debates raise 
questions about the role of new information, about whether new or better cues can 
overcome potential bias towards existing ones. More information, even better 
information, doesn’t always mean we change our minds. As Sniderman and Theriault 
put it, “When citizens are able to hear opposing sides of a political argument, rather than 
falling into confusion or succumbing to uncertainty, or inner conflict, or muddle-
headedness, they are more likely ‘to go home,’ that is, to pick out the side of the issue 
that fits their general view of the matter” (1999: 23). Again, I seek to complicate the 
standard account of cue theory by directing attention towards the cultural processes that 
produce and replicate them, rather than at outcomes. 
! These debates about whether new, different information will change voters’ 
preferences, commitments, or behavior are related to more recent discussions about 
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28 Elsewhere, Ackerman and Fishkin suggest a national Deliberation Day, where citizens could gather to 
educate themselves on and debate contemporary issues (2004). Writing in a symposium on the idea in 
Legal Affairs, Lupia argues that education won’t make an enormous difference because citizens could 
reach the same endpoints with shortcuts, and could better use their time doing other things (2004). 
Posner chimes in to reject even Lupia’s heuristic approach as hopeless (2004). In his view, the American 
electorate is more or less irredeemably ignorant and we should just make our peace with it; neither cues 
nor one Deliberation Day a year will save us (2004; see also Luskin & Fishkin 2007)
the factors that distinguish high-quality cues and about the relationship between cues, 
ideological identity, and motivated cognition. Levendusky’s research suggests, for 
instance, that as party elites become more polarized, elite cues will be clearer and more 
easily distinguished, which in turn will make voter behavior more predictable (2009). 
Malka and Lekles (2010) find that that voters’ existing ideological identifications not only 
influence what cues they take, but can actually construct preferences on issues about 
which they know nothing (2010). Specifically, the authors discovered that when voters 
did not have pre-existing knowledge about farm subsidies, their party ideology and 
identity helped them determine what their preferences “should be.”
! Goren, Federico, and Kittleson (2009) plumb a different relationship between 
party identification and cues; their study found that parties can prime recipients to take 
cues along partisan lines by controlling the partisan identity of the source of the cue. 
Cues from more recognizably partisan sources are more likely to be interpreted in 
partisan fashion – which is to say they are more likely to be supported along party 
identification alone (806; see also Zaller 1992). However, the study also finds a 
relationship between party cues and preference formation: at least over the short term, 
party cues were able to move a voter’s preferences, not simply align votes with them 
(818). These studies advance a much deeper and more difficult question: “What is the 
direction of causality between beliefs and preferences?” (Kuklinski, et al, 2000: 812) Is 
what we want always a product of what we believe? Or can what we want turn around 
and change what we think? Lupia and McCubbins’ model assumes an actor’s 
preferences are stable and given rather than fluid, unsettled, sometimes fickle creatures 
of interactions with our social world and those who populate it. Our given beliefs lead to 
given preferences that are outside their model. But what if we construct our belief 
system to justify our pre-existing preferences? This would dramatically reduce the ability  
of new facts or information to change minds. “If people already know their policy 
opinions, why should they bother to consider the facts?” (Kuklinski, et al, 2000: 812)  
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! A recursive relationship between preferences and beliefs seems likely, or at least 
plausible.29 Peterson, Skov, Serrtizlew, and Ramsøy (forthcoming) argue that scholarly 
focus on the availability and reliability of cues has obscured inquiry into the 
psychological processes behind cue-taking. They posit that most literature has assumed 
that cues are heuristic tools that minimize voters’ cognitive effort. Their work, on the 
other hand, suggests that party cues may actually motivate voters to “invest cognitive 
efforts in defending pre-commitments... (e.g., by spending effort to produce convincing 
arguments for giving into the motivational pull of one’s [party] identification).” (4) Cues, 
in other words, can not only tell us what we should do given what we want, but tell us 
what we want and force us to expend cognitive effort to try to justify it. 
! Peterson, et al, offer an exciting expansion of the theory, and one that opens up 
inquiry into the sorts of social, cultural, and cognitive processes that affect not only what 
cues we take, but how we take them. They explore how cues actually construct what we 
believe and want (and how we justify those beliefs and desires). But what if we are 
wrong about how to get what we want, or even self-deceived about what we want? 
Particularly in situations where cultural practices or patterns encourage particular 
deceptions, cues may be marshaled in perpetuation of those deceptions. I will argue 
that in baseball, a cultural framework encourages particular forms of self-deception in 
which the social cue of agent use plays an integral role. 
! The role that agents play in fomenting players’ self-deceptions about their 
professional chances raises another interesting question about the relationship between 
cues and internal cognitive processes. Players, I suggest, are not cueing others with 
their agent use, but rather themselves; while the meaning of the cue is still socially 
constructed, it is often deployed for players’ internal benefit. Here, too, the reasons 
players find the cue-as-self-signal to be beneficial are interwoven with the pressures 
and patterns of baseball culture. There is rich interplay between baseball’s culture, the 
identities it prescribes, who players understand themselves as being and what they 
think they want, and how they “ought” to act to get it. Understanding this interplay helps 
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29 Lupia, with Druckman, has explored the world of preference formation, but does so from a cognitive 
science perspective that keeps the causal arrow firmly pointed from belief ---> preference, and still does 
not engage the possibilities opened up by social inflection of individual beliefs or preferences. 
Nonetheless, see Druckman & Lupia, 2000.
us to investigate how illicit agent use as a cue comes to exist, why players think it 
applies to them, the role in plays in their confidence and self-deceptions, and how their 
cultural rules channel them towards this cue rather than others.The cultural frames in 
which this cue operates construct its meaning, the goals for which it is deployed, and 
the social and psychological processes in which it is involved. 
! I think Gamson words it a bit strongly, but one of his questions does put a 
pleasantly fine point on it: “Is it really meaningful to talk about facts as if they are 
divorced from the larger frames and scenarios in which they are embedded?” (1998: 
1580) Kuklinski, et al, identify this as a problem that plagues researchers seeking to 
determine citizens’ familiarity with political facts: “Political facts are in large part 
politically determined, and the researcher often cannot identify precisely what the true 
and relevant facts are” (1998: 143). Regardless of whether it makes sense to talk about 
cues “divorced from the larger frames and scenarios” in which they are embedded,30 a 
lot can be done by taking the logic of cues as shortcuts, removing them from that 
constrained environment, and putting them somewhere where we needn’t immediately 
exclude any messy sociological questions that thrust themselves forward. The actors in 
Lupia and McCubbins may “live in a world where facts are true or false, clearly 
distinguishable from interpretations, and independent of the frames in which they are 
embedded” (Gamson, 1998: 1581), but cues don’t have to.
Legal Consciousness and Socio-Legal Cues
! For cues to guide us in complex situations, we need them to be of service to 
multivariate choices, such as the complicated path from amateur baseball player to 
professional, not just binary ones. Focusing on the processes of cue-taking rather than 
the outcomes means I needn’t look just to cues that result in the same outcome as 
exhaustive research, but simply for patterned behavior that is used as a shortcut. To put 
cue theory and legal consciousness into conversation, we need to remove these three 
ties that bind cues in Lupia and McCubbins’ model without doing undue violence to the 
underlying concept. These are not exactly the constraints that worry Gamson (he frets 
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30 Given Lupia and McCubbins’ aims, I’d say it makes perfect sense.
on a grander scale) but by removing these more basic schematic constraints, we can 
put cues back into the social and political “frames and scenarios” where Gamson would 
prefer to see them. 
! There’s nothing in the basic logic of a cue that requires the decision at hand to be 
between only two alternatives. That the decision-maker happens to be choosing 
between two possibilities is a basic assumption dictated by the problem that Lupia and 
McCubbins are trying to address. But the concepts of trustworthiness, knowledgeability, 
external forces, and “enlightenment” can apply equally well in situations where an actor 
is faced with a wide variety of options. Evidence shows that environmental stimuli can 
not only trigger desires, but activate complex behaviors, and even raise the utility of 
consumption (Laibson: 2001). In fact, Laibson also explains that environmental stimuli 
can do much to explain complicated human behavior that seems otherwise random; 
they condition, structure, and precipitate decisions in complex situations (2001: 
82).!
! Laibson imagines a dessert tray inducing a sugary order from a patron who had 
previously been dedicated to his diet (2001: 81), but it could just as easily be a friend 
saying, “I’ve eaten here before and you have to order the torte! I know you’re on a diet, 
but it’s light and delicious.” Such a friend would meet the conditions of persuasion 
(trustworthiness and knowledgeability) and would help us choose from among myriad 
dessert options. We can complicate the situation more, even while sticking with 
gustatory examples. Imagine how you might mold your behavior at a fancy dinner party 
where you were unfamiliar with the complicated etiquette. Faced with too many knives, 
forks, glasses, and assorted unknown paraphernalia, you would likely follow the lead of 
someone you assumed knew what they were doing. Outside fork first? You wash your 
fingers in this bowl of water with a lemon wheel? Verbal communication would be 
unnecessary; merely noting the behavioral cues from your dinner companions would 
enable you to successfully navigate the complexities of the formal table (and save you 
perhaps no small degree of embarrassment). 
! Proper manners seems a far cry from the facts that Lupia and McCubbins’ actors 
seek, but I think the two are closer than they appear. Appropriate dinner table behavior 
is a socially determined fact, and while some facts about the world are objective, many 
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are themselves socially or culturally framed or mitigated. Even stipulating that one policy  
position is, as a matter of fact, closer to a person’s preferences than another, those 
preferences are in the first place socially constituted in much the same way 
“appropriate” manners are. This is close to the critique Gamson articulates (1998), and 
that Kuklinski, et al (1998) are after when they write that many political facts are 
politically determined (1998: 143). 
! To say that a cue is something we use as a shortcut is helpful, but an incomplete 
articulation of exactly what a cue is – especially after removing Lupia and McCubbins’ 
analytical clarity. Some of how a cue comes to be a cue for a particular person will be 
more thoroughly analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4, but some explication here will be 
instructive. To begin, I want to distinguish two different categories: social cues and 
informational cues. Social cues are cultural markers that we use to situate ourselves 
and others within a cultural framework. They are hints, aspects of performed social 
identities that allow us to place the performer. To borrow an example from Bourdieu 
(one that will resurface in Chapter 3), attendance at the opera is indicative of a high 
social status. Opera has a particular set of meanings in a culture, and someone’s 
attendance at the opera is a shortcut by which others can make assumptions about 
status. Note that these assumptions may not necessarily be correct, but that we still 
believe that a person’s attendance at or enjoyment of the opera tells us something 
about their place in the social world. 
! To return to the dinner party, imagine arriving at a pre-dinner cocktail hour and 
endeavoring to distinguish guests from caterers. Carrying a tray would be a rather 
obvious hint, but more subtle cues of dress and manner would likely be sufficient to 
know from whom you could order a drink without embarrassment. They would enable 
you to situate fellow guests and waiters within the social context and would dictate what 
sorts of behavior toward them would or would not be appropriate, which is to say that 
you could not only fix them in the proper social place, but your proper relationship to or 
with them as well. Social cues, then, perform two analytically distinct functions. First, 
they are shortcuts by which we locate ourselves and others in a particular place within a 
social or cultural frame. In so doing, they also tell us who in the frame is relevantly like 
us and who is relevantly unlike us. At the cocktail party, you and other guests are alike 
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in ways relevant to the social discourse, while you and the waiters are relevantly un-
alike. 
! This grouping function provides a segue from social cues to informational cues. 
By informational cues, I mean something much closer to cues in the way that Lupia and 
McCubbins characterize them – shortcuts by which we can determine what decision or 
course of action is best for us to make or take. In multi-variable socio-legal scenarios, 
this will mean imitating the behavior of those we perceive to be similarly situated. By 
observing how similar others navigate complex situations with which we are unfamiliar, 
we can navigate them ourselves through mimicry. Note that this sets up social cues as 
prior to informational cues; social cues place us with or apart from others, which is 
required in order to know which others we can look to for informational cues. Chapters 3 
and 4 will deal with how social cues emerge as such, and how we go about determining 
who we are like and unlike within a cultural frame; Chapters 5 and 6 will tackle how 
cultural predispositions affect our receptivity to informational cues. 
! There are many social theories and theories of identity formation that could 
inform the ways that social cues emerge against and in relationship to other cultural 
markers, and many psychological constructs and phenomena that would be helpful in 
understanding how informational cues get molded and inflected by the culture that 
undergirds and surrounds them. Many of these will be examined in specific situations in 
the coming chapters, but this project’s central inquiry suggests a particular theoretical 
approach to supplement cue theory. Because I examine individuals’ relationships to a 
rule, the cultural influences that substantiate its widespread violation, and the replication 
of that norm despite costs to those who perpetuate it, legal consciousness is a natural 
framework for us to examine the ways in which a culture gives meaning to social cues 
and influences the interpretation of informational cues. 
! Organizational cultures construe and constitute legal meanings that reflect their 
interests and demands (Edelman 1992, 2005) and are themselves private legal systems 
that create meaning for their employees (Edelman & Suchman 1999). Fuller, Edelman, 
and Matusik note that “the words of law may take a strong meaning that produces 
serious substantive change in one organization while taking on a weak meaning that 
produces sham responses in another” (2000: 211). Even different social networks within 
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an organization can create different perceptions of organizational justice among 
employees, and even affect how those perceptions are transmitted (Umphress, et al 
2003). When the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra went on strike, the same information was 
received and interpreted very differently by the musicians than it was by the 
administrators; the differences in each group’s perceptions could be traced back to 
different feelings about the groups’ roles within the larger organization (Glynn 2000). 
Here, materialist and cultural perspectives on the relationship between law and 
organizations diverge. Materialist approaches, while acknowledging an organization’s 
power to influence the law through litigation,31 tend to view law as external to individuals 
and organizations – as something to which they react – with an understandable 
emphasis on incentives and the rational pursuit of organizational goals within a set of 
constraints. Compare this to a cultural view that emphasizes both the ways that law 
provides the institutional signs and signals that organizations internalize and the ways 
that organizational behavior determines what law is (Edelman 1992, 2005; Edelman & 
Suchman 1996). 
! What both approaches have in common is the notion that an organizational 
culture influences the way those within an organization perceive information, which is to 
say that it can determine what emerges as a cue within the organization. From here, it is 
an easy cognitive step to ask how these cultures structure individual participation within 
them. Law and rules are not just for lawyers, nor simply an influence on social relations 
and relationships, but to reiterate Silbey’s point, “conceptual categories and schema 
that help construct, compose, communicate, and interpret social relations” (Silbey 2005: 
327; see also Edelman & Suchman 1997). The durable predispositions that law helps 
create – legal consciousness – are products of law as culture, and influence how 
individuals approach and relate to law. Studying the phenomenon requires careful 
attention to how individuals and local cultures accept and inflect those categories and 
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31 See Edelman & Suchman 1997 for a helpful summary of materialist approaches. 
schema (Silbey 1992: 37; 2005: 327).32 Silbey, in the sociological tradition, calls for the 
study of legal consciousness to return to an explication of how legal structures and 
attitudes are reproduced despite the inequalities they create and perpetuate (2005: 
358). Legal consciousness as Silbey articulates it attempts to explain how an 
individual’s consciousness is not only produced by cultural structures, but is a form of 
participating in culture in a way that tends to reproduce it. 
! Attention to individuals’ relationships to the rules and norms that guide their 
participation in a culture provides a theoretical counterpoint to cue theory’s investigation 
of how individuals gather and process information when making decisions. A dialog 
between these two frameworks generates four questions around which I will structure 
my analysis. First, how does a culture construct rule-breaking as a social cue? By what 
processes does a particular sign or symbol attain the ability to stand in as a shortcut for 
social position? Second, how do individuals come to think of themselves as recipients of 
some cues rather than others? How do baseball players determine who is relevantly 
“like them” and who is not when determining whether or not breaking a rule is 
something they “should” do?
! Having examined how amateur baseball can help answer these two questions 
about the origin of social cues, we can turn to two questions about how cultural 
predispositions inflect how we receive informational cues. For one, how do baseball 
culture and identity affect how players interpret facts and signals about their relative 
positions? When we receive information, we do not consume it unfiltered; it is inflected 
by the situation in which we come across it, by our own prior beliefs and preferences, 
and by our self-identity. It is interpreted and used in light of the information we already 
(think we) have. Nor is it simply a matter of information being refracted through personal 
and cultural lenses; information can be channeled or blocked all together through the 
cultural roles that we and others inhabit. A fourth question, then: how do cultural roles 
close off and channel the flow of information and the accessibility of informational cues?
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32 Within the study of legal consciousness, too, different goals have led to different conclusions and 
agendas. Disparate findings as to whether Americans were litigious (e.g., Lieberman 1981) or not (Haltom 
and McCann 2004), or preferred to settle things on their own (Ellickson 1991), led to an emphasis on the 
production of law and legal process, rather than – as Silbey would prefer – the (re)production of legal 
ideologies (2005: 341).
! These four questions, each a product of the creative tension between cue theory 
and legal consciousness, form the backbones of the four chapters in which I use 
amateur baseball as a case study to try to leverage some answers. Each question, 
though, comes with its own array of background literature warranting more elaboration. 
How Does a Cue Become a Cue?
! Cues emerge from the dizzying background of signs, symbols, and other 
information as signposts for particular actors. Stellar navigation requires one to find a 
star and compare it to other known points in order to strike off confidently in directions 
unknown without needing comprehensive knowledge of what else might be on the map. 
We use cues to find our way through unknown legal, political, and social spaces, and, 
just like stars, we need to know where a cue is in relation to its surroundings before we 
can use it to navigate. But how does a particular cue become a cue? Various strands of 
socio-legal literature suggest different approaches for behavior that becomes “typical” in 
a culture or subculture, but each leaves different stones unturned. Ellickson gives an 
account of how a behavior might emerge and come to be associated with a particular 
group or identity (1991), but does not (as Bourdieu does) tell a story of how that group’s 
behavior might be taken up or aspired to by others (1968, 1977, 1984). Bourdieu’s 
cultural analysis gives us a method by which elite habits come to be reproduced through 
the aspirational behavior of others. Finally, heuristics literature in political science shows 
how social and political networks give meaning and texture to a cue; which is to say 
they make a cue a cue (Fuhse 2005; Calfano & Djupe 2009). They do not, however, 
tend to tie in accounts of how a cue originates or comes to be reproduced. Cue theory 
and legal consciousness taken together allow us to use these varied literatures to 
construct a narrative of how a behavior emerges in culture and forms the associations 
necessary to substantiate a social cue, and how it is replicated by virtue of its place in 
that culture. 
! Ellickson gives a lucid and plausible account of how a particular norm might 
originate. He tells a story of Shasta County cattle ranchers who believe that they incur 
liability for motor vehicle accidents with their loose cattle only when their property is 
fenced; “The motorist buys the cow on the open range” (1991: 83-103). In fact, the 
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formal law resolves claims according to simple negligence principles, rather than the 
strict liability that ranchers believe legally applies (1991: 88). Ellickson hypothesizes that 
“members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to 
maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one 
another” (1991: 167). For the ranchers, there had long been no economic incentive to 
fence in cattle. It was expensive, and there was little risk of accident in the early, empty 
days of northern California. At such a time, it would have made little economic sense to   
pay the possible exorbitant costs of fencing cattle with such limited risk, so a norm 
arose favoring different liability determination. Ellickson’s insight is that in small systems 
where communication isn’t overly costly, informal but complex systems of norms 
emerge to maximize the welfare of the group even if – perhaps especially if – they 
contravene the “official” rules that purport to govern those groups.
! The economic situation has changed, and the law has changed too, but the 
ranchers’ beliefs have proven quite sticky despite consistent judicial opinions that ought 
to undermine them; ranchers seem to think that legal professionals are the ones getting 
it wrong (Ellickson 1991: 103). As the norm assimilated into the set of cultural patterns 
that constitute rancher practice and identity, it seems to have propagated and 
reproduced itself over the years. Ranchers come to their beliefs about accident liability 
on the open range not through consultation with official sources or through discussion 
with legal experts or insurance adjusters. Their source of information is the set of 
cultural beliefs and practices that constitute traditionalist ranching, including the belief 
that a rancher who does not fence in his cattle does not incur liability for accidents with 
motorists, or damage done to crops. Counterintuitive as it might seem now, or to 
outsiders, Ellickson theorizes that when the norm developed in frontier culture, there 
was little risk to the few crops grown in the area, and motorists were few and far 
between (1991: 186-88). 
! Any set of cultural structures, whether for ranchers or baseball players, might be 
described as Bourdieu does his concept of habitus: “systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to act as structuring structures” (1977: 
72). Methodological and disciplinary boundaries aside, behind Bourdieu’s distinctive 
phraseology lies a helpful extension of Ellickson’s insight, and cues and cue theory are 
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a helpful pivot point between the two. The markers of elite behavior come to provide the 
standard by which behavior is structured more broadly. The “pure gaze,” for example, is 
the aesthetic elite’s learned practice of subconsciously deciphering a piece of art’s 
cultural code (1984: 3-4, 31). Only when the cultural context that produced a work of art 
is congruent with the code as understood by the aesthetic observer can the act of de-
coding art be done effortlessly and “naturally” (Bourdieu 1968: 510, 589).
! The ability to participate in haute culture depends on an individual’s ability to 
appropriately pick up on and display cues about art’s position in a cultural matrix, and 
about the participant’s position as well. An intellectual’s ability to effortlessly join a 
discussion of Goya’s work depends on her ability to instantaneously situate Goya 
appropriately in social space – here, his name or the name of one of his paintings 
playing the role of a cue – and to say the right things and react in the right ways. There 
are degrees; it is easier to fake enjoyment of opera than knowledge of opera. One 
requires enough money to buy tickets and dress appropriately (and at least enough 
cultural knowledge to know how to do that; see Bourdieu 1984: 272); the other requires 
some degree of actual cultural fluency.33 These behaviors become affiliated with elite 
cultural status and are reproduced through aspirational behavior by others. That a 
certain person or class of persons acts in a particular way already tells an observer 
something about that behavior. Both individual and group identities (elite and otherwise) 
are inextricably intertwined with what behavior tells others about the actor.
! Cues depend on the cultural matrices that surround them for their meaning, and 
for their reproduction. Though advocates of heuristic approaches to political behavior 
argue about the efficacy of cues, they tend not to connect them to patterns of social 
hierarchy and reproduction, which influence what becomes a cue and can help explain 
a cue’s propagation even by those it might appear to harm. Nonetheless, cue theory 
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33 The “pure gaze” may be impossible to imitate, but other aspirational behaviors are not. Veblen first 
isolated the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption to display one’s wealth (1899), while Bagwell and 
Bernheim have more recently found that purchasing ostentatiously expensive goods creates more 
customer satisfaction than lower-priced but otherwise identical goods (1996). This satisfaction surely 
comes from the perception that one cements one’s status through an expensive purchase, but the 
psychic value is embedded in a social context where the purchases of the rich elite constitute and cement 
the behavior to which others aspire. Consider, too, Atukeren and Seçken’s attempt to statistically quantify 
the psychic benefits of owning fine art (2007). 
does offer examples of cultures and subcultures providing meaning for a cue. It’s been 
argued since 1952 that voters can use party identification as a proxy (Berelson 1952), 
but even simple partisan cues can be understood only in the context of preexisting 
partisan positions, values, and stereotypes. Nelson and Garst find that voters are less 
likely to use political statements as cues when they cut against the speaker’s assumed 
political positions: speeches on individualism are more readily accepted when given by 
Republicans than Democrats, the reverse being true for speeches on egalitarianism 
(2005: 510).34 Arceneaux’s experiment finds that while candidates are punished by their 
partisans for stepping off the party line on a high salience issue (abortion), they were 
not when it was an issue less firmly identified with partisan politics (federalism) (2008: 
152). The background assumptions and stereotypes about Republicans and Democrats 
are what give meaning to the political cues we use.
! Commonly held signs and symbols give meaning in smaller social or political 
networks as well. Calfano and Djupe show that Republican candidates use phrases that 
signal particular values to evangelical Christians without impacting others (2009). A 
statement like, “There is power, wonder-working power, in the goodness and idealism 
and faith of the American people”35 draws on biblical passages and hymns common to 
evangelical Christians and loaded with connections to GOP politics. However, 
understanding those references and their political overtones requires familiarity with the 
culture of evangelical Christianity. The cultural context in which the utterance is heard 
determines whether it is taken as a proxy for a candidate’s religious-political affinities or 
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34 See also Druckman, et al, 2010, on a frame’s general ability to mitigate the power of a cue. 
35 Calfano and Djupe take their coded statements from Kuo 2006. 
not.36 What one person says is “shaped by symbols, scripts, and schemata” available 
within a subculture (Fuhse 2009: 67).37 
! Ellickson gives an account of how an instrumental rule-breaking behavior might 
arise and become embedded in a small group, but cannot explain how that behavior 
might reproduce itself outside of a group for which it was intended. Conversely, 
Bourdieu tells a story about how elite and/or hegemonic practices and ideologies come 
to be reproduced by both elites and by others, but does not analytically connect such 
reproduction to the origins of behaviors or ideologies. Various empirical attempts in cue 
theory itself show how symbols in a particular culture – evangelical Christianity, for 
example – give meaning to the cues that emerge within it and illustrate some of the 
ways that legal or political consciousness might, as Silbey theorizes, help participate in 
constructing and reproducing “meaning-making.” They have not, however, connected 
those meanings to the ways that a culture either creates or reproduces a cue. 
! My empirical investigation and analysis of amateur baseball will use the 
conceptual foundations of cue theory to connect these literatures and to fill in a few of 
the gaps between them. I will show how agent use could have emerged as an 
instrumental economic behavior and subsequently become culturally attached to elite 
status. Once part of the cultural matrix, agent use becomes a social cue, a shortcut 
signifying things about players who have agents, and the behavior is reproduced by 
those outside the group for which it was intended (and for whom it serves no economic 
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36 Turner takes it a step further, showing that stories from CNN and FoxNews are taken as partisan cues 
(liberal for the former, conservative the latter) “irrespective of the actual content of the stories” (2007: 455; 
emphasis added). The surrounding signals, stereotypes, and assumptions that themselves serve as cues 
not only create the environment that gives the content possible political meaning, but they give particular 
meaning to the content regardless of what that content is. A CNN story recounting a decrease in attacks 
against American troops against Iraq but an uptick in their sophistication, for example, was perceived as 
liberally slanted when attributed to CNN, and conservatively slanted when attributed to FoxNews.
37 Bartholow and Heinz give a somewhat more playful example of such “symbols, scripts, and schemata,” 
showing that the “association between alcohol and aggression is automatically activated upon exposure 
to alcohol-related images, and that activation of this link has consequences for social perception;” 
behavior is more likely to be considered aggressive or licentious if there are alcohol-related cues present 
(2006: 35). Other contextual assumptions create other social cues: we use our perceptions of customer 
service quality as a cue for the risk of investing with a company (Chen & Chang 2005); toddlers use cues 
from others to more readily decipher the semi-stable framework of language (Hall, et al 2003: 1557); ads 
comparing a product to a well-known brand are more effective than comparisons to lesser-known brands 
because well-known brands function as cues for more people (Grewal, et al, 1997; see also Roggeveen, 
Grewal, & Gotlieb 2006). 
purpose). Though players are not public about their relationships with agents while they 
are still in college, once out of college they no longer have any reason to hide their 
formerly illicit agreements. Elite players – those taken in the first few rounds – are the 
most vocal, often having their agents make announcements about their contract 
agreements. So while current players remain secretive about their relationship with 
agents, former players cement agents as elite accoutrements. As baseball players learn 
what it means to be a baseball player, and especially what it means to be an elite 
baseball player, they come to know the behaviors and markers of that status. Agent use 
takes a place alongside the habitual use of black athletic socks, the ubiquity of chewing 
tobacco, and imitation of Albert Pujols’ batting stance as learned behavior marking elite 
identity. Further, it is not merely elite status that perpetuates the use of agents year to 
year; the aspiration to elite identity is a powerful cultural force as well. 
! The story to this point shows how a social cue can emerge and become part of 
the way individuals make sense of the cultural space around them, but will not yet have 
explained why baseball players who see neither monetary returns nor publicity 
advantages from having an agent (recall that such information is rarely spoken about) 
would choose to participate in the reproduction of a social cue. To better understand 
how these social cues not only help them make sense of the culture, but to participate in 
it, we need a story of how people come to understand themselves as proper recipients 
of particular social cues. 
How Do We Know When a Cue Applies to People “Like Us”?
! There are few limits on what could become a cue – if, indeed, there are any. But 
a constitutive element of a social cue is a place in the social framework from which 
individuals can draw reliable inferences about the roles they and others are to play. As a 
behavior becomes standard, as a practice becomes a pattern, it comes to have 
particular social meanings. We can learn about our social place through observation of 
those who we deem to be “like us” in the relevant ways. But questions about how we 
group ourselves with others or how we distinguish ourselves from others presuppose 
answers about how we conceptualize our identities. Determining who we think is like us 
requires some account of who we think we are. 
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! Cue theory imagines given, stable preferences and beliefs. But what if the 
identities those preferences and beliefs help to constitute influence what cues we think 
apply to us and how we interpret them? Our identities are a crucial component of cue-
taking: who we find trustworthy, whose preferences we accept as proxies for our own, 
and what we find persuasive are all impacted by who we think of ourselves as being. 
Legal consciousness and its relationship with narrative identity theory can provide the 
background that explains identity’s effect on cue-taking. On the other hand, cue theory 
can provide some explanation as to how identity facilitates the reproduction of social 
structures. When we make decisions that perpetuate social cues, it is in part because 
taking and acting upon social cues reproduces the social framework that produced 
them. 
! Cue theory at least gestures at the ways identity provides a backdrop against 
which cues are taken. “Strongly held affective predispositions are triggered 
automatically by attitude objects with relevant symbolic meaning” (Sears 2001: 30). In 
other words, cues, which have symbolic meaning garnered from cultural patterns in 
which they are embedded, are most salient when they trigger the facets of our identity 
we hold close. This process can be either conscious or subconscious. McAdam and 
Paulsen conclude that “prior ties would appear to encourage activism only when they 
(a) reinforce the potential recruit’s identification with a particular identity and (b) help to 
establish a strong linkage between that identity and the movement in question” (1993: 
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663).38 The suggestion would be that actively fostering connections to recruit’s sense of 
identity would amplify an organization’s ability to establish a new activist.39 
! Rankin finds that “symbolic predispositions of national identity provide long-
standing, stable, and accessible attitudes” that uninformed citizens use to formulate 
opinions on trade policy (2001: 372; emphasis added). Adherence to traditional 
American values of free markets provide shortcuts for some who end up advocating free 
trade, while other symbols of American nationalism direct voters to more protectionist 
positions (2001: 370). These shortcuts cut across party and take the place of deep 
engagement with economic argumentation and analysis; they formulate one’s economic 
opinions. But though work like Rankin’s goes some distance towards acknowledging the 
relationship between cues and preferences, it still does not address the question of how 
a person came to identify as “American enough” to choose to make use of cues about 
economic nationalism. 
! Social identity theory focuses instead on the impact of local culture on identity 
formation. Individuals inevitably come to perceive themselves as psychologically 
intertwined with a group and internalize that group’s goals, norms, and rules (Tajfel 
1978; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Stets & Burke 2000; Hogg & Vaughan 2002). Our social 
identities “represent the internalization of the rules, expectations, and norms associated 
with specific social rules as aspects of the individual self” (Brewer 2001: 117). In this 
school of thought, we do not so much insert ourselves as we are inserted into a 
predetermined social system; our position is defined relative to others in it and to the 
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38 McCann’s exposition of the pay equity movement is grounded in the theoretical recognition of “the 
ongoing, dynamic process of constructing one’s understandings of, and relationship to, the social world 
through use of legal conventions and discourses” (1994: 7). Rights discourses provide the legal resources 
with which movements advance or even constitute their cases, but identity is wrapped up in the 
intersection of the pay equity movement and feminist movements. The changing discourse of “equal pay 
for equal work” found a natural ally in existing feminist groups, and appealing to that identity led to 
important partnerships between the two (McCann 1994: 120-21). Individuals who consider themselves 
feminists have a relationship with feminist organizations, which themselves intersect with a new set of 
norms and symbols surrounding pay equity. How that interplay develops will be determined in part by the 
self-identities of the organizations’ members, organizational patterns and identity, and the patterns that 
guide the relationships between the two.
39 Compare this to Valentino, Hutchings, and White’s finding that reinforcing negative racial stereotypes 
heightens the role of racial attitudes, unless the receiver becomes aware of the cue being used, in which 
case the effect is suppressed (2002: 88). 
various cues in that system. It was not by coincidence that all of the musicians 
considered music to be the paramount task of the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra (as 
opposed to making money or attracting patrons). Their self-definitions as musicians 
meant the internalization of a musician’s values, goals, and practices (Glynn 2000). 
! The cultural landscapes that give cues their meaning help us make sense of the 
world around us by letting us partake of prefabricated norms and patterns inherent in 
our interactions with others, especially others with whom we identify. Whether 
Foucault’s seventeenth-century soldier who modeled himself with signs of strength and 
courage – “lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders,” as 
Foucault quotes Montgommery – or the eighteenth-century version that is molded 
through the manipulation of a docile body, the identity of an individual soldier is (at least 
partly) constituted through pre-existing physical and mental markers imposed on him by 
martial culture (Foucault 1978: 135-36). 
! Some of the sociological literature on gangs utilizes the same imagery of 
imposed or given identities. “A youth’s self-identity... is inspired and affirmed by 
commitment to and identification with the gang... one learns what to think about one’s 
self and how to act – and the group itself and the roles that group members represent 
provide the person with the ingredients for self-identification” (Vigil 1988: 424). The gang 
provides markers for an individual’s identity, and both that identity and the meaning of 
those markers are reinforced by their performance: “Roles provided by the gang, and 
the symbols and rituals by which these roles are enacted, reinforce this identity” (Vigil 
1988: 424). Garot argues that gang membership is both articulated in and reinforced by 
patterns of dress (2010: 64-65), that the symbols of gangs as social resources are 
reinforced by how others perceive membership (117-18) and that certain acts of 
violence not only constitute membership but can summon forth one’s identity as a gang 
member (159-60). Cultural structures bring to the surface particular facets of identity, 
reinforcing those aspects in the process.
! The language of prefabrication, imposition, and “given” identities emphasizes the 
culture’s power to enforce certain kinds of identities. It echoes the Althusserian concept 
of “calling forth” subjects of a particular ideology and “hailing” them as such (Althusser 
2001). A subject is “hailed” as one appropriate to a particular ideology by invoking the 
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ideology’s signs and signals that constructed the subject’s identity in the first place. 
Althusser’s claim “is not that the category of the subject is affected – or acted on – by 
ideology, or that it is just like ideology, but rather that it is constitutive of ideology: to the 
extent that there is a subject (and there always is), it exists as such through 
ideology” (Wingrove 1999: 877). The interpellation of the subject exists through the 
socio-linguistic practices that are “the means and mode of subject formation” (Wingrove 
1999: 872). But focusing on prefabricated and given identities limits our ability to wonder 
about and analyze the ways that individuals build and make their own. Political 
heuristics may envision culture as a backdrop against which an individual’s identity 
assigns values and beliefs, but the sociological literature swings the pendulum far in the 
other direction. At its most extreme (Althusser, perhaps) individuals’ identities exist only 
through ideologies. Even in less extreme forms, the literature emphasizes culture’s 
power to mold individual identities in pre-structured, prefabricated ways. 
! Narrative identity theory accepts instead a starting premise that “fashioning 
oneself and being fashioned by cultural institutions – family, religion, state – [are] 
inseparably intertwined” (Greenblatt 1980: 256).40 In short, we assemble stories about 
ourselves that tell who we are by incorporating the signs and symbols of the structures 
that surround us. As Schiffrin styles it: “The language used in narrative creates a story 
world in which both agentive and epistemic displays of self can position a story teller in 
a matrix of actions and beliefs that together display a social identity” (1996: 198). Bruner 
adds that narrative is itself an ordering principle: “We organize our experience and our 
memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative – stories, excuses, myths, 
reasons for doing and not doing, and so on” (1991: 4). It is the process by which we 
fold, bend, and refract our disparate and inconsistent experiences to fit them together 
into something we perceive to be a comprehensible whole. “We impose bold and 
imaginative metastructures on local details to achieve coherence” (Bruner 1996: 164; 
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40 Greenblatt’s take on literary history theorizes that, even among the great literary figures of early-
modern English, there may not have been moments of “unfettered subjectivity,” but that an individual 
could fashion his or her own identity through individual choices, if only from “among possibilities whose 
range was strictly delineated by the social and ideological system in force” (Greenblatt 1980: 256). He 
argues, in short, that culture gives us an overabundance of tools for constructing our self-identities, and 
we choose from among those possibilities. The sixteenth-century figures Greenblatt examines did this – 
or so he argues – through stories: letters, memoirs, and works of fiction.
see also Bruner 1990: 99-138; Bruner 1998). Rosenwald and Ochberg echo this when 
they say that “the storyteller says, ‘This person I am today is who I have been years 
becoming’” (1992: 9).
! Legal consciousness seeks to explain identity’s influence on how people address 
themselves towards the law, legality, and legal structures, so it makes sense that it has 
incorporated narrative identity theory. Engel and Munger take as their task “tracing the 
emergence of identity and orientation toward law from experiences in early childhood, 
through adolescence and continuing...” (2003: 12). Sara Lane’s childhood experiences 
integrating her into able-bodied culture help define her relationship to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act as a tool for her pursuit of her “deserved” equality, while Rick 
Evans’ story is dominated by limitations and constraints he feels are unalterable, even 
with the ADA (48-58).
! Ewick and Silbey’s methodology and theoretical frame reflect the same 
ascendence of narrative as identity construction: “We use the language of stories and 
narrative to describe what we found... we adopted the concept of narrative because 
people tend to explain their actions to themselves and to others through stories” (1998: 
29). Their story about Rita Michaels, a devout Catholic whose beliefs about the world 
and her place in it are structured by her faith, her family, and her community, is a perfect 
example of the work that narrative can do to construct not only identity but legal 
consciousness (Ewick & Silbey 1998: 60-77). For Rita, marriage was an exclusively 
private affair, and her relevant moral universe was constituted by her friends and 
neighbors. These beliefs and identities (privacy, community, Catholic, mother, friend, 
neighbor, etc.) deeply influenced the way that Rita conceptualized the role of law in her 
life. As the authors put it, “To Rita, her affairs were immediate, subjective, and trivial in 
contrast to what she described as the permanent, remote, and solemn public realm of 
law and legality” (Ewick & Silbey 1998: 77). Notably, only when her divorce threatened 
to fracture the identities she had built did she resort to the world of law for solutions. 
! Both sets of authors seek to explain why the law means different things to 
different people, even if those people are similarly situated, and even though they are 
“equal before the law.” Both use narrative identity as a way to argue that individual 
agency certainly affects how we think about law and rules, but that we select actions 
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from among those made culturally available to us. They track between legal 
consciousness as an individual phenomenon and as a product of cultural structures, 
between identity as an independent variable and identity as a pure product of our 
environment, settling somewhere in the middle where our consciousness is a form of 
participation in both the construction of our own identity and the reproduction of cultural 
forms.
! Narrative identity is a helpful pivot point between legal consciousness and cue 
theory, providing a way to tie the shifting preferences and beliefs that constitute identity 
both to the reproduction of extent social structures and the ways that we determine 
which social and informational cues are appropriate for us. Over the course of their 
lives, Cape Cod Baseball players have learned what behaviors are appropriate for 
“people like them” by assimilating cultural practices into the stories they tell about who 
they are (thereby reproducing them). When asked when they started playing, they say 
things like, “I was hitting off a tee as soon as I could hold a bat,” or “I don’t know... when 
can you walk?”41 These stories stretch back to boyhood memories of Little League and 
of playing catch with their dads,42 and they stretch forward to an imagined future in 
professional baseball. These stories come not only to structure aspects of a player’s 
identity, but to shape his actions with an eye to an aspired to future. These learned 
behaviors and identities, in turn, influence which cues players think they ought to take, 
and which they ignore as applying to other people. Their identities as baseball players 
group them with a certain social population; who they think is like them affects what 
sorts of social cues they take – what sort of behaviors they choose to mimic. The stories 
they relate  about who they are tell them who their peers are or ought to be, and what 
shortcuts they can take to act like them. 
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41 A Freudian interpretation would maintain that as young adults, these players are projecting an “ego 
ideal”; a desire to emulate the adulated youth we remember ourselves as leads us to try to return to this 
identity for the world to keep adoring us (or to start to do so again) (Freud 1914; Fine 1986; Brown 2007).
42 If there is a more primordial image in 20th-century American (male) mytho-poetics than a boy playing 
catch with his dad, it certainly escapes me. 
How Can Self-Deception Change How We Interpret Informational Cues?
! How is it that information available to players fails to influence their behavior in 
ways we would expect? When a player knows full well that he is a 30th-round pick and 
that an agent will do him no good, we would anticipate him not working with an agent 
given the costs. Is agent use nothing more than costly self-deception? While it would be 
overly simplistic to conclude something so reductive, self-deception does have the 
power to shape our ideas of who we think we are or can be, and therefore to influence 
and impact the types of cues we take. We do not consider information about ourselves, 
our type, our goals, and the cues that we think speak to us with fresh eyes; they are 
impacted by the individual, social, cultural, and political beliefs that we already hold. But 
how, exactly, do self-image and self-deception change how we perceive cues?
! Athletes sometimes foment their self-deceptions as a matter of intentional 
practice: “Someone who enters an important athletic competition may imagine herself 
dominating it... executing (in her mind) all the required tasks to the point of perfection 
may convince our competitor that an excellent performance is well within her reach 
even in the presence of undermining beliefs” (Lazar 1999: 285). Baseball players almost 
all say that when in the batter’s box or on the pitcher’s mound, they need to believe that 
they are better than the player they are facing (even – perhaps especially – in the face 
of overwhelming statistical evidence to the contrary). They say that in order to get a hit 
or a strikeout, you must believe that you can get one, no matter how obviously talented 
your opponent. Nor is willful self-deception limited to happenings on the diamond. 
Players’ aspirations to professional baseball are themselves crucial aspects of their 
identities. And what is true for their at-bats proves true for their aspirations: they fully 
believe that to make it to the next level, they must already believe that they belong 
there. One will never make it to the Cape, to the Minor Leagues, or to “The Show” (the 
Majors) unless one is committed to the belief that he will, regardless of what the 
evidence suggests. 
! Cue theory and other empirical political science have illustrated that confirmation 
bias and “motivated cognition” can play a role in how we process information; we tend 
to accept information that confirms what we think and are generally suspicious of 
information that tends to disconfirm our beliefs (Taber & Lodge 2006; Cowen 2005). 
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These empirical efforts, however, shy away from a theoretical explanation of how an 
individual arrives at beliefs that end up precluding further truth-seeking. Once again, 
narrative identity provides a backstory that supports our tendency to shy away from 
information that disrupts our existing belief structures; in authoring our own stories, we 
look to the type of life we wish to live, or the type of person we wish to be, and 
repackage information in ways that can substantiate our desires (Eakin 1999, 2008; 
Palmer & Champlin 1979). Given narrative identity’s ready link to legal consciousness, 
the ease with which we deceive ourselves in (and with) our own stories carries 
significant import for those who wish to use legal consciousness to explain the 
reproduction of hegemonic legal structures (Silbey 1992, 2005). In fact, self-deception 
can be crucial to the reproduction of social patterns by those they seem to mis-serve; 
the gang members in Venkatesh’s work replicate the structures in which they live at 
least in part because they are self-deceived about their chances of advancing (2006, 
2008; Jay-Z 2010: 75). But the ethnographic and theoretical work is disconnected from 
the concrete ways that self-deception encourages actors to process information. 
Examining self-deception in the context of the relationship between cues and identity 
can help explain why we take some cues and not others, and how new information can 
not only fail to shake established beliefs but even be re-appropriated and marshaled in 
their defense. 
! We often find ways to cram new information – even potentially disruptive 
information – into our pre-existing narratives. Recall Sniderman and Theriault’s finding 
that people confronted by irreconcilable sets of information tend to “go home,” to choose 
the interpretation that better fits with existing beliefs (1999, 2004). We accept, for 
instance, information that confirms our beliefs and hypotheses more or less 
unflinchingly, but when faced with evidence to the contrary, we seek out reasons to 
discredit the opinion or the source (Taber & Lodge 2006: 755). “People are often unable 
to escape the pull of their prior attitudes and beliefs, which guide the processing of new 
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information in predictable and sometimes insidious ways” (767).43 When exploring why 
even uninformed citizens often refuse to demur to experts, why “citizens are deliberately 
dismissive, stubborn, and irrational,” Cowen finds similarly: “People seek out evidence 
that is favorable to their point of view and neglect evidence that is unfavorable to their 
point of view” (2005: 437-38). Cowen pushes just a bit further to engage pride, an 
emotion inextricably bound up with self-esteem and self-concept: “When pride is 
involved, as is often the case in politics, individuals shy away from strict truth-seeking 
behavior” (2005: 444).44 
! However, as before, cue theory and related political science literature treats 
identity as a background factor rather than a fluid variable that is in dialog with the 
culture it helps an actor to interpret. When it concludes that we reinterpret or ignore 
information because of our prior beliefs, it leaves open questions about how we came to 
those beliefs and how we came to value them. This is, as we have seen, a question that 
narrative identity theory is well-equipped to address, and it readily incorporates 
practices of self-deception as well. Perhaps it is the role of imagination that so readily 
joins story, narrative, and fiction. With imagination, we are able not only to perceive 
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43 This can happen to presidents as readily as the common voter. Bill Clinton didn’t decide not to 
intervene in the former Yugoslavia because he had read Balkan Ghosts, Jervis surmises, but had read 
Balkan Ghosts because he was seeking out reasons not to intervene (2006: 658). Reagan, a 
contemporary noted, could “convince himself that the truth is what he wants it to be”; even persuading 
himself that he wasn’t trading arms for hostages (Nofziger 1992: 45; Jervis 2006: 659). Nor is it simply a 
matter for domestic politics. Acharya argues that sensitivity to how we reinterpret and repackage 
information is crucial to building transnational norms: recipients of new norms can tweak “the shape and 
content (or both) of foreign ideas to make it more congruent with the recipient’s prior beliefs and 
practices” (2004: 245).
44 In Newman’s work on motivated cognition, he writes that “in plain language, discovering that one’s 
preconceptions might be wrong is cause for concern.” (1999: 60) Finding ourselves so concerned “causes 
an increase in the intensity of cognitive processing, and that extra processing can potentially turn up new 
evidence that is more congenial to one’s directional goals.” The fact that we more often than not find what 
we would rather find can be traced to the fact that “attitude-consistent knowledge is generally more 
cognitively accessible than knowledge inconsistent with one’s attitudes.” Why would such a phenomenon 
be so widespread? Are our identities so fragile or so contingent that we must carefully police the 
information that confronts them? Elga hypothesizes that “[unrealistically high] self-evaluations promote 
the sort of self-esteem and self-confidence that help people start projects and persist through 
difficulties” (2005: 117). Others have gone so far as to suggest that escapism and self-deception may be 
evolved traits that enable us to continue when rationality would seem to demand despair, retreat, or 
suicide (Longeway 1990; Trivers 2011).
things that have not happened yet (our potential futures) but to perceive and convince 
ourselves of things that are not true. 
! The obvious links between narrative, self-image, and the possibility of self-
deception give rise to questions about the veracity of the stories we tell about – and to – 
ourselves. As Palmer and Champlin have it, “The concept of mind, which autobiography 
considered as a literary genre involves, is one in which the possibility of self-deception 
is crucial” (1979: 64; see also Eakin 1999: 43).45 When we tell stories about ourselves, 
“We draw on the resources of the cultures we inhabit that specify what it means to be a 
man, a woman, a worker, a person in the settings where we live our lives” (Eakin 2008: 
22). These roles and settings are drawn around, in contrast to, and in reference to 
others who inhabit them. Anthony Kenny suggests that the questions we ask about who 
we truly are – “Do I really love her? Am I the kind of person who would betray a friend to 
his death to save my life?” (1988: 31) – cannot be answered by introspection, but only 
by through our interactions with others and the world around us. It is when we don’t like 
the answers provided by those interactions that self-deception becomes a crucial 
accoutrement. Audi argues that self-deceptions cause rationalization, but that 
rationalizations may in turn create and entrench self-deception (1988: 117-18). 
Rationalization is the spin we put on new information to fit it in our belief system. It is a 
conscious process, so it makes sense that self-deception need not be unraveled by a 
subject’s knowledge that he is biased, or reaching, or rationalizing (Newman 1999: 62). 
! Narrative identity and autobiographical theory have done well to acknowledge 
and analyze the role that fiction plays in our construction of identity, and those who, with 
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45 Consider an excerpt from Albert Speer’s autobiography (Speer was Hitler’s chief architect and Minister 
of Armaments and War Production): 
I did not want to know what was happening [at Auschwitz]. During those few seconds, while Hanke 
was warning me, the whole responsibility had become a reality... from that moment on, I was 
inescapably contaminated morally; from fear of discovering something which might have made me 
turn from my course, I had closed my eyes. This deliberate blindness outweighs whatever good I 
may have done or tried to do in the last period of the war (1970: 481). 
Or, as he later put it in an interview for Playboy, “If I didn’t see it, then it is because I didn’t want to see 
it” (Norden 1971). His later regrets, mea culpas, and supplication notwithstanding, how could Speer 
possibly blind himself to such atrocities? It is instructive, if not particularly satisfying, when Burrell and 
Hauerwas say that “his self-deception was correlative to his identity as he clung to the story of being 
Hitler’s apolitical architect” (1974: 108).
Silbey, would use consciousness and identity to explain how we interact with and 
reproduce legal structures would do well to incorporate it as well. This is especially true 
when the ideologies people use to build their identity encourage self-deception, and 
self-deception in turn aids in the reproduction of that ideology. An example from the 
sociology on gangs illustrates this quite well. Consider the low-level urban crack dealers 
who accept incredibly poor wages and almost unbelievably high risks of death46 in order 
to sell (Venkatesh 2006, 2008; popularized in Levitt and Dubner 2005). Venkatesh sees 
the structural problems that encourage young black men to enter the gang lifestyle, 
while Levitt and Dubner see an economic “tournament” with entry-level participants 
willing to take high risks and low payoffs for a shot at the jobs at the top of the pyramid 
(2005: 106-107).47 
! But none of the authors heed the fact that for this to work, participants must 
believe that they are the exceptions, that they are the ones who will beat overwhelming 
odds and make it to the top.48 As we look for explanations of how and why people 
reproduce practices that seem to harm them, self-deception can offer not just color and 
texture, but a concrete mechanism. Both the ways legal consciousness reproduces 
legal structures and the specific ways citizens perceive and interact with law can be 
enriched by closer examination of self-deception as a “durable predisposition” itself. It is 
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46 Levitt and Dubner note that the street-level Chicago crack dealer has a higher risk of death than a 
Texas death row inmate (2005: 105-106). 
47 Akerlof and Kranton take a different economic approach in Identity Economics, endeavoring to spell out 
the implications of an economic theory accepting – perhaps even built on – the utility (to use their term of 
art) an actor gets from actions consistent with his self-identity (2010). Whether our beliefs are rational or 
not, we like doing things that confirm them and dislike doing things that cause tension with them. Simple 
as the premise sounds, it has powerful effects. Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice found that when 
people’s goals of self-control become impossible to maintain, they didn’t readjust them but discarded 
them altogether, with sometimes disastrous results (relapsing to alcoholism, binge eating, and so on); 
actions that threaten our identity can have devastating psychological effects (1994). Benebou and Tirole 
confirm that what seem like little decisions snowball: “[people] see their own choices as indicative of ‘what 
kind of person’ they are, implying that lapses [in self-control] can have a severe adverse impact on future 
behavior” (2004: 850; see too Benebou & Tirole 2002).
48 It’s the former hustler who sees the roles that rationalization, self-deception, and willful blindness play: 
“The truth is that most kids on the corner aren’t making big money – especially if you break their income 
down to an hourly wage. But they’re getting rewarded in ways that go beyond dollars and cents. The kid 
on the streets is getting a shot at a dream. The dream is the he will be the one to make this hustling thing 
pay off in a big way. He sees the guy who gets rich and drives the nice car and thinks, yep, that’ll be me. 
He ignores the other stories going around, about dudes who get shot or beaten to death with bricks and 
chains” (Jay-Z 2010: 75). 
a specific means by which consciousness reproduces ideology, and for those more 
closely directed towards legal consciousness’s effects on the lived experience of law – 
Engel and Munger are a good example (2003) – self-deception can have a profound 
impact on a person’s relationship with law and rules.
! Put differently, it isn’t just that people learn who they (think) they are by 
arrogating cultural symbols into a personal narrative, but that they learn how to 
participate in a culture according to the culture’s own internal rules. The inclusion of 
particular cultural aspects into a concept of the self is a way of defining oneself on a 
culture’s terms, and situating oneself within it. We learn what is considered fair, what it 
means to “play by the rules,” and when exceptions to those rules may be made. The 
process of identity formation is one through which we learn how to be who we are 
supposed to be in a social framework, and also what the rules that constitute that 
framework are. At the macro level, we learn what justice is, what fairness is, what law is 
in part by defining ourselves in relationships to such concepts, and in part by 
assimilating into cultural frameworks that define them. 
! Close analysis of these players shows how confidence emerges as a cultural 
norm, and is itself assimilated into individuals’ identities. Accompanying confidence is 
self-deception and the reinterpretation of information to make it compatible with existing 
beliefs about one’s abilities and future. Failing to get a hit through the first seven games 
of a season isn’t – can’t be – evidence that a player isn’t up to snuff; it’s “just a slump.” 
The self-deception players practice makes them believe things that aren’t true and 
envision futures that won’t happen. Importantly, these culturally embedded practices 
cause the type of confirmation bias and motivated cognition that social science 
illustrates and are also a specific mechanism by which the reproduction of cultural 
norms occurs. The rampant violation of NCAA Bylaw 12.3.2.1 happens at least in part 
because baseball’s ideology produces self-deceptions that strongly encourage breaking 
it. Ideology produces both cues and self-deceptions, and self-deception provides a 
means by which the cues are reproduced. In short, deeply rooted cultural practices 
influence how players interpret informational cues available to them, which is to say, of 
course, it changes what those cues mean to those players. A bad week at the plate or 
on the mound isn’t an informational cue indicating a player’s comparative lack of talent 
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or prospects, but rather a cue triggering more work and more confidence-building to 
ensure the future that a player already imagines. And, significantly, confidence-building 
at a time when a player’s identity as an elite is under threat from the Cape’s relentless 
meritocracy often takes the form of an illicit agent. Players protect their identity from 
what threatens it through the transgression of a rule.
How Do Cultural Roles Channel and Block Informational Cues?
! Even acknowledging that the information we receive may be reinterpreted in light 
of our pre-existing preferences and beliefs, we do not exhaust the ways in which our 
identities and communities affect our relationships with cues; information is channeled 
to and away from us by our networks and the roles we play within them before we ever 
even get a chance to reinterpret it ourselves. But exactly how do cultural roles control 
the flow of information?
! Though some in political science have long suggested attention to roles as an 
explanation for political behavior (Searing 1991), roles have yet to be connected with 
cues, or fully extended to encompass identity formation as well as performance, or 
behaviors that are unperformed as well as those that are performed. Goffman’s analysis 
of the ways we perform our social identities provides a framework to connect the ways 
that our social networks provide aspects of those identities to the ways those identities 
and roles exclude cues and information (1959). Not only does Goffman’s frame allow 
easy connections to the reproduction of behavior and to the related concept of self-
deception, but it provides a logical starting point to discuss how learned roles require 
taking some cues while excluding others. Other sociological approaches to group 
identity in social networks give excellent color to the notion that we take elements of our 
social performances from the symbols provided by that social network, but these too fail 
to connect the phenomenon to cues, to relate the concept to the possibility of rule-
breaking, or to address the consequences of behaviors that go unperformed (Adler & 
Adler 1988; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Brewer 2001). Using cues to tie roles to behavior 
and then pairing them to explain why some cues get taken while others are ignored 
allows more elegant connections between roles, identity, behavior, and rule-breaking. 
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! Twenty years ago, Searing called for political scientists to pay more attention to 
the roles politicians play and the ways in which those roles affect their behavior (1991). 
Searing’s call was premised on the idea that politicians’ adherence to the expectations 
attached to their roles affected their behavior, and that by understanding their 
conceptions of those roles, we could better understand their political behavior (1991: 
1252). “Politicians use the term role to refer to the part one plays in an event or 
process... and conceive of these parts as ‘gestalts’ – patterns composed of sets of 
characteristics” (1253; emphasis in original). In other words, politicians use the roles 
they conceive of themselves as playing to bring order to the circumstances that 
surround them. In considering their behavior, politicians consider what is characteristic 
of someone who occupies their role: “They think about [roles] as patterns, as 
configurations of goals, attitudes, and behaviors that are characteristic of people in 
particular positions” (1253; emphasis in original). In other words, in their role as 
representative, they consider what appropriate goals, attitudes, and behaviors 
characterize someone like them. The social norms and expectations that govern what’s 
“appropriate” to someone in a particular role impact how that person thinks of 
themselves as they try to fit the mold. Ashforth, Kreiner, and Fugate speak similarly of 
roles and “role schema” that endow a particular identity with “goals, values, beliefs, 
norms, interaction styles, and time horizons” (2000: 486).
! Searing was almost certainly right that attention to the roles performed is a fruitful 
way to examine behavior in political settings and networks, but the insight can be 
pushed out in a number of directions. For one, we need not limit our wonderings and 
analysis to political situations; roles can play an explanatory role in legal settings as 
well. More concretely, the idea that one’s role influences one’s behavior opens a path to 
examine the ways that cue-constructed identities form roles in the first place. We take 
some cues and not others and, as we assimilate cues into a performed identity, that 
identity itself encourages taking some cues and the behaviors they suggest, while it 
pushes us to ignore other cues and their associated behaviors. What we need is a 
framework or theory that allows for a fuller understanding of the reciprocal relationship 
between cues, roles, identity, and behavior. 
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! In searching for a framework with which to begin, it makes sense to start with 
Goffman (1959). Goffman defines status/position as a “social place”: “It is a pattern of 
appropriate conduct, coherent, embellished, and well articulated” (1959: 75). Much like 
the ideologies that give rise to statuses in the first place, the performance of social 
identity’s outward facets gives an individual a specific place in a particular social 
setting.49 It inserts the actor into that space and gives him and others positions in it 
relative to each other. These may be self-fashioned and self-consciously performed, but 
as Goffman notes, the signs, signals, and symbols that individuals use to perform an 
identity are usually prefigured by the social structure (1959: 27; Goffman’s term is a 
“front”).
! There are a few points of contact between Goffman’s work and concepts I’ve 
already illustrated. For one, I examined ways in which a norm developed for one group 
of people – Ellickson’s Shasta County ranchers – might escape the bounds in which it 
was established and be accepted by others. Consider this as compared with the 
Shetland Islanders that Goffman discusses. Though most men on that island have long 
given up their forebears’ pastoral existence, they still dress as farmers would; their 
ancestors intentionally left their homes in some disrepair to deceive off-island tax 
collectors, and current residents continue to let their roofs age and the colors fade 
despite the fact that tax collection no longer follows that paradigm (Goffman 1959: 39). 
Goffman talks about self-deception, too: the possibility that a social performer might 
come to be taken in – self-deceived – by his or her own performance. When a person 
“comes to be performer and observer of the same show,” it must impact the way 
information is (re)interpreted or processed: “It will have been necessary for the 
individual in his performing capacity to conceal from himself in his audience capacity the 
discreditable fact that he had to learn about the performance... there will be things he 
knows, or has known, that he will not be able to tell himself” (1959: 80-81).
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49 The language of performance is given a somewhat more literal meaning in Bandelj’s ethnographic 
study of Method actors. In seeking to create an authentic character, Method actors not only create 
detailed life histories for their roles, but in doing so draw on the cultural markers that stake out the social 
space and social expectations for a person like the one they are trying to (re)create. By using culturally 
accepted symbols and signals, Method actors situate a character in social spaces common to the actor, 
the character, and the audience, and reproduce social norms and expectations in the process. See 
Bandelj 2003.
! Other sociological analyses add to these concepts the fact that our performances 
not only proceed with others – Goffman’s “teams” (1959: 77-105) – but that our public 
and private identities are defined in relation to others. “In selecting a particular role, the 
individual places him or herself into a defined position relative to others and to the social 
system as a whole” (Brewer 2001: 117). Or, as Ashforth and Mael put it, it’s as much 
about “homogeneity in attitudes and behavior” as it is “internalization of, and adherence 
to, group values and norms” (1989: 21). Rudolph’s ethnography of graduate students 
and faculty advisors suggests that the players on that stage construct an apprenticeship  
together through the shared use of available discourse strategies (1994). It comes as no 
surprise, then, to find that departments that take an active role in teaching students the 
behaviors and social norms appropriate to their roles make the socialization process 
notably easier (Weidman & Stein 2003). On film sets, crew members learn the 
appropriate behavior for someone in their professional role through a complex system of 
enthusiastic praise, light chastisement, and role-based joking (Bechky 2006). Lipsky’s 
popular ethnography of West Point cadets is an excellent example of individuals 
fashioning their identities from cultural bits and pieces that are more or less forced upon 
them over an intense four-year socialization process (2003). Adler and Adler provide an 
excellent (and for us, especially relevant) example. College basketball players in their 
ethnography assimilated the organizational identity the team forged for them into their 
own sense of self (much like the Cape Crusaders) (1988: 404). The basketball players’ 
public presence requires a certain performance: “any time they were in a public setting, 
they were likely to be approached by autograph seekers,” and they would “take on the 
role of the athlete” (1988: 408). While certainly a type of role-performance, the attention 
players got from being “called forth” as such played into their pride and self-identity 
(408). 
! While certainly a helpful signpost, Adler and Adler do not make several 
connections that are available here. They do not, for instance, analyze the role cues 
play in the process of identity construction they interrogate. They note that the team 
atmosphere provides player identity, but do not say how players pick up certain traits or 
behaviors. Cues can accomplish that goal; they are one way we learn how to perform 
the roles we wish to inhabit. Nor do Adler and Adler explain that our social identities are 
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not simply products of what we choose to perform; inevitably our roles command us not 
to perform in certain ways.50 It isn’t simply a matter of opportunity cost; being a gang 
member not only means speaking or dressing in a certain way, it is fundamentally 
incompatible, as Venkatesh learned, with other ways of speaking (in his case, like an 
academic; 2006). 
! A few concrete examples illustrate the potential costs of behaviors that go 
unperformed because they are inconsistent with one’s role. Beamish finds that a 
company-wide culture of containment, where no one’s role included crossing 
organizational boundaries, enabled a decades-long cover-up of an oil spill (Beamish 
2000; see also Aldrich & Herker (1977) on organizational boundaries). Similarly, Ellis’s 
history of Goldman Sachs traces that company’s recent troubles to a degradation of a 
long-standing organizational subculture valuing client relationships (2008). Heide and 
Wathne describe two kinds of business people – those who view things more 
economically and try simply to maximize outputs, and those who rely on a more 
personalized network of connections and relationships – and find that when they 
interact with each other, norms are broken, expectations are unmet, and success is 
rarely the result (2006). In each situation, people’s roles in an organization demand 
information not be shared, boundaries not be crossed, and ideals be abandoned. 
Identities come to favor some informational cues while excluding others in ways that 
reinforce those identities. And crucially, others who help perform those identities treat 
people in particular ways, and not in others. A president who fills his cabinet with “yes 
men” will not ask for reasons why he might be wrong, and cabinet members will not 
provide them.
! Just as baseball players come to think of confidence and a degree of self-
deception as proper manifestations of their identity as players, they believe that serious 
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50 Some work in political science examines how balkanization in American suburbs blocks the flow of 
information through unperformed acts: “To the extent that residential balkanization and other trends 
translate to a decline in communication across lines of political difference, one of its adverse effects may 
include fewer opportunities for people to learn about legitimate rationales for oppositional 
viewpoints” (Mutz 2002: 122; see also Eulau & Rothenberg 1986, and Anderson 2010). Who we 
associate with and the roles and norms that dictate those interactions can close off whole avenues of 
information. “Social context affect the supply of political views and information in a geographically 
(neighborhood) or socially (workplace) defined unit... as a result, the political views of our friends, 
neighbors, co-workers, and fellow travelers will reflect that supply” (McClurg 2006: 362).
consideration of the pros and cons associated with the business of baseball is improper 
behavior for someone like them. Similarly, though coaches have an enormous amount 
of information about a player’s professional odds and whether an agent would be of 
value to them, both players and coaches perform identities as coaches and players that 
abjure discussion of these pragmatic considerations. Just as a player’s identity and role 
exclude information about their value, coaches’ identities themselves block the 
transmission of such information to the players. A coach telling a player that because he 
will be a 30th-round pick he will not need an agent would serve as an informational cue 
in exactly the way Lupia and McCubbins characterize it: a player using a trustworthy 
and knowledgeable source as a shortcut for actually researching a topic himself. 
However, the roles that baseball commands coaches and players to play prevents this 
informational cue from arising in the first place. 
! Players turn to agents in part, I think, because it is genuinely helpful to have 
someone with whom to talk through the process of professionalization. This is not a 
material benefit, and one that would be hard but not impossible to capture in a cost-
benefit analysis. What is of most interest here, though, is wondering why players would 
pay someone for the ability to talk through the questions they are inevitably asked by 
scouts and agents after games when they could do so with their coaches or teammates 
for free. Part of the answer may be that these alternative possibilities are closed off; 
baseball culture forces players towards agents for the simple act of talking about 
something they were asked after a game. 
! Another way to think of this is to cast culture as preventing alternative ways of 
performing an identity. In most cases, a player could readily act as his own agent: there 
is little he must do, and he is often clearly sophisticated enough an actor to do it. This 
particular way of being a baseball player, however, is shut out by the dictates of 
baseball’s culture. Much like the effects of self-deception, however, the roles players 
take on perpetuate a system of norms that seems to harm those who replicate them. 
Here, a new, alternative system of norms that could possibly serve players better is 
suppressed through the expression of existing social roles. Even if better informational 
cues from coaches were available, the course of action they would suggest might still 
be cut off by cultural pressures. Again, it is worth hesitating to emphasize the 
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interconnections between behavior, self-image, and cultural constructions. Players may 
come to understand themselves as individuals who do not involve themselves much in 
the business of their sport, but this cannot be separated from the informal rules of their 
culture that determine what behaviors are appropriate and which are not. What 
individuals may process as aspects of their self-identity are also internalized norms 
dictating what it means to act properly. Acts of self-definition are simultaneously acts 
assimilating cultural norms and rules into oneself (or, alternatively, defining oneself in 
opposition to cultural norms). In any event, acts of self-definition cannot be separated 
from the culture that provides the language with which we do the defining. 
Cues, Consciousness, and Socio-Legal Navigation in Sharper Focus
! Each of these four questions offers a different pivot point between cue theory and 
legal consciousness. Theories of norm origins and transmissions offer a way to think 
about how a cue becomes a (social) cue in the first place by attaching itself to a 
particular social demographic and becoming embedded in a structured system of 
cultural meanings ripe for reproduction. Narrative identity theory explains how we can 
engage those social cues to situate ourselves in that structured system by using them to 
determine who else in it is relevantly similar; by using existing social cues to make such 
a determination, we also reproduce them when we try to imitate our perceived peers. 
Cultural norms like confidence and self-deception fundamentally and systematically 
alter how we receive informational cues, and the patterns of reception that emerge can 
cyclically reproduce the very norms that influenced the reception in the first place. 
Finally, cultural roles can channel and block both informational cues and alternative 
conceptions of an identity; when existing structures prevent acceptance of certain 
informational cues by suppressing potentially more efficient norms and practices, the 
existing structures ease their own reproduction. 
! Though these phenomena will be illustrated in the coming chapters with 
reference to the amateur baseball players in this particular case study, each of the four 
is far more broadly applicable, even to cases that might seem surprising. The nexus 
between norm origins and cultural identification can help explain why people decide to 
wear certain things – gang colors, for instance – even in situations where doing so 
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appears to be costly, or even seriously dangerous, and even in situations where the 
individual doesn’t belong to a gang.
! NCAA enforcement of Bylaw 12.3.2.1 is limited, and there are other instances we 
can explore where under-enforcement opens up opportunities for individuals to structure 
their identity – in part – by breaking a rule. How is it, outsiders may wonder, that so 
many apparently devout Catholics can consider themselves as such while essentially 
ignoring many dictates of the Church (particularly those orbiting abstinence and 
contraception) (Goldscheider & Mosher 1991)? One possible explanation emerges from 
the relationship between cue theory, narrative identity, and legal consciousness. The 
story that such practitioners tell about themselves both casts their Catholicism as a 
constitutive of identity and denies that their behaviors are contrary to that identity. 
Catholic ideology, in other words, is not in lockstep with Catholic doctrine, a fact that is 
reinforced by the under-enforcement of doctrinal rules. Such Catholics accept a 
consciousness through the Church that allows for behaviors that are technically 
prohibited, and situate themselves in a social space where they define themselves as 
“like” other Catholics who do not necessarily follow doctrine to the letter. Catholic 
consciousness does not require Catholic doctrine, and the performance of Catholic 
identity allows for behavior prohibited by doctrine. !
! As I have already noted, street-level crack dealers are unlikely to profit from their 
career path; they are far more likely to end up dead or in jail than to turn it into a 
lucrative practice. Explanations that suggest they either misperceive their costs and 
benefits, or are simply reproducing the norms that surround them are – while not 
incorrect – incomplete. To fully grasp the law-breaking in this scenario, one must take 
account of the common patterns of psychological self-deception that influence how they 
process informational cues that guide their behavior. 
! Finally, consider how physicians may choose between two treatments: one risky 
but potentially more effective, one safer but possibly less likely to fully address the 
medical issue (Kessler & McClellan 1996). The decision they make is one with 
malpractice ramifications, but rather than simply a cost-benefit analysis, let me suggest 
that the way they approach the question will be influenced by how the perceive their 
role. Doctors who consider their role to include risk-minimization (perhaps because they 
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play a role alongside many others in a large healthcare provider) would be more likely to 
take the “safe” route, while doctors who perform the role of “healer” might be more likely  
to make a risky but more effective decision. Either way – and it would vary widely by 
individual and hospital culture – the way doctors perceive their role in the social space 
of their office or hospital would inflect the way they approach medical/legal decisions. 
! Cue theory and legal consciousness sharpen each other. Cue theory helps legal 
consciousness deal with specific mechanisms that reproduce legal structures, while 
legal consciousness helps cue theory broaden its horizons by addressing some 
analytically prior considerations that can influence how we process political or legal 
information. Taken together, they provide the socio-legal scholar with an analytic toolbox 
with which to tackle questions about how individuals place themselves within a legal 
framework, gather information about legal decisions, and make the decisions necessary  
to navigate the space. A rich array of possibilities suggest themselves; I have offered 
some possibilities in the foregoing few pages, but I encourage readers to engage their 
own imaginations in looking for new ways that the stories we tell about ourselves, the 
lies and half-truths we use to substantiate those stories, and the roles they tell us to play  
in our social spaces dictate the shortcuts we take when we make decisions. 
! “Stealing signs,” for me, has taken on a double meaning. A batter on second 
base might be able to see a catcher call for a fastball, and telegraph to his teammate in 
the batter’s box what to expect. The batter will know what performance is coming before 
it even happens. And, by the time a player is on the Cape for summer league, he is 
already performing many of the aspects of an elite identity. We, then, can often predict 
what is coming next. We can read the signs these players give, both intentionally and 
unintentionally, and say that it is likely they will break NCAA rules by the time summer 
ends. We have stolen their signs, just as they will “steal” the elite marker of agent use 






Sampling, Subject Recruitment, Interviews, and Ethnography
! Garot (2010), Rios (2011), and Kirkland (2008a; 2008b) all seek to explicate the 
cultural logic behind a target population’s behavior by engaging a small subject pool in a 
representative institution or situation. Kirkland’s use of members of the National 
Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, Rios’s involvement with a sub-community in 
Oakland and Garot’s embedment in a school for at-risk youths gave each access to rich 
subject pools with particular commonalities in much the same way my time with the 
Cape Crusaders served my study. I emulate their methods in part because I too sought 
to uncover the logic behind a specific cultural pattern. So while my sample is far smaller 
than Ewick and Silbey’s (2003), not to mention Tyler’s (2006), it is somewhat larger than 
these three to which mine is better compared. 
! I interviewed all “full” members of the Cape Crusaders’ 2010 team, and several of 
the “temporary players” who filled in for those who were still involved in the NCAA 
playoffs when the Cape Season began: 26 players in all, nine of whom I interviewed a 
second time in the summer of 2011. I interviewed five Crusaders coaches – the three 
who coached in both 2010 and 2011 twice – and one former Crusaders coach. I 
interviewed 17 host parents, four league administrators, three agents, and three scouts, 
for 62 subjects for the whole study. 
! Interviews of players and coaches were conducted at the Crusaders field. Host 
parents and administrators, while sometimes interviewed before or after games, were 
more often interviewed at their homes or offices. Interviews were semi-structured and 
open-ended, lasting anywhere from 20 minutes to over two hours, and aiming to “open 
up spaces in which to listen for culturally mediated... communications” (Driver 2007; 
cited in Garot 2010), or what Rubin & Rubin would call “elaborated case study” and 
“ethnographic interpretation” (2005: 6-7). Interviews during the first summer investigated 
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both the dimensions of the empirical puzzle and the cultural meaning of an agent in the 
world of amateur baseball. “I avoided asking players about their direct involvement with 
agents early in the interview for two reasons: first, to avoid putting players on their guard 
by asking about their own illegal decisions and to prod the ways they characterized 
agent use in the culture at large.  This also enabled understanding the logic they 
deployed in describing the place of agent use outside their own particular experiences, 
much as Kirkland avoided direct mention of law and civil rights early in her interviews to 
see how the subjects deployed them “naturally” (2008a: 407).” Though the topics of the 
interviews remained largely static, I allowed them to deviate as subject responses led in 
new directions. (Rough interview scripts are available in Appendix A). In 2011, I asked 
questions more directly guided by the four conceptual questions that undergird the four 
chapters that follow, seeking to elucidate more concise logics at work behind the cultural 
place and status of an agent. Questions focused less on the practical questions of agent 
use and more on players’ narrative identities, the role of confidence, and the cultural 
interactions between players, scouts, coaches, and agents. 
! To supplement the data on cultural roles and interactions gathered in interviews, I 
spent time in summer 2011 gathering more traditionally ethnographic data. I attended 
team meetings and practices, sat with the team during games in either the dugout or the 
bullpen, and rode the team bus. I sought, here, to observe and later analyze the 
patterns of behavior in the spaces baseball marks out as belonging to its domain, just 
as Garot supplemented his interviews with field data gathered “hanging out in the 
classroom and on the yard, tutoring, playing basketball, playing games like chess and 
dominoes, and talking” with his interview subjects (2010: 16; see also Rios 2011: 8). 
Like Garot, I followed Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw’s dictate to “grasp what [subjects] 
experience as meaningful and important” (1995: 2). 
! Nonwhite minorities experience the law differently from whites (Nielsen 2000), 
though I know of no study on whether that social fact is true of a ruling body such as the 
NCAA. Ethnic diversity varied between the subgroups in my study. Players on the Cape 
Crusaders over-represent the West Coast (California in particular) but hail from every 
region in the country, encompass white, black, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander 
ethnic groups, and span the socio-economic spectrum. The coaches, however, are all 
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from the West Coast or Southwest, and all but one are white. Similarly, virtually all of the 
host parents and team and league administrators are Cape Cod natives, born and 
raised on the peninsula. They are all white, and virtually all middle- or upper-middle 
class, with an outlier or two on both ends of the spectrum. 
! Like Kirkland (2008a; 2008b), I cannot presume to know how this study might 
have differed had the coaching or host-parent demographic been more diverse. And, 
while there may well be variations in, say, narrative identity between upper-class and 
working-class players, or between white players and Hispanic players, or perhaps even 
regionally, the evidence I collected suggested that the dimensions of shared identity at 
issue in this work cut across ethnic and socio-economic divisions. In some ways, the 
baseball field is profoundly egalitarian in its ruthless meritocracy; your batting average is 
the same no matter your background, and you are often prejudged not by your social 
class or ethnicity, but by your statistics. Baseball ability is one dimension along which 
one would expect differences in norm acceptance, narrative identity, confidence, and 
social role to emerge, and the nature of a Cape Cod team ensured a broad sample 
including a future first-round pick, players who would not be drafted, and many in 
between. In that, the study not only captures a breadth of experiences, but mirrors the 
makeup of other teams in the league, former Crusaders squads, and teams in other 
elite leagues such as the Alaska League or the Northwoods League. 
! The few hundred players who play for the ten teams in the Cape Cod League are 
selected in an informal draft, though each club can “protect” players returning to the 
league from a previous summer, and informal understandings give some coaches the 
first chance at players from particular schools – one reason the Crusaders over-
represent the West. These mechanisms are methodologically significant because each 
team, while selected for baseball talent, is unlikely to be biased towards any particular 
race, ethnicity, religion, social class, intelligence, sexuality, etc., at least not any more 
than an average high-level baseball team. While there certainly may be broader social 
over- or under-representations among baseball as a whole, there is no reason to think 
that either my subject recruitment or resulting data are much inflected by further 
selection biases.
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! One variable that warrants further study is the effect an undergraduate institution 
can have on a player’s relationship with agents and the relevant NCAA rules. I made no 
efforts to determine whether players from well-known programs that produce many draft 
picks were more or less likely to have an agent than similarly ranked players from less 
well-known programs, but plausible theories can be advanced in either direction. It 
could be that experienced programs offer institutionalized ways to navigate the 
transition from amateur to professional without an agent. However, it could also be that 
elite programs perpetuate the conception of elite status in which an agent plays a role, 
and even provides easier access to agents through pre-existing relationships. More 




Leading Off: Welfarist Norms and the Porous Boundaries of “In-Crowds”
Putting Cues in Context
! Evangelicals who hear a politician say, “There is power, wonder-working power, 
in the goodness and idealism and faith of the American people” hear and understand 
the phrase differently than do those unfamiliar with evangelical subculture (Calfano & 
Djupe 2009; Kuo 2006). The phrase comes from the evangelical hymn, “There is Power 
in the Blood,”51 to which few outside evangelical culture have had exposure. We credit a 
political candidate’s assertions more readily when they line up with assumptions we 
base on the speaker’s party affiliation (Nelson & Garst 2005: 510), which is to say we 
find these statements on the whole more trustworthy and informative. And, for better or 
for worse, we assume things about a person based on whether he or she can discuss 
Verdi’s oeuvre (or properly use the word “oeuvre,” come to that). These social facts, at 
least as I have presented them, are not explicitly connected to the broader social 
patterns that give them their meaning; without more context they are “divorced from the 
larger frames and scenarios in which they are embedded” (Gamson 1998: 1581). But if 
a cue is a shortcut, a way to get information without doing the legwork otherwise 
required to get it, where then does that information come from? A social cue (a cultural 
marker that allows an actor to place herself or others in the appropriate social space) 
requires connections to other social markers for it to have any meaning at all. 
! For a cue to serve its purpose – for it to be a shortcut by which actors either fix 
themselves in a social space or determine what action befits people “like them” – it must 
be situated such that it can convey information about the context in which it sits. 
“Wonder-working power” must have relationships with other relevant religious and 
political signals and facts in order to convey the message that it does. These 
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51 Words and music by Lewis E. Jones, 1899. 
relationships to other pieces of cultural and political information are what constitute a 
cue as a cue; its place in the cultural matrix is what enables its use as a shortcut to 
other pieces of information. A clear account of how a cue becomes embedded in a 
matrix of cultural meanings is necessary if I am to show that cues can be mechanisms 
that reproduce existing social structures (and are therefore of use and interest to those 
seeking to explain that reproduction). 
! Lupia and McCubbins imagine a voter using another’s political opinion as a proxy 
for their own by virtue of perceived similarities. We wouldn’t think twice about a voter 
who copied an acquaintance’s stance on an abortion bill because he knew they were 
both staunch Democrats, but consider how many background assumptions are 
implicated in even what seems like an obvious case. For such a cue to function, our 
voter must place himself and his friend on a political spectrum and determine what that 
likely means for their policy preferences. It is only because the term “Democrat” is tied 
to particular sets of preferences, beliefs, norms, and behaviors that one can reliably 
make assumptions based on the label alone. It may not always be accurate – certainly 
not all Democrats have the same policy stance on abortion or any other particular issue 
– but that does not mean that an observer is wrong to believe that a policy position is 
more likely, perhaps far more likely, based on the cue of party affiliation alone. 
! A party label is a cue that enables assumptions about one’s political preferences; 
a social cue enables an observer to make assumptions about the social place of the 
person attached to it. Take, for instance, the Western practice of wedding rings. The 
practice needn’t necessarily have become a social cue, but it functions as one because 
the ring’s connections to other social norms, practices, and identities trigger 
assumptions about the wearer and the observer’s social relationship to the wearer. A 
ring’s presence in a social situation indicates what sorts of conversations can be had 
between two actors, what groups or pairings are appropriate, how much eye contact 
can be made, and implicates a host of other micro-social negotiations. Singles who 
wear a ring to ward off unwanted suitors (or married spouses who remove the ring to 
appear single) themselves rely on the impressions created by the ring in order to 
deceive. 
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! Goffman’s concepts of roles, fronts, and teams are all at work here, and social 
cues are part and parcel of the fronts we put on to convey who we wish to be – not act 
like, be: “To be a given kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required 
attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one’s social 
grouping attaches thereto” (Goffman 1959: 75; emphasis in original). While we cannot 
take his words too literally (one can be a married person without wearing a ring), his 
phrasing is a helpful reminder that we often think of social performances as part and 
parcel of social identities, and feel that identities without “appropriate” performances at 
least require an explanation. There are many reasons a spouse in a perfectly happy 
marriage might not wear a ring (surgeons may decide not to wear jewelry they would 
have to take off many times each day), but the fact of being married and not wearing a 
ring often demands social explanation specifically because it is contrary to convention. It 
confounds the social assumptions we make based on the social cue. 
! In elite amateur baseball, a social norm encouraging illicit agent use has 
emerged despite financial disincentives for the large majority of players. To give color to 
claims about how cues emerge against a background of myriad cultural practices and 
signals (and are meaningful only insofar as they “fit” among other cultural structures), I’ll 
examine in this chapter the origins, development, and expansion of a behavioral norm 
turned social cue. Instrumental welfarist reasons exist for players at the top of the 
pyramid to use agents in violation of NCAA rules. Using Ellickson’s framework as a 
starting point, I’ll give an account of how economic realities could easily have given rise 
to a behavioral norm – much as his theory would predict (1991). However, I will go 
beyond Ellickson’s theory and show that though the norm may have arisen for 
instrumental economic reasons, it has bled outside the population in which it developed 
(and for whom it is “rational” in the too-narrow economic sense). Players well outside 
the group that benefits monetarily by using an agent use one anyway. This is an 
empirical claim, and central to the empirical puzzle from which my conceptual analyses 
emerge. Thus, it will be worth spending some time illustrating the facts on the ground 
and detailing the structures that undergird the puzzle I’m attempting to illustrate and 
explain. 
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! After showing both that elite players garner material benefits from violating Bylaw 
12.3.2.1 and that lesser players do, as a matter of fact, violate the rule despite an 
apparent lack of incentives, I’ll argue that (as Bourdieu would have predicted) this is 
because elite behavior has set the norms of expected behavior. Though the norm in 
question might have arisen for simple monetary reasons, it became attached to elite 
identity and took on a life of its own apart from its instrumental origins. It has become 
part of what it means to be an elite baseball player. It is no longer simply a rational 
economic expectation; it is part of a constructed social identity. Having an agent 
becomes a way of performing elite identity. As Bourdieu suggests, elite norms have the 
power to set the terms in a social milieu; agent use, while secretive in college, becomes 
publicly attached to status as former amateurs reveal their relationships as 
professionals. And while Bourdieu argues that these norms may serve to keep non-
elites from infiltrating elite ranks – the “pure gaze” being impossible to mimic – they also 
provide the very tools necessary to perform the identity. The assumptions you make 
about others by virtue of a social cue would then be the very assumptions you hope 
others make about you when you propagate the same social cue – or, in the case of 
self-signaling behavior, assumptions that reinforce beliefs about yourself. 
! In either case, the assumptions are predicated on a social cue’s connections 
within a cultural structure. In the coming chapters, I will show how narrative identity 
influences which social cues people take, and which structures they therefore 
reproduce; how a particular cultural predisposition influences the interpretation of 
information and how that influences what informational cues mean; and finally, how the 
social roles we inhabit can suppress competing performances and competing 
interpretations of social and informational cues, thereby encouraging instead the 
replication of existing structures. Each of these inquiries probes the relationships 
between cue theory and the reproduction of social structures, but each is predicated on 
this chapter’s claim that cues take on meanings as such by becoming embedded within 
a social structure in the first place. 
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The Welfarist Origins of Agent Use in Amateur Baseball
! Ellickson theorizes that informal norms may arise among small groups when they 
maximize the welfare of those within that group, even – perhaps especially – when 
those norms contravene less generous official rules: “Members of a close-knit group 
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare 
that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another” (1991: 167). In the case 
he describes, northern Californian cattle ranchers developed informal liability rules that 
insulated them from damage incurred by their cattle on the open range. Given the 
economic realities of early (and sparsely) populated California, the system of norms 
developed among ranchers made economic sense. It became embedded in ranching 
culture, and has proved difficult to “un-stick” even as economic and legal realities of 
Shasta County have changed. 
! Much like the ranchers, baseball players and agents have developed a system of 
norms operating outside the official governance of the NCAA, which of course forbids 
the relationships that develop between players and agents. These norms are driven by 
the economic realities facing a small subset of the players who will be drafted to play 
professional baseball (and therefore a small subset of the players on Cape Cod). These 
economic realities are, in turn, driven by the organizational structure of professional 
baseball. A little background on the structure of professional baseball and the draft will 
be instructive. 
! Beneath the Major League players who perform on television and in America’s 
sporting cathedrals are thousands of minor league players who toil in relative obscurity. 
Out of the spotlight, these players stay in the game for a tiny chance of making it big. 
Each of the 30 Major League franchises operates a series of minor league teams, or 
“farm teams,” to develop its players. Typically, an organization will have (in descending 
order of talent) a Major League team, a “AAA” (Triple A) team, a “AA” (Double A) team, 
High A, Low A, Rookie League, and assorted specialty fall, winter, or short-season 
teams. Players shuttle up and down from one rung of the ladder to another at the whim 
and command of the organization. Salaries range from almost $60,000 per year in the 
highest minor league to a few hundred dollars per week (only six months a year) in the 
lowest – far cries from the millions teams spend on players at the Major League level. 
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! Each Major League franchise drafts over 50 new players each year out of high 
schools, colleges, and from foreign countries to staff its minor league teams. In order to 
prevent more successful or more monied teams from pressing those advantages, each 
team may select only one player in each of the 50 rounds of the draft. Only a tiny 
fraction of these draft picks will ever play in a Major League stadium; the huge majority 
will spend their entire career – whether one year or 15 – in the minors. Knowing this, 
teams put enormous emphasis on their first picks of the draft. Two agents I spoke with 
put it like this:!
Avery: After the third round, they have no plans for you. You’re 
filler.
Brad: If you’re a fourth- to tenth-round guy, they say –
Avery: Maybe he’ll surprise us.
Brad: Maybe he’ll surprise us, but they’re on the expectation that 
the three guys who make it to the Major Leagues are their first 
three picks of the draft. Everybody else is [filler].52
! Draft dynamics stem from these assumptions. Teams consider their first three 
picks (perhaps as many as their first ten) as valuable commodities. As a result, they are 
under pressure to make sure that their number-three pick actually signs a contract with 
the team. If he does not, he may re-enter the draft the following year and be taken by a 
different team. The opportunity cost of getting literally nothing for a valuable third-round 
pick is very high, so these players may be able to negotiate a signing bonus with a team 
well above what Major League Baseball recommends: “slot money.”53 Faced with 
paying a little extra for a highly touted prospect or getting nothing at all for a valuable 
third-round pick, teams are often willing to part with a few extra dollars (or a few 
hundred thousand extra dollars). This is where an agent can be most helpful. Pitcher 
Trent Añez, a top prospect who was eventually drafted in the first round,  put it this way: 
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52 “Filler,” means roster filler. The 40 players that teams take after the top ten rounds are really only in the 
minors to fill out rosters so the first ten-round players have people to play with. 
53  “Slot money” is what Major League Baseball recommends as a signing bonus for a given pick in a 
given round. As you would expect, it declines as the draft progresses – quite precipitously after the tenth 
round. A number-one overall pick might receive a signing bonus north of $10 million, while at the bottom 
bonuses are a few thousand dollars, or sometimes nothing at all.
“[Agents] play a huge role in getting you the amount of money you want... signing out of 
slot is what you want to do, but you have to have a good advisor to do so.”
! For the top picks, much of this posturing and negotiation takes place before the 
draft. Agent Avery Eisen: 
If I’m, you know, one of the studs coming out, I need an agent 
because now it’s a whole different ballgame. The agent needs to 
be more involved because now he has to actually negotiate with 
all 30 teams, trying to push you up the draft to get you more 
money.
! Playing teams and their scouts off each other involves complex strategy, and an 
experienced hand makes a difference. Catcher Hal Olsen says an agent is the pivot 
point around which interested teams orbit:
A lot of the guys we’re talking about in the top ten rounds – the 
elite guys – that’s why they have [agents], because those are the 
guys all the scouts are talking to, all the – there’s multiple scouts 
looking at all of them. They’re all contacting them and stuff, and 
that’s – I feel that’s why they all have them.
! In Olsen’s view, an agent’s role in this situation is to take the attention given to 
highly touted prospects (i.e., those likely to go in the top five to ten rounds) and turn it 
into a higher signing bonus. Again, the relationships between these players at the top of 
the heap and their advisors are founded on mutual economic advantage. For those 
players whom teams consider valuable, unique commodities, agents can parlay that 
position into more money for the player, and take 4% to 10% of a signing bonus that 
may be in the millions in return. Rather than abide by the regulations set forth by the 
NCAA, elite players and their agents play by their own rules: a set of norms guiding 
mutually beneficial behavior outside the NCAA’s defined legality. 
! In this moment of economic analysis, the comparatively rare enforcement of 
NCAA regulations is of special relevance. The NCAA is spread too thinly to cover 1,500 
draft picks each year – even to cover the few hundred with enormous financial 
incentives to violate Bylaw 12.3.2.1 outlawing agents. Though the instances of 
enforcement are public and severe enough to generate fear,54 they are few and far 
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54 See Fitt 2008, 2009b, 2010c. Further detail on these sanctions can be found below on page 59.
between when one considers the full sweep of amateur baseball. The violation of 
NCAA rules by this handful of elites isn’t much of a puzzle. Their behavior is readily 
explained by standard cost-benefit analysis, and by Ellickson’s theory as a specific 
instantiation of economic analysis of the law. Provided that the benefits provided by a 
player-agent relationship outweigh the average cost of breaking the attendant rule, we 
would expect individual actors to break it. And if those actors constituted a small group 
with relatively low transaction costs, we would (per Ellickson) expect norms guiding that 
behavior to emerge. 
The Out-Crowd: Dissipation of Monetary Incentives 
! These predictions seem to be born out by the informal structure of amateur 
baseball and its draft. But the economic reality that undergirds behavior at the top of the 
draft dissolves rapidly as the rounds progress. As agents Avery Eisen and Brad 
Anderson noted, teams consider their top three picks to be their future Major Leaguers, 
with vague hopes for picks four through ten. After that, in their words, “you’re filler” – 
you’re there for the ten players who were taken first to have full teams on which to play. 
Teams consider these players more interchangeable and expendable than the scarce 
commodities at the top. When a third-round pick threatens to walk away from the 
bargaining table, he has leverage because the team feels it cannot afford to lose the 
pick. But when a 30th-round pick walks away, teams simply don’t care as much, says 
third baseman Tory Jimenez:  
What’s an advisor going to do? Say you’re a senior drafted in the 
20th round. What’s an advisor going to go tell these people that’s 
going to persuade them or make them think that they need to give 
you more money, when it’s all a business when you get to that 
level? If they’re going to draft you, they obviously like you as a 
player, but they’re going to make sure that their top-round picks 
are getting money, and you’re kind of there just to give their top-
round picks a place to play.
! Host parent Jimi Sattler puts it more bluntly to me than he would to a player: 
“They’re not going to negotiate with you. I think it’s pretty much take it or leave it... that 
late in the draft they’re just fill players anyway.”
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! This difference in situation is what drives the puzzle I’m exploring. The 
economics that provide the foundation for agent-player relationships at the top don’t 
apply outside the first ten rounds. Trent Añez knows as much. “To be honest with you, 
there's no money, like, out of the top ten rounds. It’s hard to – I mean, these teams 
aren't going to want to sign you out of slot and you’re going to have to take slot – and 
it’s not enough money to live off, let’s be honest.” Fellow pitcher Val Marcos says, “You 
know that’s where the big money is – the top ten rounds. Later in the draft, there isn’t a 
whole lot of money there for the players.” And he knows that this changes the dynamic 
between player, agent, and professional club: “There isn’t a whole lot of negotiating that 
goes on in the draft, that late in the draft. It’s kind of ‘take it or leave it’ at that point.”
! It is immediately apparent that these players understand the dynamics of the 
draft and how changes in that dynamic affect the economic relationships between 
players, teams, and the agents that try to maneuver between them.55 Eighteen of the 26 
players on the Cape Crusaders readily acknowledged that there is little reason for later 
picks to use an agent. Head Coach Nathan Kimmel, who has been coaching on the 
Cape and in the college game for well over a decade, certainly understands. “If you’re a 
30th- or 40th-round pick,” he says, “you don’t have a lot of leverage. You don’t have a lot 
of bargaining power.” One of Coach Kimmel’s pitchers, Steve Mott, carves out a much 
smaller slice of the draft where an agent makes sense:
After the first couple [rounds] they just slot it up.56 I mean, if you’re 
not going to be a first-rounder, [there’s] really not very much need 
for an agent, because you got to pay them a percentage of the 
money you get, which is not going to be – it’s just going to be 
slot... Four percent of, you know, something... a hundred-thousand 
bucks. It’s just, like, it’s not – it’s kind of pointless to have them 
because they’re just going to slot you anyways. 
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55 Players’ sophistication is noteworthy because it is at odds with the standard performance of baseball 
identity, which abjures too much involvement with the business side of the game. Players outwardly claim 
– and I think truly believe – that they are not the kind of person who deals with baseball’s economics 
themselves, and yet their sophistication suggests that they readily could. I argue in Chapter 6 that, 
despite their ability to go it alone, players’ social roles prevent imagining this alternative performance of 
their identity. 
56 Steve means that teams will simply offer players slot money without any thought of negotiation. 
! Avery Eisen, an agent himself, echoes sentiments clearly articulated by the Cape 
Crusaders and their coaches: “99% of the time, the agent is not doing anything for 
them... they just have an agent to have an agent, because the agent – the job he’s 
supposed to be doing, he’s not doing.” Avery doesn’t mean that the agent is neglecting 
his duty, exactly, but that he simply can’t do for these players what he normally gets 
hired to do. As Steve Mott put it, it’s “pointless.” In fact, it’s worse than pointless. “Really, 
the only advantage [an agent] could give you is if you’re more of a higher draft pick... I 
don’t think – especially if you’re going to be a later draft pick – that an advisor could 
really help out that much,” says pitcher Len Clement. Clement also notes it comes not 
only without benefit, but with a cost: “It just – it takes more money out of your pocket.” 
Nor can an agent move a player up the draft board to a higher round in most cases; 
recall scout Tim Smalls’ assertion that there’s “NOTHING an agent can do to get that 
player drafted any higher.” Regional Cross-checker57 Rory Jones simply says of agents, 
“They have no influence on the draft.” Coach Billy Jameson, himself a former AAA 
player, says of agents who claim that they can move a guy up the draft, “It’s a bunch of 
crap – I don’t think they have anything to do with it.”
! The realities that gave rise to agent use in the first place simply do not apply to 
most of the players who come to Cape Cod. While all of the players on the ten Cape 
diamonds are professional prospects, and while most will be drafted, only a few find 
themselves in a position to be drafted in the first few rounds. For the rest, an agent 
seems simply to take 4% to 10% of a signing bonus that they are incapable of 
increasing – “money out of your pocket,” to repeat Len Clement’s phrase. 
Norms Beyond the Boundary: Mimicked Behavior in the Out-Crowd
! And yet illicit agent relationships are rampant even at the bottom end of the draft. 
Infielder Derrick Martinez, when asked how many of his college or Cape teammates 
who are likely to be drafted have or had advisors, takes a beat, then answers: “I would 
say... probably all of them... all the way down to the 46th round.” Both Tory Jimenez and 
66
57 Like much else in baseball, a team’s scouting structure is hierarchical. Area scouts target players in a 
given geographical reason, Regional Cross-checkers double-check the assessments made by area 
scouts, and National Cross-checkers double-check their work. 
Sal Killian estimate that “75 percent of each team” have agents/advisors, a number 
Sean Flanagan thinks is about right:
I find that it’s more and more common, especially when I come up 
here to the Cape, and all these guys – most of these guys – are 
going to be drafted. Most of them are sophomores, going to be 
juniors next year, then be drafted next year, so I find that more and 
more guys have advisors, probably like 75 to 80 percent of them.
! Jimi Sattler, who has hosted between fifteen and twenty players over the years 
that he’s been involved as a parent with the Crusaders, guesses that somewhat over 
half of his guests have illicitly had advisors, and is certain that any player who ended up 
being drafted did – whether drafted in the first round or the 50th. Given that it seems 
almost all players likely to be drafted have an agent while still (allegedly) an amateur, it’s 
worth mentioning that the Crusaders had over two dozen players taken in the 2010 draft  
– almost 85% of the team even when one includes temporary players – from the first 
round to the 49th. When I asked long-time host and team administrator Joe Santori 
about the NCAA rules about agents, he simply scoffed: “It’s such bullshit. They all 
cheat.” Fielding Coach Jesus Izturiz is less dismissive, but reaches the same 
conclusion: “In reality, everybody up here has an advisor, and everybody in some way, 
shape, or form commits NCAA violations every day.”
! Coach Izturiz brings up a point that ought not to be glossed over. I’ve focused 
here on the fact that players later in the draft will see no monetary returns from using an 
agent, and will pay 4% to 10% of their signing bonus for that privilege. However, there is 
still the potential cost of being caught and facing NCAA sanctions. The overmatched 
NCAA punishes a very small percentage of agent violations that number in the 
thousands, but when they come down on a player, they come down hard. Recall from 
Chapter One that in 2011 – during the college season preceding my second summer of 
fieldwork – Logan Ehlers was suspended for 60% of his team’s games because his 
advisor spoke to a scout while watching a game from behind the backstop. In 2000, a 
player was suspended for a few weeks for accepting gifts worth less than $100. In 2010, 
the University of Kentucky preemptively kicked one of its players off the baseball team 
because of allegations that his advisor had spoken to a professional franchise on his 
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behalf. The risk of getting caught having illicitly used an agent may be small, but it isn’t 
zero, and for many players, the potential cannot be outweighed by (non-existent) 
material benefits. Players know this, too: 16 of the 26 Crusaders explicitly mentioned 
the NCAA rules against agents, and none of the other ten stated that the rules allowed 
an agent. 
! Having established the empirical dimension of the puzzle at hand – the elite 
development of a behavioral norm and its adoption by those facing very different 
circumstances – we can finally turn in earnest to the practice’s social dimensions. In the 
next two sections, I’ll examine the ways that elite behavior sets the social expectations 
for norms and behavior, how those norms become part of the social meaning of 
“eliteness” (social cues to a particular identity) and how that social meaning replicates 
itself.
Elite Agendas: The In-Crowd and the Setting of a Norm
! Bourdieu describes the ways in which elite cultural practices set the terms for 
participating in haute culture. Only when an individual can pick up on and display social 
cues about art’s position in a cultural matrix can she be said to be fully participating in 
that culture. The aesthete’s ability to read all of the cues provided by a piece of art – or 
its mere mention – is analogous to the evangelical Christian’s ability to read broader 
political messages into a candidate’s use of the phrase “wonder-working power.” A 
social cue, whether that phrase or a reference to Warhol’s “Campbell’s Soup Cans,” 
relies on both roughly stable connections to other cultural artifacts and a listener’s ability 
to decode those connections. What I’m after here is the cultural process by which a 
behavior becomes sufficiently embedded in a cultural framework to become a social cue 
– simply put, a story of how a cue becomes a cue. 
! Bourdieu notes that certain behaviors are affiliated with elite status – attendance 
at the opera, to use his example. Though this is a satisfactory beginning given his aim 
of explaining how such social norms get reproduced, it ignores the analytically prior 
question of how the behavior became a norm in the first place. I have already told part 
of this story: elite players plausibly engage agents for economic reasons. The next step 
is to show that the behavior becomes affiliated with elite social status within the 
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subculture. That connection – the affiliation of the practice with a particular status – is a 
crucial part of the explanation of how the practice becomes a cultural shortcut by which 
we learn about actors in a social sphere and our position relative to them.
! Elites, as I have shown, have economic incentives to procure an agent’s 
services, but the norm may spread through mimicry even within that in-group. Len 
Clement thinks that elites who aren’t sure about the need for an agent might be 
persuaded by seeing others with one: “If one elite player sees another having [an 
agent], they might also have to have one so they don’t feel like they’re falling behind.” 
Already, the norm has begun to act as a social cue, with one elite determining socially 
appropriate behavior based not on research or reasoning, but on a shortcut learned by 
observing another. Here, the social cue is also operating as an informational cue within 
the tight constraints levied by Lupia and McCubbins; the actor makes the same decision 
he likely would if he were to rationally and exhaustively weigh the costs and benefits of 
the decision. He simply does so through mimicking the behavior of someone he thinks 
is relevantly “like him.” Cues, in this story, function in multiple ways. 
! Much of what follows in the ensuing chapters simply probes deeper into the 
processes by which players come to the conclusion that they are included in an identity 
category that substantiates a relationship with an agent. The ways in which players form 
and narrate their self-identities, the ways the subculture encourages confidence and 
self-deception, and the way it counsels against over-involvement in the fiscal aspects of 
the business: all are phenomena that lead players to identify themselves as people to 
whom a particular behaviors applies. But though these processes are disparate and 
conceptually distinct, they all culminate in the mimicry that reproduces a social cue. 
Within the circle of elites for whom agent use is economically rational, this mimicry is 
also a way to determine how to maximize one’s preferences without doing research that 
would otherwise be necessary. It is a valid informational cue in the sense intended by 
Lupia and McCubbins. 
! Of course, players know that the mimicry isn’t limited to fellow elites. Donyell 
Traynor thinks any player who “sees that other players are being successful with an 
advisor, then yeah... that would make them want to have an advisor too.” Pitcher Val 
Marcos puts a slightly uglier spin on it, but comes to roughly the same conclusion. “I’m 
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sure that guys see the top talent, you know, they have the top advisors or whatever. I 
think that you might see a little envy,” he says. “You might see guys, like, you know, ‘if 
they have one, then I need one.’ When really you might not need one.” Sean Flanagan 
is similarly sure that elite behavior impacts the rest of the sport: “If you see all these 
guys going into the top five to seven rounds, and they all have advisors, and, you know, 
I definitely think that it has some effect on guys who are going to get drafted later in the 
20th, 30th round.” 
! There’s no doubt that for many it is aspirational mimicry, acting like those you 
wish to be like. For both top prospects and professionals, an agent is a necessary 
accoutrement, and for the latter a public one. Mike Preecher, a top pitching prospect, 
says, “When you get to the pro level, or the Major League level, everyone has an 
agent.” Larry Kloves is straightforward about players trying to act like their professional 
idols: “The thing is, you see like, the things on TV, like Alex Rodriguez, $215 million 
contract. Scott Boras signs [former number-one pick Stephen] Strausborg to this 
contract. And it’s like, ‘Oh, I want one of those, because look what he did for this guy.’” 
Team housing director Irene Isaac connects what Preecher and Kloves indicate: 
When you look at the big – you know, Derek Jeter or whoever, 
[Alex] Rodriguez, you know – when it comes to contract talks, they 
know they’re not in there doing the contract talks. They’ve got their 
agent. So I think it’s kind of like they see that, and that’s like, 
“Okay, well, then that’s what I’m supposed to do. I’m supposed to 
have an agent,” that’s what they do. That’s part of being a 
professional player, is having other people deal with this for you.
!
! It’s worth taking a moment to parse Irene’s words; she hits on so much of what’s 
at work in the culture. Derek Jeter and Alex Rodriguez are baseball royalty, and their 
behavior both as prospects in the 1990s and All-Stars in the last decade set the 
expectations for elite baseball players. As Irene notes, observers see what elite players 
do and want to arrogate those symbols to themselves. But the words she uses show a 
much more sophisticated appreciation for the cultural mechanisms at work; it’s far more 
subtle and complex than “player see, player do.” She says that having an agent is a 
“part” of being a professional player, which invites ready comparison to Goffman’s 
analysis. Being a professional player, he would argue, is not simply receiving money to 
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play – even if it’s millions of dollars – nor playing in front of 60,000 fans at Yankee 
stadium, nor even playing on TV in front of millions. These are certainly components, 
but let’s take seriously his argument that “To be a given kind of person, then, is not 
merely to possess the required attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct 
and appearance that one’s social grouping attaches thereto” (Goffman 1959: 75). Being 
a professional means having an agent – a “standard of conduct” that attaches to an 
agent. Irene’s explanation that players feel they are “supposed” to have agents is 
related.
! Former announcer and host parent Corey Roberts agrees that it has become 
attached to the social role itself: “It’s like, you got to have an agent, it’s just part of the 
deal. Like you got have a pair of shoes, you know? You got to have an agent. That’s 
become part of the culture.” When players conceive of themselves as occupying a role 
a constitutive part of which is having an agent, failing to do so is failure to properly play 
their social role. Whether consciously or not, players understand this as well. Pitcher 
Larry Kloves: 
It’s true. That’s what I mean – it becomes part of the business. I 
mean, it comes with being a great athlete, being able to take that 
next step. It’s just you have to deal with that stuff. But it’s definitely  
– you’re fortunate enough to be in that situation, so you have to 
accept it, and go with it.
! Larry says having an agent “comes with being a great athlete,” suggesting that it 
is part and parcel with the role that these players play. This sort of attachment is what 
allows a behavioral norm to operate as a social cue. When it is embedded in a cultural 
role, it forms connections to other cultural roles and categories, and these connections – 
this roughly fixed position within a culture or subculture – are what constitute something 
as a cue. They are what give meaning to the cue, and what allow a cue to convey 
meaning about them. In Chapter 1, I suggested that the metaphor of stellar navigation is 
an illustrative one: to use a star as a navigational guide, you must know its relationships 
to other points in the firmament. You learn information about your position in the world 
by using a star’s position, relative to other phenomena, to determine your own. In the 
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same way, a social cue provides information by virtue of its position relative to other 
points in the cultural firmament. 
The Cultural Meaning of Agents: Elite Behavior as Cue and Habitus
! The elites’ norm becomes a social cue because it situates itself alongside other 
cultural features; it allows participants to learn about an actor, a role, or the culture itself 
through the shortcut of the cue. It “means” something and becomes a social cue; it 
gives information to an observer. This is a slightly different point than the one made in 
the previous section. There I showed how a particular cultural practice becomes more 
or less fixed in relation to other cultural norms, memes, identities, and practices. Here, I 
want to focus on the result of this fixed position: that the norm qua cue comes to have 
meaning in and of itself. I’ll show how players begin to take a relationship with an agent 
not simply as a feature of elite behavior, but as something that itself means something 
about a player with an agent and his place on the cultural landscape. 
! If we explore baseball’s subculture as habitus, we can focus on the way in which 
it tends to reproduce itself, and how agent use – as a part thereof – reproduces itself as 
well. As Silbey argues, cultural norms, including social cues as I have conceptualized 
them, are not simply ways social actors make sense of what is around them. They are 
ways that we participate in “meaning-making” and cultural (re)production (Silbey 2005). 
Much of this has been foreshadowed by the discussion of Goffman so far. When social 
actors perform their roles, they use the “symbols, scripts, and schemata” available to 
them (Fuhse 2009: 67). In participating in the creation and recreation of cultural 
meanings, individuals use the norms of presentation and behavior that constitute the 
roles they play in the social sphere. Recall Greenblatt’s argument that individuals 
fashioned their identities from “among possibilities whose range was delineated by the 
social ideological system in force” (1980: 256). Because identities are built from existing 
norms, practices, and social performances, those norms, practices, and performances 
are themselves reproduced.58 
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58 Consider again the Method actors in Bandelj’s study (2003). To take on their character’s persona, they 
often begin by appropriating a socially or culturally recognizable symbol resonant with their character’s 
identity – playing an old person by using a cane, say. They come to perform, in the most literal sense, by 
arrogating existing social cues, which they then reproduce through that performance. 
! “When a player has an advisor, you kinda see him as more of one of the elite 
players,” says Hal Olsen. “Kind of like we said – the guys who expect to get drafted 
higher.” It’s a simple step for Hal to take in saying that one makes assumptions based 
on a player’s decision to hire an agent, but it’s a conceptually important one. It suggests 
that having an agent is not simply an economic decision, nor just a cue (in Lupia and 
McCubbins’ narrow sense) by which one elite takes a shortcut to a “rational” decision. It 
has taken on a meaning in context through which others learn things about an actor. It 
isn’t just something elites do; it has become something that means eliteness. When 
asked what he thinks when he hears someone has an advisor, outfielder Peter Wrass 
says, “It makes me say ‘he’s gonna get drafted,’ or ‘he’s got good draft possibilities.’” 
Peter is using a player’s relationship with an agent to gather information not about what 
would be economically “rational for him”; he is using it to gather information about the 
other player, about what it means to be a player like that. He is using it as a social cue, 
and can do so only because having an agent has attached itself to elite identity and 
become part of what it means to perform that identity – which is to say part of that 
identity itself. Calvin Kirkwood’s diction is telling if open-ended: “If you have an advisor, 
then obviously you know, that means – definitely means something.”
! Silbey suggests that actors within a particular culture or subculture participate in 
the culture through the use of such resources (2005). In making sense of what’s around 
them, in participating in the construction of meaning within the culture, actors – or 
rather, baseball players – use the scripts that surround them to understand the roles 
they play and the roles played by others who populate the subculture. This participation, 
Silbey is quick to say, effectively reproduces the structures that enable it (2005: 341). 
When players use relationships with agents as cultural information, they reproduce 
norms and behaviors that may not serve them particularly well. Though it is clear that 
players at most positions in the draft don’t need agents to work through it, the behavior 
is part of the cultural apparatus players use to make sense of and participate in the 
world around them. It is habitus, “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to act as structuring structures” (Bourdieu 1977: 72). 
They are ways of thinking that are part of the cultural matrix, part of how people 
participate in that cultural matrix, and how that matrix tends to reproduce itself. 
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! This is, at least in part, because players mimic the behavior of players at the top 
of the pyramid. As Irene Isaac noted above, players even take the behaviors of Major 
League All-Stars like Derek Jeter as models for their own. Coach Kimmel knows that not 
only does he benefit from encouraging his players to mimic professionals, but that he 
and his staff do the same:
When you watch a Big League game and you watch Joe Girardi 
manage a game, or you watch Derek Jeter, the way he conducts 
himself in batting practice and pre-game, and stretching and 
getting his running in, and how he handles adversity – that’s what 
being professional is... So, if we could all pattern ourselves, if I 
and our coaching staff could pattern ourselves... that’s how we 
want to behave. And I think the guys want to behave like a guy like 
Derek Jeter, or an Albert Pujols, or Cliff Lee, Roy Halladay... We 
can learn a lot by observing what the best are like, and that’s how 
we wanna – that’s what we wanna be like.59
! Kimmel’s comments here are rich. When he says that both players and coaches 
ought to “pattern” themselves after elite, professional practices, he indicates that 
“proper” practice is set by the sport’s elites, and that mimicking those practices is 
common, even lauded practice. Elite practice is, in other words, part of the way that 
others make sense of the cultural landscape, part of how everyone else participates in 
“meaning-making.” Notice, too, the sheer breadth of behavior for which elites and 
professionals operate as models. How and when they run, how they practice before a 
game, how they stretch, how they hold themselves in the batter’s box: all of these little 
signals are part of the elite identity, and part of what encompassed into a broader 
baseball identity partially through mimicry. Batting Coach Carl Brake tapes pictures of 
Major League players batting to the locker room wall so that his players have an image 
of the best batting stance to copy, but feels he needs to encourage his players to copy 
far more than that. 
I put up a ton of pictures of Major League guys – old school and 
new school stances, loads, lower-halves – for them to look at. And 
what I’m finding is I need to find more pictures of those big 
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59 Joe Girardi is the manager (coach) of the New York Yankees. Derek Jeter and Albert Pujols are All-Star 
batters; Cliff Lee and Roy Halladay are All-Star pitchers. 
leaguers doing early work. Pedroia running with the parachute 
behind his back, working his feet. Prince Fiedler of the Brewers 
hitting off the tee with Rickey Weeks making sure he’s keeping 
quiet with his feet.
! Brake uses examples during practice as well, telling players to emulate Derek 
Jeter or All-Star Troy Tulowitzki while practicing throws from shortstop to first base, or to 
practice following through a swing like all-time greats Don Mattingly and Ted Williams. 
Not only does this implicitly group players with those they mimic, but institutionalizes the 
practicing of aping elites. And, as Coach Kimmel shows, coaches encouraged this 
imitation not simply when players are on the field, performing their sport, but in their pre-
game attitude and carriage as well. 
! Copying the practices, attitudes, body language, and mindsets of successful elite 
or professional players is itself embedded in baseball culture. Coaches tell players not 
just to play, but to act like the professionals they aspire to be. Considered this way, 
having an agent is comparable to honing one’s practice swing to look professional; both 
are acts that players witness elites performing and take as social cues to elite status 
(again, by virtue of the cues’ position within a social structure). When players 
themselves then perform elite identity (or at least try to) they replicate these social cues 
in the process. They attempt to play the professional by adopting the appropriate batting 
stance, the appropriate in-game carriage, but also with professional-looking practice 
swings, the right body language during the National Anthem, and dugout demeanor. 
Nearly every aspect of their baseball identity – their dominant identity – is guided by 
how a “professional” ought to act. Elite practice sets the standard for “successful” 
behavior. Others replicate the practices, and in so doing reproduce the structures that 
give them social meaning. 
! There is variety to how replicable an elite practice can be by those in the “out-
crowd.” At one end of the spectrum, Bourdieu’s “pure gaze” can be achieved only 
through the cultural education that constitutes elite culture; it occurs when decoding a 
piece of art happens seamlessly and effortlessly because the viewer’s interpretive 
apparatus is the same as the cultural apparatus that produced the art in the first place 
(1984: 3-4, 31). As such, it cannot be faked. But even within the arts, we can think of 
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degrees. Perfect, seamless appreciation of opera cannot be faked, but one can fake 
some knowledge of opera with a few well-chosen facts or bon mots, and one can fake 
enjoyment of opera without even enough knowledge to recite those facts. Similarly, 
while it’s costly to fake one’s economic status by purchasing an expensive house, there 
are less taxing signals one can send to (mis)represent status: cars, clothes, 
accessories, meals, etc. Conspicuous consumption, even in its less expensive guises, 
is not only a signal to others of a particular status, but an aspiration. You signal your 
desire to belong to a particular group by arrogating to yourself the symbols of it. 
! A distinction between the production of elite numbers and the performance of 
elite identity is worth making. Batting coach Carl Brake does tell his hitters that looking 
and acting professional may get them noticed by scouts even if they don’t get a hit that 
day, but no degree of proper body language can overcome chronic lack of baseball 
production. The performance of elite identity is a meta-language that trumpets 
membership in a club, without a necessary connection to the production of numbers that 
would justify that membership to a statistician. Markovits and Albertson note that even 
the most knowledgeable and passionate female sports fans are often assumed not to 
be by their male counterparts; though they can “produce” the relevant knowledge and 
passion, they have difficulty performing a role or speaking a meta-language male sports 
fans tacitly (or explicitly) assume you have to be a male to play or speak (2012: 
206-211). Conversely, a baseball player may not be able to replicate a better player’s 
batting average or earned run average,60 but he can copy batting stance, or attitude, or 
routine, or mindset. !
! Or he can copy the fact that elites have agents. For this cultural phenomenon to 
occur, having an agent must be a cue. It must convey more complicated information as 
a shortcut. Players learn what it means to act like an elite, which is to say they learn the 
social meaning of being elite, by observing elite players. To inhabit, mimic, or display 
that particular role, an actor uses the props and scenery appropriate to it, which 
includes an agent. Performing this role reinforces and reproduces its place in the social 
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60 Batting average is a measure of how frequently a player gets a hit; earned run average, or ERA, is a 
measure of how many runs a pitcher allows per nine innings. 
structure (despite the fact that it may be economically disadvantageous for those who 
reproduce it). 
! Something ought to be said about the potential for this sort of norm diffusion to 
dilute the ability for a player to intentionally signal eliteness by having an agent. If 
having an agent is seen as a badge of, say, top-five-round status and is for that reason 
mimicked by those on the outside looking in, the mere fact of having an agent will no 
longer as closely track a player’s chances at going in the first five rounds. That players 
do this is unambiguously true, though the dilution of the signal matters less than one 
might think. For one, scouts and other team representatives don’t care about whether a 
player has an agent or not. Player statistics are a much better proxy for ability than 
having an agent is, and teams are concerned with elite ability, rather than elite identity. 
They are generally not interested in the performance of identity, but in the production of 
numbers. 
! As another matter, players tend not to discuss whether or not they have an agent 
with other players. There is a risk associated with having an agent, and the risk rises if 
one is too public with the information; secrecy in the face of the behavior’s illegality 
functions as a structuring condition enabling it to maintain its plausibility as a cue of elite 
status. Further – and this is a point to which I will turn in more detail in Chapter 6 – 
talking too much about the business aspect of baseball is considered largely 
incompatible with baseball-player identity. While expanded agent use might dilute the 
ability to signal eliteness to others by having one, such signaling isn’t the root of what’s 
at work here, and there’s no reason to think that dilution of a social identity is 
necessarily implied.
What Happens After a Cue Becomes a Cue?
! Though elite amateur baseball players likely began using agents for the 
economic reasons that underpin Ellickson’s theory of norm formation, the use of agents 
became part of what it means to be an elite player, and a way of performing that identity. 
In becoming part of such a performance, it became a cue; it became a way both of 
gathering information about participants in a culture and a way of to convey information 
by giving (or “giving off”) and impression of oneself. Cue theory connects accounts of 
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norm origins (such as Ellickson’s) with theories of social reproduction. No matter why a 
particular norm comes to be associated with a particular identity, once it is, it is subject 
to the cultural forces of performative identity and structural reproduction. Here, the illicit 
use of agents may have instrumental origins, but once it became attached to the 
performance of elite identity, it was embedded in the sets of meanings that constitute 
the subculture.
! Jay-Z (neé Shawn Carter) notes that the baggy pants, Timberland boots, and 
oversized winter coats that characterize East Coast African-American men’s fashion 
have their roots in the instrumental dress of urban crack dealers (2010: 13). For street-
corner dealers working during cold winters, the clothes offered both warmth and ample 
space for the dealers’ product and protection. These norms of dress travelled through 
the nexus between street culture and East Coast rap (Jay-Z is himself a former crack 
dealer), and from there to the music-consuming public. Jay-Z’s fans dressed in the way 
he did as a way of identifying with and performing a street identity even though they 
likely did not share his particular past. A norm associated with illegal/criminal behavior, 
not unlike having an agent, escaped the group for whom it had instrumental value and 
came instead to be arrogated by a much wider population who used it to perform a 
particular identity. 
! This identity, by the way, comes with no small amount of political controversy and 
possibility for dangerous misinterpretation. In the wake of Trayvon Martin’s tragic killing, 
the black hoodie became both a symbol for resistance to white privilege, power, and 
systemic racism, and at the same time a lightning rod for what many perceived as the 
dangerous identities performed by black youth. CNN’s Don Lemon argued in the 
summer of 2013 that stereotypical fashion for black male youths was part of the 
problem – memorably if naively suggesting that they “pull up their pants.”61 Lemon was 
rightly excoriated for what many perceived as blaming young black men for systematic 
and systemic racial bias for which they are plainly not at fault. Yet many young people – 
black, white, and other – dress in ways that arguably mis-serve their socio-economic 
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61 Lemon’s comments were aired during “No Talking Points” in the CNN Newsroom on July 2tth, 2013, 
and can be viewed at: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2013/07/27/
cnns_don_lemon_bill_oreillys_criticism_of_black_community_doesnt_go_far_enough.html
prospects precisely because others make predictable (if biased and unfair) assumptions 
based on such sartorial decisions.62
! Both Garot (2010) and Rios (2011) show that even young people not associated 
with gangs still perform some of the behaviors associated with them. Debates about 
profiling, urban crime, “stop and frisk,” and school uniforms, to name just a few, all touch 
on the fact that performative identities that are (often unfairly) implicated in criminal 
behavior have been adopted by many who haven’t broken any rules at all. As we seek 
to understand and, in some instances, control these performances (by, say, banning 
certain outfits at schools), perhaps we would do well to probe beyond the behavior itself 
and ask why something perceived by many to be harmful has been adopted by so many 
others. 
! In this chapter, I’ve offered an account and demonstration of how a behavior can 
become a social cue by embedding itself in a social space. The endeavor is analytically 
prior to wondering what we can do with cues, and has, I hope, helped show a clearer 
idea of what exactly a social cue is. But an explanation of how a social cue comes to be 
is only one way in which cue theory and legal consciousness can be combined to give 
richer texture to how we gather and process political and legal information. Yes, using 
party affiliation as a cue requires affiliation to trigger justified background assumptions, 
but equally important is an account of how particular background beliefs, preferences, 
and self-identities suggest to a person that they are the appropriate recipients of that 
cue. In other words, the story of how a person comes to think of himself as a Democrat 
will influence which social and informational cues he thinks of as applicable to him. 
Identity provides a way to combine the beliefs and preferences that structure our 
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62 Consider, for instance, this excerpt from the Los Angeles Police Department webpage on how to 
identify gang members: “Gang clothing styles can be easily detected because of the specific way gang 
members wear their clothing. Examples are preferences for wearing baggy or "sagging" pants or having 
baseball caps turned at an angle. Gang members often prefer particular brands of shoes, pants or shirts. 
For example, some gangs like to wear plaid shirts in either blue, brown, black or red. These shirts are 
worn loosely and untucked. Gang graffiti, symbols, messages or gang names can be written or 
embroidered on jackets, pants and baseball caps. Other identifying items include belt buckles with the 
gang’s initials, key chains, starter jackets (team jackets), and red or blue bandannas commonly called 
‘rags.’” .http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/content_basic_view/23468 (Accessed September 4, 
2013)
interpretation of information with the reproduction of the social structures that tell us 
which information applies to “people like us.”
! So there is yet another question analytically prior to one’s taking an informational 
cue: how does a person know which cues a person who occupies their social space, a 
person “like them,” is supposed to take?
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Chapter 4
Casey at the Bat: 
Cues and Narrative Identity: Being and Becoming an Elite
What Does it Mean to Be Someone “Like Me?”
! By the time I can read a perceived expert’s opinion on an insurance reform 
referendum (to borrow Lupia’s example; 1994a), several related social phenomena 
have already occurred. For one, the expert’s affiliations have made connections to other 
social and political facts and structures, at least enough to make me feel confident that 
those affiliations justify some assumptions about the distance between the expert’s 
preferences and my own. In addition, I have either consciously or unconsciously 
reached conclusions about my own beliefs and preferences; for me to use someone 
else’s preferences as a proxy for my own, I must have some extent preferences 
surrounding the lacuna I’m trying to fill from which to draw conclusions. However, such a 
brief sketch minimizes the ways in which my pre-existing beliefs and preferences inflect 
what cues I am likely to take and the ways I am likely to interpret them. Who I (think I) 
am determines which social cues I take; the social cues I take reinforce my place in a 
cultural matrix and determine which behaviors are appropriate for me, which is to say 
they help determine which informational cues I take. Furthermore, as we will see in the 
coming chapters, they even influence the way I interpret or ignore the informational 
cues before me. 
! Some of this echoes the concept of given or prefabricated identities common to 
social identity theory, which describes how individual identities are given to them by 
their social associations (Foucault 1978; Tajfel 1978; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Stets & 
Burke 2000; Hogg & Vaughan 2002). A gang member’s identity is prefabricated by the 
norms and practices of gang life and gang membership and given to him by his 
membership in that gang (Vigil 1988; Garot 2010). The concept of “prefabricated” 
identities provides ready links to Althusser’s concept of being “hailed” (2001); having 
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one’s identity “called forth” by the activation of relevant social signals. In this stark 
example of “given” identities, the subject exists only through ideology (see also 
Wingrove 1999: 877). That is, an individual’s identity is constituted entirely by the social 
and cultural structures that surround it, leaving – at its most extreme – little room for 
agency. 
! On the other hand, narrative identity theory in its various guises explains how 
individuals fashion their identities from available social schema by telling a story about 
who they are – a story that is itself necessarily drawn from the social structures through 
which a person moves (Greenblatt 1980; Bruner 1991, 1996; Rosenwald & Ochberg 
1992; Schiffrin 1996). Narrative identity does well to explain how a culture can limit the 
choices available to an individual actor, and to leave room for that actor to choose 
among them, but it struggles a bit to explain how some options become more 
acceptable than others. When Ewick and Silbey (1998) and Engel and Munger (2003) 
tell stories of how people characterize and interact with law and legal structures, they 
lean heavily on narrative identity theory to explain how their subjects tell stories about 
who they are and how that affects their relationship to law. These individual choices are 
not unfettered, but limited or even forced by the social structures that surround them. 
Legal consciousness, their methodology counsels, is both a product of our environment 
and an individual phenomenon. It is a way we participate in the production of our own 
identity and in the reproduction of cultural forms. 
! No matter where an individual scholar aims his or her lens, the overlaps between 
individual identity formation and culturally constructed rules and resources are indicative 
of the ineradicable conceptual linkages between the two. As Greenblatt notes, even 
individual efforts at building a self are supplied with culturally defined materials (1980). It 
is not just defining a self, it is defining a place within a culture that is circumscribed by 
the culture’s rules. It is about learning how to participate in a culture by accepting and 
internalizing the culture’s definitions of what behavior is appropriate or inappropriate, 
what is fair game, and what is against the rules. 
! Once again, putting cue theory and legal consciousness in dialog will enable a 
connection between our pre-existing beliefs, preferences, and identities, and the way 
we make decisions when navigating a social, legal, and/or political space. We build our 
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own identities and tell our own stories, but when we do we make ourselves into a 
particular kind of person occupying a specific social place. The people we understand 
ourselves to be in turn influence which social and informational cues we are likely to 
take. We are “called forth” when we take others’ behavior towards us to be a product of 
where we sit in social space; understanding that we are being so treated is one way that 
we say “that social cue applies to me.” 
! Baseball players’ development clearly demonstrates these different analytical 
moves. Well before they arrive on Cape Cod, the Crusaders have spent a lifetime 
concretizing an identity as an elite player. Their memories as players stretch back to – 
and through – childhood, and their dreams have been reinforced by their success every 
step of the way. Their lived experiences have built for them a self-conception as an elite 
baseball player, and they therefore favor behaviors consonant with that image. The 
stories they tell about themselves uniformly cast them, well, in uniform; that visual token 
of their identity is part and parcel of the narrative they use to explain who they have 
become. 
! Baseball does so much to structure their daily lives that players’ identities qua 
baseball players have come to dominate other facets of their lives. Out on the Cape, the 
social cues placing them as elite players and cementing the image they have of 
themselves as such are legion. In fact, most that happens on the Cape calls them forth 
as elites, reinforcing their understanding of the social place they occupy, of the social 
role they are playing. The ways they are treated by their coaches, their fans, 
professional scouts, and of course agents all betoken a status and professionalism they 
hold close to their senses of self. It is also, crucially, part of an imagined future. Their 
narrative identities do not stop in the present, but incorporate an assumed future in 
professional baseball. Such dreams are also a part of their history; they have “always” 
wanted to play professionally in the same way that they have “always” played baseball. 
Players’ histories cast them not only as occupying a particular social space now, but as 
occupying a related one in the years to come: a player who doesn’t just act 
professional, but is a professional. In practice, this means that the behaviors players 
mimic are not just ones appropriate to their current status, but to what they believe their 
future status will be as well. 
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! It is not quite that rule-breaking in the form of agent relationships is constitutive of 
identity in the same way law-breaking is for gang members. After all, it is at least 
possible to be an elite baseball player without an agent. I argue instead that rule-
breaking is confirmative of an existing identity and consistent with the narrative players 
tell about who they are. Their identity puts them in position to take social cues 
reinforcing their self-conception as elites, and to reproduce those cues and the culture 
that defines them by acting in ways that their identities suggest. An agent, in many 
ways, is best characterized as similar to the cleats, baseball mitts, sunflower seeds, and 
chewing tobacco: a symbol of the type of person a player considers himself to be, or at 
least wishes himself to be. The arguably harmful practice of having an illicit agent is 
replicated in part because it is a natural outgrowth of the identity perpetuated by the 
social cues available to the players on the Cape Crusaders. 
Origin Myths and Building a Receptive Identity
! All stories have a beginning; most good stories have good beginnings. For the 
Cape Crusaders, the sport began before their memories do. Their beginnings are 
almost mythic, lost in the fog of childhood. It is amazing how much their answers to a 
seemingly simple question – “When did you start playing baseball?” – can reveal. Tory 
Jimenez answers immediately: “Since I was old enough to hold a bat, I guess.” He 
laughs, then guesses an age: “Three years old?” Len Clement simply says he’s been 
playing for “as long as I can remember.” These two, like almost all of the others, simply 
don’t remember a time before baseball. Baseball predates their memories; they’ve been 
told about childhood obsessions, or their first encounters with the sport.  Seth James is 
forced to speculate about when he started playing. “Around two... if that’s possible. I 
started playing T-ball at my church. At least that’s what I’m told. I don’t really remember.” 
! Twenty-four of the 26 players interviewed could not remember a time before they 
played baseball. How few things – how few people – can any of us say that about? 
One’s family, one’s childhood home, sleeping, eating, breathing, school for those who 
went to pre-school; there are very few things that any of us know we have been doing 
since before we even began to form memories. Both Trent Añez and Larry Kloves are 
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sensitive to the reality that baseball has been part of their lives for literally as long as 
they can remember. How long have they played baseball? 
My whole life... probably since I was three, four years old.... Yeah. 
I can’t remember. I’ve always been playing. Sports have been 
basically my whole life. ! ! ! – Trent Añez
I started playing... probably when I started walking. (laughs) I’ve 
been playing baseball all my life.! ! – Larry Kloves
! Baseball is more like eating or walking for players who have done it for their 
entire lives (and who, as we will see in a moment, have always shone at the endeavor). 
It is simply a constant feature of their lives, part of themselves before they even knew 
who they really were. For many, it is not only a fixed star in their life, but one with 
connections to other fixtures that transcend memory: their homes and their families. 
I started playing probably before I could walk. Because my dad 
was making me – I don’t know – probably putting baseball stuff 
around me because he always played baseball. 
! ! ! ! ! - Outfielder Vlad Simon
I started playing as young as I can remember. T-ball... whenever 
that was, however old you are... like five, I want to say. Maybe. I 
don’t know. But as far as I know before that I was playing catch 
with my dad in the backyard all the time.
! ! ! ! ! – Catcher Hal Olsen
! But for poetry, for sheer cinematic Americana, it is difficult to top Jon Tufton:
When my dad was working on the farm, I was probably out 
swinging the bat, and he’d come over after he got done doing the 
chores. I was probably about five or six, and he’d be throwing me 
some balls in the – in the middle of the farm.63
! Like their parents, like their childhood backyards, baseball is something that has 
always been a part of these players’ stories. It is one thing to reminisce about things out 
of memory long since abandoned (pre-school, for instance) but quite another to think of 
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63 It’s worth noting that Jon’s story echoes two seminal American films about baseball. In Field of Dreams, 
Kevin Costner builds a baseball diamond in the middle of a cornfield; in The Natural, Robert Redford is a 
boy-wonder baseball player who makes a run at the Big Leagues from the farming heartland. 
it alongside other timeless features of one’s life. Baseball is their origin myth, their 
Aeneid, their constant. As Ray Sheffield puts it, “It seems like every day that comes by 
deals with baseball.” Jon Tufton echoes the sentiment: “It’s just always been part of my 
life.” 
! “Figure the number of hours, the number of leagues, the number of whatever 
they’ve ever played in,” says Housing Coordinator Irene Isaac. “This has been their 
whole life.” Steve Mott explains that it is also a way of marking time. “I played in Pony, 
so going through Mustang and Bronco and everything, I was always the bigger guy and 
I realized every time I went to the next level, I was still the bigger guy.” The graduation 
from one youth league to the next – Pony, Mustang, Bronco – and to high school, then 
college, and now the Cape divides players’ lives into discrete units defined by their 
sport. Baseball literally marks transitions from one life stage to the next. But Steve 
Mott’s comment says more: “I was always the bigger guy.” These players are defined 
not simply by the longevity of their careers, or by the intimate connections baseball has 
to other aspects of their lives, but by the fact that they have always been one of the best 
players – often the best player – on every team for which they have ever played. By the 
time they have reached the Cape, they have been at the top of Little League, high 
school, and even their high-powered collegiate teams. Host parents understand this as 
well as anyone, as former host and team announcer Corey Roberts explains: “When 
you’re the star of your team, you’re the big man on campus. When you’ve been growing 
up all your life and you’ve been pegged as the superstar, you know – you’re entitled.”
! Team Treasurer and host parent Larry Dennis agrees. “They do get treated as 
something special. Wherever they are, they’ve been really good at whatever level 
they’ve played at, and whatever team they’re on.” He takes a breath and continues.  
“The hero adulation thing is – I’m sure – intriguing... I think that’s a pressure on the kids, 
too – to be successful in the thing that they seem to be the most noticed for.” Larry is on 
to something when he talks about the thing players are “most noticed for.” It’s worth 
pausing to appreciate the full scope of what baseball has meant to these young men. In 
addition to connecting them to childhood, to their families, and to their progress through 
life, baseball has brought them attention and adulation, success and opportunity. It is 
what they are best known for, and what they think makes them who they are.
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! We are, all of us, fragmented. We are sons and daughters, parents and 
grandparents, teachers and students, friends, lovers, neighbors, employees, 
supervisors, and so on. This entails being different things to different people at different 
times, and putting on the appropriate act; we might ask the same question quite 
differently depending on whether we put it to a classroom full of students or to a dinner 
table full of friends. Goffman’s central insight is exactly this: our identities are constituted 
by the parts we play, by the props, scenery, and fellow travelers who put us in the 
appropriate social role. But not all identities are created equal; some are easier to bring 
to the surface – to “call forth” – than others. 
! For the Cape Crusaders, being an elite baseball player is omnipresent and 
impossible to submerge; it is an identity that dominates and overshadows all others. 
Seth James says being a baseball player is “everything” to him – an answer every 
player asked that question repeated, if not in exactly those words. Players consider their 
identity qua baseball players to be crucial to their self-definition, to their sense of self. 
When I ask Trent Añez what it means to him, he has the same answer. 
Everything. I feel like it’s just a part of me now. It’s family, school, 
and baseball, in that order. It’s literally part of my everyday life, 
because I wanna be a professional baseball player. So everything 
is centered around that, everything I do is directed towards the 
draft and helping my college team win. So... everything. 
Everything. Everything in life now, at this point.
! “You literally eat, sleep, and breathe it,” Trent says. There is more to Trent’s 
misplaced literalism than might first meet the eye. Baseball does guide most, if not all, 
of his everyday activities. What he eats revolves around trying to build muscle and keep 
his body healthy; when he eats is determined by game times, workout routines, and 
practice schedules. His sleeping habits are patterned on game days versus off days and 
on morning practices. Ray Sheffield says much the same thing: “I think baseball, eat 
baseball, live baseball, so you know... everything I do is in baseball terms. I would say 
my whole identity is baseball.” Baseball is an around-the-clock activity, he continues: 
“from the minute you wake up to the minute you go to sleep. It’s never-ending.” Len 
Clement chimes in: “It’s pretty much always on your mind... I’m always thinking about 
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my next start. It’s part of your life. It’s something that you don’t take for granted. It’s 
something that you love doing, and you don’t ever want to think about the end of it. 
Being a baseball player is really part of your life.” 
! When Len says it’s “part of your life,” he means that it’s more than a sport: it is a 
lifestyle. Baseball is more than a pastime for these young men. It is, as I have noted, 
something more, something that sits alongside school, career, or family as a more or 
less permanent fixture of their lives. Of course, it isn’t actually permanent. Nothing is, 
and baseball’s promise can be more fleeting than many. On some level, the players 
must know this, but even in their more reflective moments, they have trouble grappling 
with the fact that this, like all good things, must come to an end. Hal Olsen reflects:
I think about that sometimes – what’s going to happen when 
baseball isn’t there anymore? It’s weird to think about because 
baseball – like I said – is who I am, pretty much. You still take 
school seriously because you know there’s going to be a time 
when baseball’s not around, but I can’t imagine what I’d be 
doing... It’s a huge part of my life.
! Baseball is who he is, he says, and to lose it would be to lose part of himself. Hal 
notes that baseball is how he relates to the world around him, and the people in it: 
“Everybody knows I’m a baseball player. Everybody I’ve ever known knows that I’m a 
baseball player. That’s just who I am.” These comments tie together the concepts of 
narrative identity and social cues. He has come to think of himself as an elite baseball 
player, and takes others’ treatment of him as social cues confirming his place in the 
social firmament. And, though I did not interview Hal’s friends, it is impossible not to 
think that they take his identity and actions as a baseball player as social cues as well, 
socially situating him and them. He has come to think of himself as the proper recipient 
of social cues for elite baseball players. 
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Training, Reinforcing, and Calling Forth a Dominant Identity
! Ballplayers are fond of saying that hitting a baseball is the hardest thing to do in 
sports; even the very best can do it only a third of the time.64 To be a player of their 
caliber means years of athletic training, both gross and fine motor skills. Players must 
have the arm and core strength to swing a wooden bat in less than a second, and the 
leg strength to drive through the ball; they must have reflexes and coordination to make 
contact with a baseball swerving towards them at high speeds, and the agility to sprint 
to first base before the ball arrives. But sitting alongside these skills are other micro-
physical details. The parallels between the ways players’ bodies are called into service 
to perform their identity and the ways Montgommery describes a soldier’s bearing are 
striking: “lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders” (Foucault 
1978: 135-36). What Ray Sheffield says about the ways baseball players carry 
themselves could be just as easily applied to soldiers: “They have this sort of walk, and 
they kind of talk all the same. You can just kinda tell who’s a baseball player and who’s 
not. It’s just by their demeanor, the way they present themselves.” Vlad Simon is a little 
more detailed, but he too has trouble describing exactly what makes a baseball player 
look like a baseball player. 
There’s definitely a look. It’s kind of hard to put into words... 
There’s a certain walk, there’s a certain way guys dress, a way 
they wear their hat, a sixth sense of like – like if you walk in to get 
food somewhere and he’s wearing like a hat, and like basketball 
shorts and – “Oh, he’s plays baseball.” I can definitely tell, 
because I’ve been around it for a while. You can tell who plays.
! Vlad identifies some of the physical presentations associated with his role: 
athletic shorts, a baseball cap, a “certain way guys dress.” Unlike other athletes, 
baseball players almost without exception prefer black athletic socks to white. Vlad’s 
teammate Peter Wrass points to the ubiquity of chewing tobacco among baseball 
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64 When one considers the physics behind using a round bat to hit a round ball that has been thrown at 
you at 95 miles per hour, it is easy to credit these claims. Actually, when one considers the physics, it’s 
hard to believe anyone can ever hit a Major League fastball. 
players as another behavioral marker.65 These are social cues that players project to 
situate themselves in a culture, and that their counterparts use to place them and each 
other. It also marks them as proper recipients for further social cues that will both refine 
their identity and further specify their social place. Their coaches demand that they 
perfect their bearing, carriage, attitude, and body language. Few of us, I imagine, think 
about how clean a player’s shoes are as relevant, or notice the crispness with which 
players sport their uniforms. To many they might seem to be small matters, but Coach 
Kimmel knows that when you are trying to build an identity – or even impose one – 
everything matters.
There are no little things, you know? There just aren’t any little 
things. Everything, um... you can’t really rank them. The way you 
put on your uniform says, you know – guys that are shining their 
shoes are taking pride in the way they look. If they can’t do simple 
stuff like that, then it’s gonna be pretty tough to hit [a pitch at] 95 
[miles per hour] with the bases loaded, and full count, with the 
game on the line... We want them to be professionals, so when 
they get to Yankee Stadium or they get to Fenway Park,66 they 
know how to conduct themselves. They know how to wear their 
uniforms, they know how to pay attention to the National Anthem, 
they know how to conduct themselves in pre-game and get their 
conditioning in, and how to pay attention to the game during the 
game, and how take care of themselves when the game is over.
!
! Two things from Coach Kimmel’s monologue are worth highlighting in particular. 
For one, none of the behaviors he articulates are actually engaged with the playing of a 
baseball game. In fact, with the exception of “how to pay attention to the game,” none 
even occur during a baseball game, but before and after. They are all about how to 
conduct oneself in a professional manner. “How would they act in Fenway Park if it was 
their first day in the Major Leagues?” asks Coach Kimmel. “That’s how we want them to 
act for 44 games.” Coach Brake’s take is more colorful, but tellingly similar: 
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65 And, for what it’s worth, it’s another harmful activity that players perpetuate despite the obvious harms 
to themselves. While no doubt nicotine addiction plays a role in the durability of this particular habit, it 
seems likely that players at least start using chewing tobacco as a way of performing the identity to which 
they aspire. Tobacco use has come to mark a certain seriousness about the game, and players wishing to 
be taken as serious students of it might well use that social cue to communicate it. 
66 Fenway Park is the home of the Major League Boston Red Sox, Yankee Stadium of the Major League 
New York Yankees. 
Coach Brown says, “Hey, tuck your shirt in.” [He mimes an 
exasperated player.] “Tuck your shirt in without the bad body 
language.” How about just – I play for the Yankees and my f---ing 
shirt is tucked in?
! What is of interest here is not that players know these social cues are for them; 
after all, they are their coaches’ players and they are obviously the target. However, the 
specific mechanisms by which the coaches telegraph that their players are the 
recipients of these cues is illuminating. Both Coach Kimmel and Coach Brake talk about 
training their players to act as if they were already professional, as if they already 
played for the Yankees. Kimmel tells them to mimic All-Star Roy Halladay’s professional 
attitude, and when Coach Brake instructs his hitters on how to impress scouts with 
professional-looking warm-up swings in the batter’s box, he does so by comparing their 
swings to Major Leaguers like Derek Jeter. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
Crusaders’ locker room is full of pictures of Major League batters either in a proper 
stance or doing a drill the coaches want the players to copy. A coach may tell them to 
tuck in their uniform or put on a baseball cap, but their instructions are laced with 
demands and entreaties to mimic Major League players. Players are constantly 
barraged by comparisons to the professional players they hope to one day be. These 
practices serve to alert players that the social cue is for them, because their identity 
counsels that they are the sort of person for whom professional players are an 
appropriate model. 
! The coaches are not the only people on the Cape who call forth players not 
simply as elites, but as (prospective) professionals. The fans, whether older fans who 
love the game or the many young children who themselves dream of playing baseball, 
come to the park to watch baseball players – not students, sons, brothers, or even 
simply young men. The uniform they wear, the number on their back, and the skills they 
bring to the field are the reasons that 3,000 fans and perhaps as many as 30 
professional scouts – will come to the Crusaders’ ballpark each night. Very few college 
players get to play in front of such large crowds and enjoy the attention from so large a 
rapt audience. Ray Sheffield responds immediately when I ask what makes the Cape 
League feel different. “Fans – so many more fans than we get at school,” he says. “That 
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kind of gives it a little professional atmosphere.” Trent Añez agrees that the fans, and 
the attention they give players, make him feel like a professional: 
You’re hanging around after the game like a half hour just to sign 
autographs, especially – like even around town you’re going to 
see discounts for our team everywhere. Everyone’s always – you 
wear a Crusaders’ shirt, everyone’s talking to you, see how you’re 
doing. It definitely feels like a professional atmosphere.
! Vlad Simon thinks of post-game autograph seekers not just as a facsimile for 
professional baseball, but as training for it, just like batting practice or a game. “We do 
early work,” he says. “We work out. We play a game, do autographs.” Greeting the fans 
and signing baseballs are also performances tightly associated with the identity these 
players project. Players perform their sport for fans while they are on the field, and their 
identity to fans when they are off. The relationship between performer and audience 
shifts a little when the last out is made, but it is still predicated on a player’s identity as a 
player. In fact, as Larry Dennis points out, all the attention players get out on the Cape 
has this identity as its origin: 
If they have any chance at all, scouts are looking at them, people 
are talking to them all the time, they get interviewed by 
newspapers and TV and radio. Even in the microcosm that is the 
Cape Cod Baseball League – we have two sportscasters this year 
– well, after the game they go out and interview the player of the 
game, or the coach, or a couple of the players or whatever. So 
there’s always a spotlight on them that not a lot of people get in 
life, and it’s all because they can play baseball.
! Fans and sportscasters are interested in baseball players only as such, and 
players respond as players. Being asked for an autograph after a baseball game while 
wearing a baseball uniform is a powerful social cue that tells players who they are, at 
least in that moment: they are borderline professional baseball players. When Trent 
Añez says the attention feels professional, it is because he interprets it as a social cue 
placing him as an important, professional player.
! Though neither autograph-seekers nor strictly fans, professional scouts are still 
an audience, and a specialized and evocative one at that. They are, after all, the 
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intended audience for the professional-looking warm-up swing that players spend time 
perfecting, but that is lost on the casual fan. Little calls forth a player’s identity as 
aspiring professional more readily than the hundreds of scouts who descend on the 
Cape League after Independence Day. When a Crusader digs into the batter’s box, 
professional baseball is literally looking over his shoulder. Bill Jameson explains the 
stakes:
To get the exposure that these kids get, playing in front of the 
scouts that they do every night – the scouts, the Major League 
general managers, national cross-checkers, special assistants to 
the GM... I mean, they get – they’re playing in front of decision-
makers in professional baseball.
! And those decision-makers are there to see them in their capacity as players. 
What could be a more telling social cue than thirty professional scouts behind the 
backstop? What could tell a player that the cue is for him more than the fact that he is 
on a baseball field, wearing a baseball uniform, and all their radar guns are pointed at 
him?
! There are more subtle twists to the Cape League that also tell players that they 
are almost professionals. Unlike college, the Cape uses wooden bats, which makes for 
a more professional-style game.67 Jon Tufton ratifies this: “I definitely think it’s a lot more 
professional here with the wood bat.” Donyell Traynor, though, gives the most detail as 
to why everyone loves playing with wood: 
[Pitchers] love them. They would rather pitch to a wood bat. To be 
honest, I’d rather play with wood bats too, in college. I would get 
rid of the metal bat immediately. You don’t play with metal bats in 
the pros, so why would you want to play with them in college? 
Why would you want to play with them in high school? It feels way 
more professional. You feel like.... you feel more like a baseball 
player. You feel way more like a baseball player when you’re using 
wood bats, playing in a wood bat league.
! When I speak to batting coach Carl Brake about wood bats and professionalism, 
he nods: “Aluminum’s not going to get you into the Hall of Fame.  Wood is.” Brake 
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67 Recall from Chapter 1 that because wooden bats break, pitchers are more likely to throw difficult 
pitches close to the batter’s body: “inside” pitches. This completely changes the strategy behind an at-bat 
to one reminiscent of how professional baseball is played. 
encourages me, though, to think beyond the wood bats: “You made a good point about 
the wood bat – don’t stop there. They’re playing six, seven days a week... they’re 
playing a professional schedule.” Playing every day – grinding through a day-in-and-
day-out routine, is a warm-up to professional life. Scout Rory Jones spoke of the 44 
games in seven weeks on the Cape as a step towards the 90, 130, or 160 game 
seasons that players face as they climb the professional ladder. The players understand 
this, and think of the Cape schedule as another measure of professionalization. “It kind 
of feels like minor league ball,” says Landon Escher. “’Cause, I mean, you’re playing 
every day. In college we play Friday-Saturday-Sunday, then maybe one mid-week 
game. Out here we play five, six days in a row. So it’s just like minor league ball.”
! The question becomes not how easy it might be to hail players qua players, but 
how difficult it is to summon any other facets of their identity. They are, after all, there 
specifically because of the ability and identity as baseball players, and it is as baseball 
players (and often only as baseball players) that they are of interest to others on the 
Cape. At least during the game, Coach Kimmel reduces players’ identities to only 
“baseball player.” He says, “When they’re on the baseball field, all they are to me are 
baseball players. It’s not Ray Sheffield the person; it’s the shortstop for the Cape 
Crusaders.” They have no names, no histories, nothing but a number and a position on 
the field. They are, in these moments that happen every day on the Cape, ballplayers 
and nothing else. Sometimes they respond as such even when that wasn’t the intention. 
Treasurer Larry Dennis wonders aloud: “You don’t often hear them talking about ‘How 
were your studies this year?’” He means to tell me that baseball is almost all players talk 
about, almost all they think about. He might be even more right than he knows. Nine 
Crusaders played for the team during both summers of fieldwork. When I sat with them 
the second summer, I thought I would start the interview with chit-chat about their lives: 
“How was your year?” Not one of the nine – not one – mentioned school, or family, or 
friends, or girlfriends, or vacations. To a man, they all started talking about baseball.
! From their coaches, to the fans, to the scouts, to their schedule, to the very bats 
in their hands, the Crusaders are bombarded with social cues telling them they are 
elites – almost professionals – and the Crusaders are more than receptive. As they 
process and internalize these social cues, it begins to affect not only their perception of 
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their social place, but also to influence how they behave. A player’s decisions to sign 
autographs after a game, to stand in a particular way in the batter’s box, or to meet with 
an agent are consistent with baseball culture’s dictates about what behaviors are 
acceptable. What is considered fair or correct is defined by baseball culture and 
assimilated by its participants. Players sign autographs because that’s what elite 
players are supposed to do; players take certain practice swings because that’s how 
elite players are supposed to look; players take meetings with agents because that’s 
how elite players are supposed act. 
Imagined Futures and Implicated Behaviors
! An agent, I argued in the last chapter, is a social cue; as I’ll show in the next 
section, players’ identities dictate that it is a social cue that applies to them. But it also 
serves to answer a different question. When a player wonders how to approach what 
they assume is the coming transition to professionalism, the fact that “people like them” 
have agents functions as an informational cue as well; it suggests a particular course of 
action without requiring the player to actually do the research as to what an agent can 
or cannot do for them as an individual. Players are drawn to agents because agents are 
a social cue suggestive of someone in their perceived position, but also because they 
already envision a professional future where informational cues suggest that someone 
like them “ought” to have one. While this cue is a faulty one in Lupia and McCubbins’ 
scheme, it makes perfect sense when one considers players’ aspirational identity as a 
component of their present one. 
! Rosenwald and Ochberg say that “The storyteller says, ‘This person I am today 
is who I have been years becoming’” (1992: 9), but it is not as if the stories we tell about 
ourselves end in the present. The person we have spent years becoming isn’t severable 
from the person we anticipate being tomorrow, next week, or next year; even though we 
know there will be intervening events and changes of course, we imagine that our 
present self will continue on a trajectory we cannot help but imagine. Just as the 
Crusaders have spent their lives as baseball players, they have spent their lives as 
players who dream of playing professionally. Seth James’ conception of himself as a 
baseball player is not predicated just on having played as long as he can remember but 
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on the early realization that: “When I knew baseball could be a job that I could do for the 
rest of my life is really when I knew I wanted to work hard at it to be able to do it for the 
rest of my life.” “I’ve always wanted to do this for a living,” notes top prospect Jerry Lee, 
“ever since I was a little kid.” Kit Nielsen changes the verbiage, but not much: “Growing 
up as a kid it’s always something I wanted to do.” Ray Sheffield, Jerry Lee’s middle-
infield teammate, says much the same thing: “It was always something I wanted to do, 
was get drafted.” He echoes the language players use to describe how long they’ve 
played: “For as long as I could remember, it’s all I wanted to do, is play pro ball.” 
Always; always; always. Dreams of playing professionally occupy a similar place in 
players’ psyches as playing itself does. It is a constant fixture. 
! The similarities in these responses – the use of “always,” the fact that the dream 
developed in childhood – suggest that the dream itself is part of player identity. Derrick 
Martinez speculates that it is a common aspect of players’ identities, while using the 
same words to describe it. “It’s always been my dream to play,” he says. “I think it’s 
anyone’s dream who plays – starts out in baseball and wants to be a Big Leaguer.” A 
good catcher must see the whole field, and catcher Hal Olsen here tries to see the big 
picture: 
I think most of us feel the same way. It’s something we’ve done 
our whole lives, and have dreamed about going to pro ball, playing 
pro ball. And being out here... it’s definitely a big step towards that. 
Most of the guys here are going to do it. It’s definitely – we have 
the same feeling about it that way. It’s gonna happen. It’s just 
when is it gonna happen.
! Hal’s comments point to the longstanding connections he and his teammates 
have to playing baseball and to dreaming about playing professionally. He 
acknowledges the confidence with which they approach their futures – the “when,” not 
“if.” 68
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68 Confidence, and its relative self-deception, are important enough to the story that they need their own 
chapter, but it is worth noting here that coaches, agents, and players alike never talk about what will 
happen “if” they make it to professional baseball. They always say “when.” They protect the dream – 
thereby protecting a facet of a closely held identity – by projecting confidence that it will come true, and 
denying the evidence that it might not.
! The power of narrative identity is apparent when one characterizes players’ 
origins as baseball players as beginnings, and their imagined (and assumed) futures in 
professional baseball as ends. They now occupy the middle of this trajectory, and must 
do what they can to make it fit the right narrative arc. And, as Goffman would rush to 
add, in order to be individuals on a path to professional baseball, they must act like 
players on such a path. The concept of a narrative arc or path finds purchase in the 
metaphor of stepping-stones players often use. As I argued above, it can literally mark 
the step from one life stage to the next as a player rises up through the ranks, and the 
Cape is just such a step, but it is not the last step players envision. T-Ball, Pony, 
Mustang, Bronco, high school, college, Cape League, minor leagues, and the Big 
Leagues; these players are still in the middle of a story to which they have already 
written the end in their minds. 
! Playing on Cape Cod, the most competitive and highly touted of the amateur 
leagues, is a step along the predefined path to professional baseball. “Even getting 
invited here is a next step,” says Trent Iñez, “because this is where all the top guys 
come.” Derrick Martinez elaborates:
It’s definitely a step in the right direction, and one step closer to 
where you want to go. You know, it’s a great opportunity if you do 
well here. It’s a really good stepping-stone.
! Not only is the Cape League a step closer to professional baseball, but given the 
percentage of Cape players who get drafted, a substantial one, as Coach Carl Brake 
explains: 
Most of these kids... I don’t know exactly what the numbers are, 
but they’re gonna get to play professional baseball. So this is kind 
of a stepping-stone, you know? It’s different than their college 
season, and it’s not professional baseball, but it’s in between. You 
get a little taste of it.
! The Cape, as Brake has it, is not only a “stepping-stone” on the path to the pros, 
but a sampling of what it will be like if – no, when – his players get there. Pitcher Brett 
Johanssen combines the metaphor of steps with the idea of a puzzle:
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It kind of feels like a puzzle, and these are all the pieces. Like, you 
know, you put it together and finally complete the puzzle. I guess, 
you know, it’s actually Major League baseball, but these are all the 
little steps for it. So with each new step, it’s like you’re getting that 
much closer.
! These players, as I have argued, have come to perceive of themselves as the 
type of person, an elite baseball player, who will play professional baseball. As they tell 
this middle part of that narrative that defines them, they conceive of themselves as the 
appropriate audience for social cues placing them in that social space, and as the 
appropriate performer to issue – to replicate – those social cues. Illicit agent use is one 
way people in amateur baseball place a player as an elite, and having an agent is a way 
to perform that identity, even if only to themselves; the privacy of the performance is 
facilitated both by the behavior’s illegal character and the social norms abjuring 
discussion of baseball as a business. 
! But more than the recipients and propagators of this social cue, agent use can 
also be considered as an informational cue for players who think of themselves as 
elites. Having fixed themselves in a particular social position by asking, “What sort of 
person am I?” players now ask a new question: “What should a person like me do?” To 
answer this analytically subsequent question is to presuppose an answer to, “Who is 
relevantly ‘like me?’” By looking to standard, normalized elite practice, players can take 
a shortcut to what they “ought” to do without having to actually research the roles, 
responsibilities, and limitations of an agent. Remember that I, unlike Lupia and 
McCubbins, do not insist that an informational cue lead an actor to the most “rational” 
decision, or to the decision they would make if they actually did exhaustive research on 
it. Instead, I’m concerned with the processes through which a person perceives as cue 
as a shortcut that answers the question, “What should a person like me do in a situation 
like this?” This, I believe, is exactly how players perceive the ubiquity of agent use 
among elites, a group of which they consider themselves a relevant member. 
Rule-Breaking as a Natural Outgrowth of Identity
! As players step from one metaphorical stone to the next, they look at fellow 
travelers walking the same path, or who have walked the same path, who have roughly 
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the same narrative arc and narrative identity. As they try to decide which step to take 
next, the widespread use of agents by elite amateurs suggests an answer. It shouldn’t 
be surprising, given the cultural symbolism that having an agent has attained, that 
developing a relationship with an agent is considered a step along the path to 
professional baseball. In fact, players like Steve Mott use the same verbiage to describe 
it: “It’s just kind of a stepping-stone. Like, at high school, then the next step is college, 
then the next step is professional baseball. So it’s just another stepping-stone.” Recall 
that his teammate Larry Kloves said that having an agent “comes with being a great 
athlete”; he went on to describe it as “being able to take that next step.” Catcher Kevin 
Timmons describes how the relationship with an agent can confirm a player’s sense of 
self and reinforce their perception of their narrative arc:
Honestly, having an advisor kind of feels like the next step in 
getting signed, getting to the Big Leagues. That’s what it makes 
you feel like, honestly. Once you’re like, “Yeah, I got an advisor,” 
it’s kind of like a step up because they sought you out, they 
realized the potential you have in playing the game, and see that 
you can play at the next level.
! Though not all players use the language of the stepping-stone, other descriptors 
achieve the same effect. Pitcher Ricky Sheppard thinks of getting an agent as a 
“checkpoint” rather than a stepping-stone, but in elaborating even he falls back on the 
pathway metaphor: “[It] lets me know I’m stepping in the right direction and, you know, 
just keep doing what I’m doing, because it’s working so far.” Peter Wrass isn’t sure he 
needs an advisor – though by the second summer he will have changed his mind. That 
said, he acknowledges that it represents progress towards the goal, though he favors a 
vertical metaphor: “I think it might be the next rung on the ladder.” Top prospect Vlad 
Simon uses a math allegory, though the same step-by-step process is implied: “There’s 
an order of operations, and that’s one of them.”!
! Housing Coordinator Irene Isaac has spent enough time around these players to 
know how attractive these players find attention from agents, and why they cling to it as 
a part of the story they tell on their way to professional baseball: 
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Some advisor walks up and says “Hi, I’m so and so, here’s my 
card,” you know, “Could we meet for lunch tomorrow and talk?” It’s 
like, “Whoa, you know, whoa. This must mean, you know, I’m 
really good. I’m doing stuff that’s right, and this is just another step 
for me to take, although I don’t have a clue of what [agents] are 
doing.”
! Players, she knows, characterize getting an agent as just another step along the 
way to what they imagine and predict their futures will be. But more than this, she 
understands the psychological value they impute to the relationship. The assumption, 
upon contact from an agent, is that it reflects the player’s own understanding of his 
talent and professional capabilities. They fit the event into the prefabricated narrative, 
the preconceived pathway, on which they believe themselves to be embarked.69
! Coach Seth Williams acknowledges the widespread sentiment that getting an 
agent is simply part of the process or narrative: high school, college, Cape League, 
agent, draft, pros. In fact, it is this general acceptance that concerns him: “I think they 
look at pro ball and they go, ‘Well, I get an agent, I get a scout, I get signed, and then 
we’re off and running.’ Well, it’s not like that.” What Williams means is that while agent 
use is a shortcut to the performance of elite identity, players can conflate it with a 
shortcut to elite production on the field. An agent, perhaps it is obvious, does little or 
nothing for a player’s on-field abilities, but Williams worries that it fosters a false sense 
of security. A better grasp of elite meta-language will not help a player get a hit either on 
the Cape or next year in Rookie League. Nor, Williams pointed out, are they particularly 
close to their ultimate goal. Even if they are one of the 1,500 players drafted next year 
to play professionally – and most of them will be – few will ever claim one of the 750 
Major League roster spots, and those who do will need to spend years of hard work 
further honing their skills in the minors. The Crusaders’ coach wishes they would pay 
more attention in fielding practice, more attention to playing an elite game than to 
performing the role.
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69 There is much here by way of motivated cognition and confirmation bias; as information tending to 
confirm what players think about the world and their place in it, players are far more likely to uncritically 
accept it (Taber & Lodge 2006; Cowen 2005). And, as I’ll show in the next chapter, use it to ward off or 
explain away information that undermines their preconceptions.
! Law and society, criminology, and other sociological approaches to law and 
deviance seek explanations for widespread rule-breaking. Social pressures, the desire 
to belong, and the constitutive work deviance does in gang membership is one such 
approach (Garot 2010), as is Tom Tyler’s finding that we are far more likely to break 
rules we find unjust independent of any benefits or costs that might accrue (2006). This 
chapter expands the number of available explanations. Unlike gang members, amateur 
players need not get an agent to actually be elite. While it is not constitutive of identity in 
exactly the same way, it is confirmative of a narrative identity they have spent their lives 
constructing, and strongly suggested by their cultural framework as an appropriate 
behavior for people “like them” despite the fact that it is against the rules, and 
regardless of any particular costs and benefits. 
! I chose not to ask the subjects of this study about steroid use in amateur 
baseball (I felt it might jeopardize the players’ trust) but one can readily imagine how 
that instance of rule-breaking could find explanatory purchase in this account. The 
identity of a baseball player is perfectly consistent with steroid use, especially after the 
revelations of its prevalence in the Major Leagues around the turn of the last century. 
There might be little pressure from one’s baseball identity not to cheat, and if steroid 
use were in fact identified with the professional role, amateur players’ aspirations for 
both higher production and a more elite identity might underwrite the practice. 
! Consider another intersection of narrative identity and deviance. The Catholic 
Church’s position on premarital sex and contraception, while socially and politically 
controversial, is doctrinally unambiguous.70 And yet, despite its steadfastness, legions of 
its flock violate these clear tenets, while still considering themselves to be practicing 
Catholics (Goldscheider & Mosher 1991; Wilhelm 1996; Jones & Dreweke 2011; Shaw 
2013). In truth, the Church’s ban on premarital sex and contraceptive measures has 
becomes divorced (as it were) from the narrative identity of what it means to be a 
Catholic (Shaw, especially, thinks that this division between doctrine and narrative is 
problem for American Catholicism; 2013). Members of the Church grow up in far more 
flexible atmosphere at odds with official decrees. Many may internalize the cultural 
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70 Pope Paul VI issued the encyclical Humanae Vitae in 1968, emphasizing the intrinsic immorality of birth 
control. 
understanding that such practices are not at odds with their Catholicism, and so what 
appears to be a case of widespread cognitive dissonance might be readily explained by 
the combination of cue theory and legal consciousness I have advocated in this chapter. 
The Church community offers social cues including and excluding particular people and 
behaviors from the faith community, thereby providing answers to “how should I act” for 
those who perceive themselves as part of it. 
! The norm is also facilitated in part by individual churches’ atmosphere of non-
enforcement; not completely dissimilar to the NCAA’s failure to enforce Bylaw 12.3.2.1 
despite official proclamations of agents’ illegality. Catholic non-enforcement of the 
doctrinal rules opens up space for identities incorporating both Catholicism and 
contraception to be fashioned by those breaking the rules. The broken rules may not be 
confirmative of a particular Catholic identity in the same way a broken NCAA rule is, but 
the social space in which identity can be structured around rule-infringement is made 
available by a similar mechanism. 
! I pivoted in this chapter from examining how social cues help an individual place 
themselves and others within a social structure to how, once situated, informational 
cues can help that individual decide the ways it is appropriate to act. How might a 
legally unsophisticated actor approach a complex legal question about how to initiate a 
divorce, or retrieve welfare? If someone they know and perceive to be like them (which 
is to say perceived as similarly situated through social cues) had been divorced or 
claimed a check, it seems likely that the novice would use their friend’s behavior as a 
proxy for what they should do – as an informational cue. 
! But informational cues are not simply there for the taking. They are subject to 
cognitive, psychological, and social forces that can change how different individuals 




The Hidden Ball Trick:
Confidence and Self-Deception: The Protective Lies Players Tell Themselves
Crash: Look, Nuke, these Big League hitters are going to light you 
up like a pinball machine for a while, all right? Don’t worry about it. 
You be cocky and arrogant, even when you’re getting beat. That’s 
the secret. You gotta play this game with fear and arrogance.
Nuke: ... fear and ignorance. 
Crash: No, fear and arrogance, you hayseed, not ignorance. 
Nuke: I know, I know. I just like seeing you get all worked up. 
! – Bull Durham
Cultural Means of Reproduction
! Silbey calls on those who study legal consciousness to interrogate the 
relationship and disparity between the law as it is applied and the law as it exists “on the 
books” to examine the ways that these discrepancies contribute to the reproduction of 
inequality by the very people harmed by them (2005: 359). When Bourdieu says that 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to act 
as structuring structures” manage to socially reproduce themselves, he is prodding a 
similar phenomenon (1977: 72). I have, so far, attempted to show how one particular 
rule-breaking norm became attached to a social identity, and how its emergence as a 
social cue to that identity led to its replication by players who bear a cost to replicate it. 
In so doing, I have borrowed the concept of a cue from political heuristics and 
marshaled it to explain how social cues enable us to make assumptions about our place 
in a social structure. 
! Now I want to begin addressing a different question, albeit one broached in the 
previous chapter: how can a particular cultural predisposition affect how individuals 
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receive and process informational cues in way that encourages them to replicate 
structures that harm them? Once players place themselves in a particular social 
grouping, they come to believe that an agent is something that “someone like them” 
ought to have. What I want to explore here are the ways that baseball’s culture shapes 
the informational cues available to players and creates a situation where rule-breaking 
(in the form of an agent) is not only confirmative of social identity, but deployed to 
protect it. 
! All sports – indeed, most endeavors – require some measure of confidence from 
practitioners. Cheng and Furnam find that academic self-confidence increases 
academic achievement even when controlling for IQ (2002:336), while Boxtel and 
Monks’s conclusion is a bit broader: “A positive self-concept in all areas seems to be the 
driving force for achievements” (2002:169). In some situations, confidence can even 
help build trust among strangers (Child & Möllering 2003), and forge new social ties 
(Shane & Cable 2002). There is some indication, though, that self-confidence and its 
positive effects on attitude and outlook are both more prominent and prized among 
high-caliber athletes (Jones, et al 2001). 
! Popular culture may have it that sprinters require more cockiness than distance 
athletes, or that goalies require a more unshakeable confidence to brush off the goal 
they’ve just let in and act as if they hadn’t, but none of this especially matters. What 
matters is that baseball players believe that their sport requires more confidence than 
others. Baseball believes in its own exceptionalism, as the sport’s tropes and mythology 
readily reveal. Part of the reason for this is the sport’s belief that it has a deeper 
relationship with failure than others. True or not, the widespread and steadfast belief 
that baseball, more than other games, is one of failure inculcates and underwrites the 
belief that those who practice it must do so with full confidence. Players are told over 
and over that they must step onto the mound or into the batter’s box with confidence in 
a favorable outcome. They are told that in order to make it to the next level – whether it 
is the next step up in youth baseball, Division 1, the Cape Cod League, or professional 
baseball – they must have confidence that they already belong there; they must believe 
that it is only a matter of time. 
104
! The tension between confidence and endemic failure leads to another 
psychological feature baseball and its players think of as constitutive of the sport: self-
deception. How can a batter step into the box convinced he will get a hit when he knows 
full well that he faces the best pitcher in the league – when cold, unyielding statistics 
suggest that a preferred outcome is unlikely? Players must ignore or explain away 
evidence that undermines their closely held beliefs about their talent and their assumed 
futures. They must deceive themselves as to the likelihood of outcomes. Players must 
ignore or recast evidence that would tend to undermine the confidence that is required 
of them. Baseball embeds within itself a belief in the necessity of motivated cognition. 
Though we all “neglect evidence that is unfavorable” and “shy away from strict truth-
seeking behavior” (Cowen 2005: 444) when doing so threatens our ego,71 baseball 
players actively and consciously practice it. Similarly, it is a general tendency to discredit 
information that undermines our preexisting beliefs and readily accept that which 
confirms them (Newman 1999; Sniderman & Theriault 2004; Taber & Lodge 2006), but 
few do it in the practiced and more or less self-aware way that baseball players do. 
! A player’s summer on the Cape can be fraught with attacks on his closely-held 
identity as an elite baseball player. In the crucible of the hardest competition they’ve 
faced to date, ERAs rise and batting averages decline, and hard evidence starts to 
mount that they aren’t as good as they thought. They are demonstrably less successful 
than some other players, and evidence suggests their professional prospects are not as 
robust as they imagine. But to accept this evidence would not only undermine their 
confidence, but the underpinnings of who they think they are. They engage self-
deception to protect both, and it is in service of identity protection that confidence and 
self-deception find themselves in relationship to rule-breaking. A relationship with or 
even just some attention from an agent reinforces a player’s belief in his quality and his 
future in baseball. It is not just a social cue that a player arrogates to himself because it 
is culturally appropriate; it is a way of influencing and concretizing the way a player 
perceives information and of protecting a vulnerable identity. 
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71 In fact, one recent study suggests that our political ideologies can even unravel our ability to do math 
when the results would threaten them. Kahan, et al (2013) found that subjects’ ability to interpret data was 
actually diminished when correct interpretation of the results would undermine their policy preferences. 
! Cue theory does little to explain how our identities – and the beliefs and 
preferences that constitute them – influence our perceptions of information; in other 
words, they are taken as a given rather than as a fluid variable.72 Legal consciousness 
searches for the mechanisms that enable the reproduction of hegemonic norms. Taking 
together and connecting them through a cultural practice of self-deception enables us to 
examine how a culture creates a particular predisposition that influences how its 
participants engage with the information around them, and how they tend to process it 
in ways that reproduce existing social structures. 
!
A Game of Failure: Confidence in the Box and on the Mound (and off the Field)
! Even the best batters fail to get a hit far more often than they succeed. This basic 
fact about the game finds itself embedded in its vernacular: it is a “game of failure.” 
Derrick Martinez believes this simple truth affects how those who play the game must 
approach it. “It’s a game of failure; you succeed three out of ten times, you know, you’re 
a Hall of Famer.73 It definitely has a big effect on how you play and how you approach 
the game.” Steve Mott uses the same words in his description: “It’s failure. I mean, 
baseball is a game of failure. You fail seven out of ten times and you’re a millionaire. 
Even though it’s acceptable to fail seven out of ten times, it still eats everyone away 
when they go, like, 1-for-3, 1-for-4. You still want to be – you want to be perfect.”74 Their 
teammate Vlad Simon explains why he thinks this makes baseball different from other 
athletic endeavors: 
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72 See, for instance, Druckman & Lupia 2000, as well as Lupia 1992, Lupia 1994a, and Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998.
73 Batting .300 indicates that a batter gets a hit in three out of every ten at-bats, and is considered an 
excellent batting average.
74 Flett and Hewitt find that perfectionism in athletes – which they define as an overemphasis on playing 
or competing “perfectly” rather than just “well” or “successfully” – can actually have a detrimental effect on 
performance (2005). While the authors do not say much by way of distinguishing confidence and 
perfectionism, or elaborating on the relationship between the two, I believe that, in baseball, confidence 
allows players to push aside the perils of perfectionism, despite Steve Mott’s words. Players know that a 
4-4 day is a rarity, and that back-to-back 4-4 days a near statistical impossibility. Knowing that they will 
inevitably not achieve perfection is mitigated by their confidence that failure is not predictive of their next 
at-bat.
You need some form of confidence, cockiness – cockiness doesn’t 
always back it up – some mental preparation. There’s a 
confidence you need – everyone needs it, but in baseball you 
really need it because you’re failing seven times out of ten as a 
hitter. You can’t do that as a quarterback. You can’t do that as a 
basketball player. You can’t do that as a golfer. You need to turn 
failing into a reality and know how to deal with it, and still be 
confident for the next AB.75 You’re gonna have bad games – 
everyone has bad games, that’s why there’s 162. That confidence 
is one of a kind. You can’t teach it. You either have it, or you figure 
it out, or you don’t get it.
! That Vlad Simon believes golfers needn’t have a cozy relationship with failure 
suggests he has never tried the game, though I see his point that few sports have 
participants failing to do the most basic aspect of the game more than two-thirds of the 
time.76 But again, whether baseball is special or not is irrelevant; what matters is that 
baseball players believe it is unique, and that this belief shows up in patterned ways in 
the sport’s culture. All three players above, for instance, say baseball is a “game of 
failure.” Part of the baseball make-up, then, is the wherewithal to shrug off the three 
times out of four one fails and to dig in for the fourth at bat as if they hadn’t happened. 
The game must be played with confidence, because confidence is required to overcome 
the failure endemic to the enterprise. Peter Wrass believes that this is part of the game, 
and therefore part of what it means to be someone who plays it:
In baseball, especially, I think you have to be very confident, 
borderline cocky. Guys who I’ve respected tell me – they told me a 
lot about how to approach at-bats. For instance, guys say you 
can’t – you always have to think you’re better than the pitcher. So 
when I’m on deck I’m just thinking, “This guy’s got nothing to beat 
me.” If I put a good swing – if I put my good swing on it, I’m going 
to win this battle.
 !
! “I think it’s one of the biggest things in baseball,” says pitcher Mike Preecher. 
“You gotta be confident, or else you’re not going to perform well, especially as a pitcher. 
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75 “AB” is short for “at bat,” a hitter’s appearance at the plate during the game. 
76 Golfers certainly fail to win the vast majority of the time; only Tiger Woods can boast winning more than 
6% of his professional tournaments. They do, of course, manage to hit the ball every time – though not 
always exactly where they intended to. A more apt statistical comparison might be to the three-point shot 
in basketball, where a 40% success rate is considered unusually good. Even the best three-point 
shooters fail more than they succeed at the task. 
I think that’s one of the main positions where you have to almost be a little cocky. You 
have to have the ‘screw you’ attitude, where you think you’re better than every hitter that 
gets up there, and show that.” His fellow pitcher Len Clement says, “I’m confident that I 
can get anyone out. Even if I have a bad outing, I know I can come back and get the 
guys out next time.” Len shares the mantra he feels defines his time on the mound: “I 
know this hitter can’t hit me. I’m gonna beat this guy. I’m better than him.” He takes a 
beat and offers a half-smile. “If he beats you, tip your cap to him. But he won’t.”77
! The belief in the necessity of confidence shows through in the frequency with 
which players invoke it. Seth James states it up front: “To have confidence when you’re 
in the box is definitely key.” Trent Añez puts it a tad more poetically. “When you start to 
doubt yourself, you’ve already lost,” he says. “When I’m out on the mound, honestly, I 
have the mindset that no one’s even gonna be able to get a hit off me. No one’s gonna 
be able to touch me. Confidence is part of the game, because the minute that you show 
weakness, and you’re up there and you show doubt in yourself, that’s when you start to 
get hit, and that’s when you start to lose.”78
! The belief in confidence doesn’t come just from the players; the coaches do their 
part to inculcate or reinforce this. “I’ve never met a guy who’s afraid to face anybody in 
the box,” as Coach Williams puts it. “[The pitcher is] trying to offset the hitter, and the 
hitter is trying to make sure he gets the right pitch. Confidence plays a huge role in that.”
Coach Izturiz echoes his players when we broach the topic: “You obviously know that 
this is a game of failure.” He puts a fine point on the importance of confidence in the 
game of baseball: “Confidence is everything, in my opinion. Especially in this game. If 
you don’t truly, truly, truly believe that you’re the best on the field, it’s gonna show up. 
Baseball is 100% confidence.” Finally, he acknowledges the inevitable result of requiring 
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77 It is noteworthy that even within baseball, pitchers and batters both believe that their position is the one 
that requires more confidence. Though I don’t have the data to pursue this particular point, I suspect that 
because pitchers think they must have more confidence as the most visible part of the defense and its 
failings, and batters think they must in order to shake off their failures, the competition involves something 
of a confidence arms race. 
78 Interestingly, Trent also ties this lesson back to his childhood, when he and so many of his teammates 
first started to learn how to be baseball players: “The thing that my dad has always preached to me since 
day one was ‘Never show weakness, and always know that you’re better than your opponent.’”
unshakeable confidence: “Baseball players have big egos. You kind of have to have a 
big ego to be good.” 
! Coach Izturiz hints at two phenomena that stem from a sport that requires the 
confidence that he and his players believe baseball does. When he says, “You kind of 
have to have a big ego to be good,” he indicates that there are consequences for those 
whose confidence is shaken too often or too roughly. Kit Nielsen describes instances of 
this: “I played with guys who are really talented, and they didn’t have that kind of 
confidence. They say, ‘Well, I hope I get picked,’ or ‘We’ll see what happens,’ you know? 
And they struggle. They get picked later, or they don’t get picked at all.” They lacked, it 
seems, the confidence, cockiness, or arrogance that players believe is required for 
success. 
! More important, Coach Izturiz hints that confidence is part of what it means to be 
a baseball player.79 “Baseball players have big egos,” he says. Confidence isn’t like the 
proper arm mechanics for throwing a curveball, or the proper hip rotation to hit a 
fastball. Confidence is part of the performance that constitutes baseball identity. Lacking 
confidence, in the minds of those who live in baseball’s culture, is both a failure to 
properly prepare to play the game and a failure to properly perform your culturally 
ascribed role. For these players who have spent their lives building and performing 
identities as elite players, confidence is part of what defines them as people.
! It is worth reiterating the conceptual difference between elite performance and 
elite identity that surfaced in Chapter 3. For their whole lives, the Crusaders have been 
able to match their confident performance with the production and success that would 
seem to support it. What has brought them to the Cape is not simply their confidence, 
but naturally the talent and hard work that have brought them genuine on-field success. 
On the Cape, almost all players see a drop-off in production, and their stats no longer 
match their ego. Their solution, however, remains the same: confidence that they will 
break through and succeed, and continuing the work that got them here in the first 
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79 Goffman, recall, suggests that “to be a given kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required 
attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one’s social grouping 
attaches thereto” (1959: 75).
place. (If it ain’t broke….) Seth James has already been working on his swing for an 
hour on the morning he takes a break to sit down with me: 
I can’t tell you how many times I meet somebody... “Oh, you’re a 
baseball player – you must be cocky.” And it’s so funny to me, 
because sure, there are cocky baseball players, but all of us have 
that arrogance about ourselves because you have to. That’s how 
you have to play the game – being confident with yourself, 
knowing what you know, and sticking with it.
!
! It is noteworthy that people assume his cockiness off the field, not just on it. It 
seems to escape the boundaries of the diamond; Seth and his teammates take it with 
them when they leave the ballpark. In fact, he sharpened the points he made above in 
the same breath: “Baseball is more than just playing a game; it’s learning how to deal 
with things, how to deal with adversity and things that go on outside the field... off the 
field you’re still confident because it carries over.” Len Clement, too, sees a connection 
between how he thinks on the pitcher’s mound and how he behaves around others:  
“What I do on the baseball field can build confidence off the field, as a person, and who 
I am. I’m more able to talk to people, and talk about myself, and to other people about 
other things, just being out there.” Steve Mott describes how his confidence, work ethic, 
and competitive spirit translate from his life on the mound to his life off the field:
I feel that you have this mentality that you want to be successful, 
and want to be the best at what you do, and you want to work 
hard, and that just carries over into everything that you do. I mean, 
regardless of if it’s a video game, for example, or doing your 
schoolwork. I mean, I’m competitive as hell playing video games. I 
can’t help it. I don’t even let, you know, anyone win. I hate losing. I 
hate losing at anything.80 
! Ray Sheffield, too, agrees that what he does on the diamond doesn’t necessarily 
stay there; the lessons he learns as a baseball player inform his day-to-day non-
baseball life:
You kind of just take things that you learn at the park and you 
apply it to everyday life. You work hard on the field, you’re most 
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80 Trent Añez feels the same way: “I hate to lose... anything, really... pick-up basketball, or... anything, 
playing ping-pong... anything.”
likely going to work hard outside the field in your job, or whatever 
you do. Your personality on the field is going to show up outside 
the field. I think everything you do on the field relates to your 
actions off the field.
! “Everything you do” as a baseball player informs how you think and behave in 
other walks of life. It is telling, I think, that these players always describe the lessons as 
moving in that direction. What they learn on the field helps them elsewhere, as they 
describe it; they don’t say that what they learn elsewhere shows up on the field. The 
confidence with which they (must) play the game impacts their carriage and persona 
with their families, in relationships, in the classroom, or while playing video games, as 
Steve Mott says. This is yet another example of players’ identities qua baseball players 
dominating other facets of their lives and identities. This particular facet of their lives 
comes to infiltrate, influence, and impact all others. Players consider confidence to be a 
demand of their sport, one that requires a particular mindset that permeates their off-
the-field demeanor as well. A baseball player must be confident to be successful, and as 
they say, this confidence overflows the field’s boundaries and comes to define their 
actions in all walks of life. 
! Confidence, in other words, becomes a constitutive aspect of a baseball player’s 
identity, a way to mark oneself as performing a particular identity, and a way to identify 
others who perform it as well. I ask Ray Sheffield, for example, what most marks him as 
a baseball player. “My confidence,” he says. “On the field I’m pretty confident, off the 
field I would say I’m pretty confident. Confidence marks me the most as a baseball 
player.” But, as I say, it’s a way of performing the identity for others as well as yourself; 
his answer when I ask how he identifies other players is strikingly similar: “The 
confidence. A lot of baseball players are pretty confident. They have this sort of walk, 
and they kind of all talk the same. You can just kinda tell who’s a baseball player and 
who’s not. It’s just by their demeanor, the way they present themselves.”
Identities Under Threat: The Cape as a Shock to the System
! Players’ confidence is a performative aspect of their identities as such, and 
intimately wound up in their self-conception as elites. As I argued at length in Chapter 4, 
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players define themselves as elites with a future in professional baseball. The best 
players on each team for which they have ever played, little has challenged either their 
perceptions of themselves or the way those perceptions influence their beliefs about 
their future. Until, that is, they arrive on the Cape. As I said at the outset, for only one of 
the new Crusaders does it remain true that he is the best player on the team. As 
evidence mounts that they are not as talented as they think, that their professional 
prospects are not as bright as they have always assumed, it is not just an assault on 
their career hopes (though it is assuredly that as well); it is an attack on the confidence, 
pastime, and ambition that define who they think they are. Their very identities are 
under threat. Long-time host parent Jimi Sattler knows this can be a real challenge: 
Some of the kids come here, and they were a stud on their team, 
now they’re playing all the studs. So they were batting like crazy at 
their college, and they get here and all of a sudden they’re having 
a hard time with their bats. They’re calling dad – “Send me bats, 
get me this, get me that.” I think that’s a little frustrating 
sometimes.
! It’s especially troubling, as Jimi notes, “when you’ve always been told you’re the 
best, you’re the greatest, and you can do no wrong.” His wife, Janice, nods sadly and 
chimes in: “The Cape brings them down a notch, I think.” Housing Coordinator Irene 
Isaac knows well the challenges that her Crusaders face. “It’s hard for them, because 
they’ve been batting .300 or something, and then they’ll come here and they’ll be doing 
1-something, you know? That’s really hard for them.” Host parent Matt Davos has seen 
enough over his decades of involvement with the team to say, “There’s just no doubt 
about it. It has to be something that really tugs at you.” Former team announcer Corey 
Roberts is no less perceptive, if a little less sympathetic: 
It’s a real eye-opener, and a rude awakening for these kids... 
They’re not as enabled as much here as they are on their own 
turf, because they’re one of many superstars. You’re not on a 
pedestal here. When you’re the star of your team, you’re the big 
man on campus. When you’ve been growing up all your life, you 
know, and you’ve been pegged as the superstar, you know... 
you’re entitled.
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! What Corey Roberts casts as entitlement and being enabled is a byproduct of the 
attention these young men have gotten for their whole lives specifically because of their 
talent and identity as baseball players. To echo last chapter, they have spent their lives 
being “hailed” as such, and as something special. Their expectations are upset when 
they arrive on the Cape; they cannot all be “special.” Coach Kimmel considers handling 
players’ egos the “biggest challenge” he faces as a manager. When ace pitchers are 
relegated to the bullpen and star outfielders to the bench, it can be, as General 
Manager Harold Sooney says, “a shock to the system.” But Harold says that only rarely 
does the shock truly shake a player’s confidence. Rather, they see it as a test – as a 
challenge – and to pass they have to stay confident in the face of mounting evidence 
that could undermine it. Sooney highlights the fact that players’ responses to this vary 
only a little; for most, it means doubling down on confidence and the work they’ve done 
to get here: 
They have to figure out how they’re going to deal with that. You 
know, sometimes a guy will just go home, you know? He’ll just 
leave. But for the most part they will stick with it. They will 
absolutely stick with it and just keep gritting it and going after it 
every day. And you know, that’s “make-up.”81 That’s a key part of if 
somebody is going to be successful or not, and what the scouts 
are looking for, too. Not just the stopwatch and the radar gun and 
whatever – they’re looking for make-up. And when Coach Kimmel 
gets calls around draft day, you know, “We’re looking at so-and-so, 
maybe in this or that round; tell me about his make-up.” They got 
all the stats; they know that. They wanna know what’s in his head.
! This is the cruel Catch-22 in which baseball puts its practitioners. Players must 
maintain their confidence even while failing far more often than they succeed, and 
continue to believe they belong at the next level even as the chances of making it 
diminish. How can players toe this odd line? How do you step into the batter’s box 
carrying yourself with “swagger,” to quote Vlad Simon, when your numbers can’t back it 
up?
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81 “Make-up” is how those in baseball refer to the psychological aspects of a player: his competitiveness, 
his work ethic, how he deals with failure, and how he responds to teammates and coaches. 
Last summer I started out 0 for 19, and I ended up hitting around .
200. [This summer] I came out here and I started out like 3 for 10 
– and I seemed pretty good – and then I went through, like uh... 0 
for 15 slump, or 0 for 10. It gets... it’s tough. It’s really, really tough. 
But I mean... you got to just keep working hard and keep coming 
out here and trying to improve.
! As I have said, this is the first time many players have had to deal with a gap 
between their confident attitude and their on-the-field performance and success. Their 
strategy, however changes little. The lesson players learn from an 0-for-19 is not that 
they aren’t as good as they thought, or that their chances of climbing the ladder have 
diminished. They interpret a rough start to mean that they have to work harder to attain 
their goals, not that they cannot attain them at all. “It definitely teaches you to stick with 
it,” according to Hal Olsen. Steve Mott says much the same thing: “It’s not a knock-down 
process. It’s just ‘I gotta work harder.’” Given two interpretations of the information at 
hand, they opt for the one that confirms pre-existing narratives and beliefs about 
themselves. In order to maintain their confidence and protect their identities, a slump 
must be exactly that – “just a slump.” It cannot be evidence that a carefully constructed 
identity and detailed plan for the future are crumbling. Players can’t ignore bad 
statistics, or the fact that they are now bench players, but they can reinterpret those 
facts. Sitting on the bench didn’t tell Jon Tufton that he didn’t have what it took. Instead, 
he said, “It kind of just pushed me to realize I had to get up earlier, get on a routine, 
work out, get to the field earlier to hit more and train more. I think it’s been helping me.”
! Cracks in the facade one wears as an identity can be truly dangerous. 
Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice’s study of self-control found that people’s efforts were 
most successful when they conceived of themselves as people in control and capable of 
exerting it (1994). However, even small ruptures in this identity – a moment of weakness 
in which an over-eater snacks on some forbidden food – had disastrous potential. 
Evidence that undermined people’s self-conception as someone in control often led 
them to discard that identity altogether, leading to binge-eating, relapses into 
alcoholism, etc. (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice, 1994). Consider the way Benebou 
and Tirole phrase their conclusions in a similar study: “[People] see their own choices as 
indicative of ‘what kind of person’ they are, implying that lapses [in self-control] can have 
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a severe adverse impact on future behavior” (2004: 850; see also Benebou & Tirole 
2002). Players’ identities are built around very clear goals, and Cape Cod puts those 
identities under the most troubling threat in their lives to date.
! But, fortunately or unfortunately, motivated cognition is built into baseball players’ 
psyches. The most likely explanation for struggling in the Cape League is that a player 
isn’t the surefire star he’s always believed he is. But this explanation is inconsistent with 
the identity players perform for others and for themselves. They actively search out 
ways to explain away their bad stats – “It’s just a slump,” “I need to work harder,” “I need 
to work on my swing” – and accept without reflection an alternative explanation: their 
struggles are a new hurdle in on their inevitable path to professional success. To 
accomplish this psychological trick, players ignore some information, and reinterpret 
other information to fit it into their existing narrative and identity. My research finds that 
they deploy this measure of self-deception to protect their identity – constitutive element 
of which is their confidence. Team Treasurer Larry Dennis perfectly captures both the 
Cape’s reality and players’ reactions to it: “It’s an eye-opener... most of them are 
hesitant to open their eyes, though, fully.”
How to Deal: Self-Deception, Ignoring Evidence, and Making Forecasts
! Lazar suggests that athletes are perhaps more likely than others to foment their 
own self-deceptions: “Executing (in her mind) all the required tasks to the point of 
perfection may convince our competitor that an excellent performance is well within her 
reach even in the presence of undermining beliefs (1999:285).” Baseball, though, builds 
practiced self-deception into the culture alongside confidence. The two are, naturally, 
related. Confidence in one’s skills, and in one’s future, better enables players to deceive 
themselves about the reality of their chances of getting a hit off the ace pitcher on the 
mound, or of making it all the way to “The Show.” As both players and coaches noted, 
they believe that for a hitter to step into the batter’s box and get a hit requires him to be 
confident that he will, no matter what the odds. As Jesus Izturiz puts it, “It’s a game 
where you have to kinda trick your mind, and believe in yourself even if you’re doing 
bad.”
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! Coach Izturiz doesn’t hide the fact that he and the other coaches actively 
encourage their players to deceive themselves and to ignore evidence. It starts in the 
batter’s box or on the mound, where coaches tell players to ignore the fact that the best 
hitter in the league is their current opposition, or that the pitcher staring them down 
hasn’t allowed a run in three games. It can be difficult, says catcher Kevin Timmons, not 
to think about who you’re facing, but it is a necessity. 
You get big names that you saw – pitchers you saw starting in the 
College World Series going against you now, and you’re like, 
“Oh... this got weird.” It’s kind of... humbling, in a way, but from a 
position-player standpoint, you don’t care. You got to take it like 
they’re any other pitcher.
!
! His fellow catcher Hal Olsen expresses the same sentiment: “Facing a one or a 
five,82 there’s no difference. You got to look at it the same and you got to go up there 
and attack.” Hal and Kevin don’t mean that they don’t pay attention to who is pitching 
against them. On the contrary, they know that being a successful hitter requires them to 
know who he is, his strengths, weaknesses, and tendencies, and how best to get a hit 
off of him. Their success requires them to know exactly who they are facing, while 
paradoxically requiring them to face him with supreme confidence. Given these 
apparently contradictory demands, they must acknowledge their opponent while 
convincing themselves that it doesn’t matter who it is because they are good enough to 
get a hit off of whomever it happens to be. The same, of course, goes for pitchers. “I’m 
confident that I can get anyone out,” says Len Clement. “Even if I have a bad outing, I 
know I can come back and get the guys out next time.”
! A few different kinds of self-deception can be distinguished. One is to be found in 
the batter’s box or on the mound just in the moment of the confrontation between hitter 
and batter: each believes himself, in that instant, to be better than the other no matter 
what statistics say about the matter. A second method of ignoring evidence takes a 
larger segment of time as its target. Baseball players are encouraged to have short 
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82  A standard rotation features five starting pitchers, who are numbered according to their quality. A 
team’s best pitcher – their “one” – goes first. The “two” starts the next game, and so forth until the fifth 
game, when the worst starting pitcher, “the five,” starts. In the sixth game, the team will go back to their 
ace. Virtually every single pitcher on the Cape was his college team’s “one,” with a few “twos.” 
memories, at least when it comes to their inevitable failures. Len needs not to dwell on a 
bad start so he can come into the next one with the requisite confidence. Batters in a 
slump need to ignore their hitless streak to step into the box convinced they can get a 
hit off of whatever pitcher is throwing, even when hitless against him. As far as players 
are concerned, past success augurs future success regardless of a change in 
competition.  
! These are forms of self-deception with which the Crusaders are well familiar by 
the time they reach the Cape League, where they are confronted with the novel 
situation of no longer being the best player on the field or even of being a below-
average player. Faced with a new problem, they marshal the cultural resource most 
readily available, and increase the time horizon beyond a few bad games. Now, weeks 
of struggling on the Cape are retooled as an indication only that more work is needed so 
as to protect a player’s confidence. “Struggling” may have meant a home-run drought in 
college, but even now that it means hitting .100 and sitting at the end of the bench, the 
same cognitive trick is trotted out. 
! Ironically, because, (as Vlad Simon noted) it’s more difficult to play with 
confidence when you’re struggling, it becomes all the more important to manufacture it 
when you are (and all the more important to turn a blind eye to the evidence or 
narratives that might undermine it). Kit Nielsen pairs the need to play with confidence 
with the ever-present belief these players nurture that they belong at the next level. “I 
think playing with confidence when you’re struggling helps out, just because, you know, 
if you know you’re good enough to compete at that level – or whatever level you’re at – 
even when you’re struggling, you’re going to have confidence that you’re going to get 
out of it.” Peter Wrass acknowledges that this requires lying to himself about his 
statistics, his opponent’s talent, and any gap between the two that may exist: “Even if 
you’re slumping, you have to just go and say ‘Look, I’ve made it this far doing something 
right,’ and you got to stick with it. You just have to always be confident in yourself and 
believe in yourself and know that you’re better, even if you’re not.” Ray Sheffield’s 
college coach reaches for a tried-and-true cliche when he tells his players to deceive 
themselves, to lie to themselves about the likelihood of their ultimate success. “When 
you’re going through rough times on the field, my college coach always told me, ‘You’ve 
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got to fake it ‘til you make it.’ So even when you’re not succeeding like you’d like to, you 
have to have that mindset that you’re still the best – you’re still going to be successful in 
anything you do.”
! Turning a blind eye to undermining evidence – evidence that attacks not just their 
confidence but their identity – is embedded in baseball culture itself. Players ignore 
some information or its implications; a hitless stretch is a slump, not an indication of 
something more troubling. Other times, they acknowledge the evidence that they aren’t 
playing well enough to get them to the next level, but reinterpret or repackage it to mean 
something more compatible with their narrative identities. The Cape may be a shock to 
the system, but the result isn’t despair or undermined beliefs. “Guys will come up here 
and struggle,” says General Manager Harold Sooney, “but if anything, that’s just 
motivation for a lot of people.” Sooney has seen enough young men struggle on his club 
to know that their reaction is usually, as he paraphrases it, “I’m just gonna work harder, 
and I’m gonna get there.” Host parent Matt Davos shows exactly how players can 
repackage failure as an opportunity. “When you’re not one of the starting guys at this 
level, and you’ve been ‘the man’ at every level you’ve ever played at, there’s got to be... 
there’s people who overcome that and use it – ‘I’ll show these bastards’ – and they 
become even better.” Davos ties together several of the threads running through this 
chapter. Players have always been “the man”; it’s part of who they are. The Cape is a 
wake-up call, a shock to that particular identity. But, as baseball itself requires them to 
do, players interpret that shock not as evidence that they aren’t who they think they are, 
but that they simply have to work harder to maintain their sense of self. 
! It starts in the batter’s box and on the mound, where a player must ignore his 
slump or his opponent’s quality and play with confidence, but the effects of this mindset 
– this intentional self-deception – are much farther-reaching. Ignoring a hitless game 
becomes ignoring a hitless week; maintaining confidence in the box is one part of 
maintaining confidence that one’s career goals are readily attainable. Players hold on to 
their imagined (even assumed) futures because it helps them play well, but also 
because the alternative is to admit that there are cracks in the facade they present both 
to others and themselves. “[No matter what happens], they still live that dream,” says 
treasurer Larry Dennis, “that maybe they’ll come to Cape Cod and somebody will notice 
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them, or like something about them.” Former announcer Corey Roberts, too, knows that 
a young player will dismiss or reinterpret information that undermines their confidence 
and identity. “When you’re 19, are you going to listen to somebody say, you know, ‘Wait 
a minute – you’re not that good?’”
! But Corey knows that self-deception and intentional blindness are 
psychologically complex endeavors. Turning a blind eye is only half the story. To 
maintain their identities at a vulnerable time, players must keep acting as if nothing has 
changed, as if they are still top-of-the-heap and clearly destined for greatness. You have 
to continue to play a role fabricated out of baseball’s culture – “the elite athlete.”  Corey 
says:
Your chances of making it, especially in baseball, you know, to 
The Show – up to the Major Leagues – are just so slim. But it’s 
like they’re just blinders on them. They’re so focused and they 
want to believe so hard that it’s like, “Well, OK, you have to have 
an agent to take care of you.” It’s just what they’re told to do.
! Corey’s words both echo several statements by other subjects – Larry Kloves’  
claim that having an agent “comes with being a great athlete,” Housing Director Irene 
Isaac’s saying players think of having an agent as “part of being a professional player” – 
and add a new dimension to them. It is because of an agent’s cultural meaning that 
having one can be used to reinforce players’ beliefs that they have promising 
professional futures. With their confidence under threat and their identities vulnerable, 
players do what they must to keep up the front befitting their performed identity, and to 
maintain and build their confidence even as statistics undermine it. It is in service not 
necessarily of players’ bank accounts but of their egos and identities that agents 
become powerful accessories. 
Agents as Confidence Builders 
! I argued in Chapter 3 that agents have a particular meaning in the world of 
amateur baseball; they are associated with elite status and professional promise, and it 
is by virtue of this that players can use them as a prop to perform an elite identity. For 
players without the stats or draft prospects to underwrite that identity, they can be 
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something more: they can be shields with which players protect their identity as elites 
that they have spent a lifetime constructing and is now under siege. They can build the 
confidence that the Cape League would otherwise erode. Agents are adept at selling 
players a future of which they have always dreamed, as agent Brad Anderson admits: 
Agents, college coaches, everyone – they’re all salesmen. So 
when you’re making your decisions, very few families make 
decisions based off a logical decision. It’s the same reason we all 
buy things we don’t need, right? I mean, salesmen come in, and I 
buddy up to your son, we have a great rapport and a great 
relationship. I can be smooth and talk to parents – and also when 
I’m representing them – and they haven’t asked me one question 
about my company yet.! !
! Agents put a face on the future that players have always imagined; players 
interpret the very presence of an agent to mean that they are walking the right path. 
Multiple interpretations of an encounter with an agent are possible. An agent could 
simply be trying to make as many contacts as possible, or could unfortunately simply be 
trying to take money from athletes he knows he won’t have to negotiate for, or (of 
course) could be genuinely trying to help a real prospect along the path to professional 
baseball. But, with confirmation bias and motivated cognition built into baseball culture 
and into players’ very identities, they are naturally more likely to assume that final 
explanation. Put differently, players are eager to buy the image of their future that 
agents are selling. Irene Isaac has found summer hosts for hundreds of Cape League 
players, and hosted dozens herself. She’s heard them describe attention from agents 
for years and sees a strong pattern.  She says:
Some advisor walks up and says “Hi, I’m so and so, here’s my 
card,” you know? “Could we meet for lunch tomorrow and talk?” 
It’s like whoa, you know? Whoa. This must mean I’m really good. 
I’m doing stuff that’s right, and this is just another step for me to 
take. [Alex: Do you think that feels good for players?] Are you 
kidding?! Yeah! Oh yeah! When they come home with that folder – 
“Look at the folder I got! Look at all this stuff this guy gave me! I’m 
going to meet him tomorrow for lunch!” It’s like a highlight!... When 
you’re 18 and this man is telling you you’re going to be the next 
Rodriguez or whatever, all you’re thinking about is “I’m going to 
buy a new car, and I’m going to buy…” You know? “Look what he 
has. I’m sure this guy is going to get me all that stuff.”
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! Note that Irene repeats the “step” metaphor so common to players and notices 
players’ tendency to group themselves with successful professionals. Here it is worth 
noting that the agent is functioning as both a social cue and an informational cue. 
Attention from someone who represents professionals suggests to a Crusader that he 
occupies the same social space, and suggests a particular course of action for people 
he now considers “like him.”
! Agents are aware of these cognitive leaps – these shortcuts – and can make use 
of them. Pitcher Sal Killian describes part of an agent’s normal pitch (so to speak). 
“When they name the names... like David Eckstein, Randy Johnson...83 like, ‘Oh, I 
represent blah, blah, blah,’ they’ll kind of go through their whole spiel and then they’ll 
name off names... and just, like, “whoa: these guys are big-timers.” Sal implicitly puts his 
own name at the end of the register of All-Star athletes the agent already represents, an 
implication all too clear to those predisposed to see it. Outfielder Sean Flanagan had 
been approached by agents who were themselves former professional players, and felt 
his confidence had been boosted by their attention. At an especially vulnerable time in 
their lives, players leap at any affirmation of their talent. When I remark to pitching 
coach Bill Jameson that agents’ words must sound good to players, he interrupts me to 
simply exclaim, “Yeah it’s got to sound good!”
! Make no mistake, that is exactly the kind of ego affirmation players see in these 
connections. Derrick Martinez doesn’t have an advisor – he has family members who 
are experienced with the transition from amateur to professional – but consider 
nonetheless the way he phrases the feeling that he (and others, he says) get from 
attention from agents:
You have someone out there on your behalf, who’s recognized 
your talents, and who knows you can play at the next level, and is 
interested in possibly representing you as an agent in the future... 
definitely makes one feel more professional. Definitely. ... If guys 
are kinda coming up to me and saying “Hey, you know, you look 
really good,” you know? “I’d like the chance, you know, to talk to 
you about advising you” – and a bunch of guys are doing that? 
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83 Two former All-Star Major Leaguers. 
That would definitely have some effect on my confidence. People 
recognize my talent on the field. 
! Derrick’s diction shows that attention from agents isn’t necessarily changing the 
way he thinks about his talent or prospects, but confirming beliefs of which he has 
already convinced himself. An agent builds his confidence by “recognizing” his ability. 
Other players confirm that such attention fits readily within the preconceived narratives 
they already have about their success (though not, of course, in those words). Pitcher 
Ricky Sheppard uses the stepping-stone metaphor players used so commonly: “I think 
it’s kind of cool that someone who’s trying to make a living by advising players is coming 
up to me and talking to me. It means I’m taking a step in the right direction.” Trent Añez 
says, “After the game, if you have a good outing, advisers are coming up to you... it just 
feels good. I mean... it feels good. It feels like you’re going to make it to the next level.”  
Kevin Timmons echoes Trent, as well as Derrick’s comments about an advisor 
“recognizing” your talent:
Honestly, having an advisor kind of feels like the next step in 
getting signed, getting to the Big Leagues. That’s what it makes 
you feel like, honestly. Like, once you’re like “Yeah, I got an 
advisor,” it’s kind of a step up because they sought you out, they 
realized the potential you have in playing the game, and they see 
that you can play at the next level.
! Mike Preecher also thinks of it as confirming his coming career; for him, having 
an agent is “paving the way into the future.” Peter Wrass describes having an agent as 
a “bridge” to Major League Baseball. Pitcher Landon Escher says having an agent “just 
makes guys more confident,” while his bullpen-mate Larry Kloves takes it one step 
further: “I think the idea of just having an advisor for a guy is beneficial.” When I wonder 
out loud if having an agent boosts a player’s confidence, infielder Ken Cameron simply 
says, “I guarantee it does.” Sal Killian seems to imply that having an agent makes him 
feel like a superhero, or an action star. “When you know someone’s working on your 
side, it’s pretty cool. Like your little sidekick, in a way. So I mean, having people work for 
you, it’s a definite confidence-booster.” Vlad Simon, like Sal, says of having an agent, 
“It’s cool. You feel more professional.”
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! Some players more clearly link an agent’s role in their narrative identity to the fact 
that they also raise their confidence. Ray Sheffield thinks about what attention from 
agents means going forward: “Everything you’ve done is hopefully going to pay off in 
the end. And when you get that attention, it gives you the hope that it will. Soon. It gives 
you that drive to keep going.” And while Ray thinks of attention from agents in terms of 
his imagined future, Steve Mott casts it in terms of the past that has helped build a 
present identity: 
Having an advisor is kind of taking a reward for the hard work. I 
mean, if you’re good enough, you put in the hard work, you’re 
going to get an advisor that wants to represent you. It’s kind of the 
deal... like I said: puzzle pieces. You do all this work and you put 
all the time in to get here and be one of the best players around, 
and they want to represent you. It kind of lets you know that, hey, 
you’re doing something right because someone thinks you’re good 
enough to go sign pretty high, and they want to represent you... 
When the guys contact you, it’s kind of like – it’s flattering... they 
think you have a chance to be a next-level guy.
! Steve’s characterization of an agent as a reward reinforces the concept of agents 
as something that happens to you at a certain moment along the path to 
professionalism. That is normally how rewards function: a benefit that accrues after an 
accomplishment. It is also a confirmation of one’s effort and demonstrated talent to date. 
All that has made a Crusader the player and the person they are today is reinforced by 
attention from an agent. It tells them, too, that their dreams of the future are not mis-
founded, but imminent. The idea of an agent as a reward suggests that an agent 
connects a player’s exceptional past to their desired future, and the flattery it bestows 
builds the confidence that constitutes player identity. All told, 21 of 26 Crusaders 
indicated that having an agent builds players’ confidence and makes them feel more 
professional. None disagreed. 
! Others perceive the same relationship. Host Parent Jimi Sattler says having an 
agent “really has the ability to pump these kids up.” The Crusader coaches – all five – 
also acknowledge that much of what an advisor gives a player comes in enhanced 
confidence. Fielding coach Seth Williams compares the confidence a player can get 
from an agent to the confidence they might get from a top-of-the-line bat or glove. “Your 
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game can be a little bit better than the next guy because you have the nicest stuff. I truly  
believe that.” Carl Brake thinks players should spend more time practicing and less time 
thinking about agents, but concedes that having one can “make you feel good,” 
acknowledging that people “love having the newest and most popular thing.” Coach 
Izturiz, though, puts it the most clearly: 
It’s a “chest out” type of deal when you have an advisor.... they 
feel cool... It always circles back to pumping yourself up. When 
you know that you have an advisor, or you’re going to be a top-
ten-round pick... it’s an ego thing, man. [Alex: How much of having 
an advisor is image and confidence?] 100%. I think you have an 
advisor to have an advisor... [it] doesn’t help the kid at all, except 
to boost his ego.
! Given the importance ego plays in this game – it was Coach Izturiz, after all, who 
said baseball is 100% confidence – one could be forgiven for thinking Izturiz would 
support having an agent. That is, until he says, “It’s stupid. That’s my conclusion.” 
Coach Izturiz may believe confidence is key, but he would rather his players build 
confidence by improving their skills and production, rather than ego-building for its own 
sake. He doesn’t want his players to have an advisor simply for the sake of having an 
advisor; better that they build their egos through a more constructive practice. 
! But coaching practices themselves build players’ confidence and foment self-
deceptions. Recall that batting Coach Carl Brake consistently compares his players to 
Major League stars, from taping pictures of appropriate batting stances up in the locker 
room to more explicitly encouraging the emulation of professionals and their habits. In 
so doing, he implicitly groups his players with the stars, encouraging them to think of 
themselves as relevantly like them and likely to replicate their career paths. Coach 
Brake reinforces players’ ideas about themselves in more subtle ways as well. As he 
patrols the outfield during a fielding practice, he notices a player’s habit of tapping the 
ball once in his glove before throwing it, and steps over to him and says, “When we’re 
playing catch, we don’t want to trick our arms and our brain into thinking they’re on 
different pages, so get rid of the taps. They’re gonna get rid of them in pro ball, anyway.” 
Later, during a brief explanation of why they shouldn’t swing at the first pitch a pitcher 
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throws, he says “You’re facing Jake Peavy84 in Chicago. Are you going to swing at the 
first pitch?”
! Not only do all of Brake’s examples put his players in a Major League context, 
they are never stated in the conditional. It is always “when” they get drafted, “when” they  
are in professional ball, “when” they are in the Majors – never “if.” The other coaches 
follow this pattern, and the players certainly pick up on it. Ray Sheffield appreciates that 
Brake has played pro ball – rising as high as Triple AAA – and hopes that the lessons he 
learned rub off: “He kind of gears up you for [pro ball], gets you ready for that. So when 
you get to the professional leagues, you’re not too far out of the loop, and you kind of 
know what’s going on.” Ray, like his coaches and all of his teammates, uses “when,” 
perhaps an indication that the coaches’ efforts to further inculcate confidence are 
working. Seth James is able to take a step back and see the purpose and effect behind 
his coach’s rhetoric: 
Whenever they say stuff like that it’s definitely a positive influence 
on your mind, ’cause you don’t think in “ifs” – the “what if this 
happens, what if that happens” – but “when this happens.” “When 
this happens, this is what you’re gonna face, this is what you’re 
gonna have to deal with, this is what your going to have to do.” It 
really helps a lot.
! Just as attention from agents is so readily interpreted as confirmation of 
preconceived narratives and prefabricated identities, coaches’ implicit or explicit 
indications that a player is destined for pro ball, or even for “The Show,” are easily 
accepted by players because they fit so neatly into those narratives and identities. 
Recall Hal Olsen’s belief that all quality players believe they will make the Big Leagues: 
I think most of us feel the same way. It’s something we’ve done 
our whole lives, and have dreamed about going to pro ball. And 
being out here... it’s definitely a big step towards that. We have the 
same feeling about it that way. It’s gonna happen – it’s just when 
is it gonna happen.
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84 An All-Star pitcher for the Major League Chicago White Sox. 
! Hal fits the “when” right into the idea of long-held dreams and identities, the same 
identities that are protected by relationships with agents suggestive of a professional 
career (suggestive, at least, to the mind of a player). These identities are also reinforced 
and protected by coaching practices that build confidence and encourage the self-
deception that a lucrative professional career is imminent. 
! Coach Izturiz was new to the Cape League during my second summer out there 
and noticed the practice of “when” rather than “if”:
Out here it’s like, “Hey, when you get to the Big Leagues, when 
you get to The Show, when you’re facing Strausbourg.”85 [Alex: 
How do players react to that?]  I think they love it, because not 
only does it pump their confidence – like, “Wow, he really thinks I 
can play pro ball. He really thinks I can make it” – but also if their 
focus is lacking a little bit, that might trigger some of them.
! The coaches become active participants in the construction of players’ 
confidence and self-deceptive practices. In a culture where players and coaches alike 
think you have to truly believe you belong at the next level in order to make it there, the 
process by which coaches pump up players’ confidence also undergirds the self-
deceptive belief that a successful professional career is in the offing. 
! This has two distinct relationships with illicit agent use among players. First, it 
parallels the way players guard their identities during a vulnerable period on the Cape. 
Coaches’ indications that pro ball awaits can help to ward off the bad stats that might 
undermine a player’s confidence and identity. But as was also indicated in the last 
chapter’s analysis, a coach’s indications that a player is destined for pro ball may also 
mark the player as the sort of player who ought to have an agent, even though this is 
not the coaches’ intention. By intentionally ratcheting up a player’s confidence and 
feeding into the need for self-deception, coaches may inadvertently reinforce the illicit 
relationships between players and agents. 
! We all practice some measure of confirmation bias, motivated cognition, and self-
deception, whether we are aware of it or not. Baseball, though, shows us a culture in 
which such practices are consciously embedded, and enables us to connect those 
126
85 A young former first overall draft pick and current star for the Major League Washington Nationals. 
phenomena to an account of identity, and to connect them and identity to a systematic 
practice of rule-breaking. In encouraging – indeed, requiring – extreme confidence and 
self-deception, baseball’s culture reinforces and foments confirmation bias, motivated 
cognition, turning a blind eye to plain facts, and maintaining unsupported assumptions 
about one’s future. These, in turn, become not simply cultural performances, but 
constitutive elements of an identity, and identity that becomes intensely vulnerable in 
the hyper-competitive atmosphere in the Cape Cod League. Just as they take another 
step along the path that defines their lives, the image of what that path holds for them 
needs more protection than it ever has before.
! Players come to believe, or rather they convince themselves of, a narrative that 
will turn out to be a fiction for all but a few of them. It is hard to know if Peter Wrass is 
speaking analytically, descriptively, wistfully, or candidly when he says, “You have to 
believe in yourself, and... you have to imagine yourself being there, and then dreams 
become a reality, you know?” But no matter whether he is describing a practice or 
simply telling me how he feels about his future, there is a certain tragic element to his 
words. For many of his teammates, these dreams will never become reality. But while 
on the Cape, these dreams are still a part of who they are, and relationships with agents 
are a way of protecting them for at least a little while longer.
Cues, Culture, Identity, and Social Reproduction
! The data here suggest that when a culture foments self-deception in a patterned 
and predictable way, it will have predictable effects on rule-breaking behavior. This 
being just one case study, it would be rash to claim that patterned self-deception always 
underwrites rule-breaking that confirms an actor’s aspirations. There are, however, 
other examples of rule-breaking behavior necessarily underwritten by some measure of 
self-deception. Perhaps the best is the choice inner-city youth make in becoming street-
level drug dealers. Venkatesh, for one, has offered sociological explanations for why 
one would opt to enter a low-paying market with an extraordinarily high risk of death or 
injury (2006; 2008): cultural norms and limited exit options from poor neighborhoods 
channel youth into dead-end “jobs” that feel normal. Levitt and Dubner put an economic 
spin on Venkatesh’s study, claiming that the young men who find themselves in such 
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gangs are acting like misguided gamblers, and are simply ignorant of their odds of 
making money (2005). Neither, though, ties in the fact that these young men must 
deceive themselves about the odds of moving up the ladder and having crime pay, so to 
speak. A former street-level hustler, on the other hand, understands well that this is 
exactly what enables them to believe what they are doing is worth it:
The truth is that most kids on the corner aren’t making big money 
– especially if you break their income down to an hourly wage. But 
they’re getting rewarded in ways that go beyond dollars and cents. 
The kid on the streets is getting a shot at a dream. The dream is 
that he will be the one to make this hustling thing pay off in a big 
way. He sees the guy who gets rich and drives the nice car and 
thinks, yep, that’ll be me. He ignores the other stories going 
around, about dudes who get shot or beaten to death with bricks 
and chains (Jay-Z, 2010: 75).
! Similarly, baseball players, as a matter of cultural practice, must assume that 
even though they are slated to go in the 35th round, that they will be the exception. 
They will beat the odds and be the one who makes it from the bottom to the top. The 
cultural manufacturing of an identity, deception about threats to it, and the costly way 
players protect it tie in to some of the puzzles Silbey identifies about hegemonic 
reproduction (1992; 2005). She calls for an examination of the means by which such 
systems are reproduced by those who do not profit from them, who may even be 
affirmatively harmed by them. While economists might claim that patterned 
misconceptions about probable costs and benefits explains the apparent paradox, a 
deeper understanding of social structures emerges when we examine the ways a 
culture can actively foment the misunderstandings that guide such behavior. Recall the 
left’s wailings after the 2004 elections about poor Americans’ tendency to electorally 
affirm economic policies that seemed to harm them (Hacker & Pierson 2013).86 While 
some have pointed out that voting can be a complex act and that social policy wedges 
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86 The most popular examination of the cultural factors that guide poor conservatives to vote against their 
economic interests is Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter With Kansas? (2005). It’s worth noting that much 
of the work I’ve done here could be applied in this case. The voters Frank takes as his case could well 
have narrative identities wrapped up in their cultural conservatism and receive a psychic benefit from their 
Republican votes, they could be systematically self-deceived about their chances for social mobility, and/
or they could have information that might change their minds channelled away from them by the social 
role they and their acquaintances play. 
can help explain the phenomenon (Frank 2005), there is no question many voters are 
mistaken about their odds for vertical economic mobility (Shane & Heckhausen 2013). 
Wouldn’t political analysts of any stripe do well to investigate exactly how our existing 
culture inculcates these deceptions about our future chances?
! These players participate in the culture as actors with a particular identity, and to 
guard it against erosion they seize on a norm – agent use – which is costly to them 
(both in possible sanctions and dollars lost). There is an intersection here between two 
powerful norms in the world of baseball. The first is the connection between an agent 
and an elite identity, the former being a performative (though not necessary) aspect of  
the latter. The second is the embedded practice of self-deception as a way of 
maintaining culturally mandated confidence. In a culture where individuals are told over 
and over that they must approach a season, a game, an individual at bat “truly, truly, 
truly” believing that they are the best player on the field, they must marshal impressive 
tactics of self-deception to believe it in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary. 
When these two intersect, the performative aspects of agent use become a concrete 
way of enacting the cultural imperatives dictated by the sport. 
! Self-deception in baseball helps to bridge an interesting gap between legal 
consciousness (as Silbey characterizes it) and cue theory as it is most often articulated. 
Saying that we are more likely to accept information consistent with pre-existing beliefs 
and preferences, or saying that we are more likely to take informational cues consistent 
with the same, does nothing to explain how we came by those preferences, beliefs, and 
identities in the first place, nor does it explain the mechanisms at work in interpreting 
exactly what an informational cue means to any given actor. Players could determine 
that a poor batting average is an informational cue indicating a comparative lack of 
talent, or they could reinterpret it to mean that they will have to work harder along the 
way to their inevitable success. Their cultural practice encourages them to accept the 
latter interpretation, to take the cue one way rather than another.
! As an account of how we accept and act on information, cue theory can benefit 
from conceptual connections to how we interpret that information in the first place. 
Political heuristics gains a powerful tool by incorporating legal consciousness’ idea that 
a culture foments its own replication, and legal consciousness can borrow from cue 
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theory the idea that an actor may replicate a social structure through the use of 
cognitive shortcuts embedded within it. Self-deception is the pivot point. As the Cape 
Crusaders have shown us, their interpretation of informational cues is inflected both by 
their identities as players and by their culturally embedded self-deceptions; these self-
deceptions, in turn, lead the players to replicate the very structures that helped create 
them, and to perpetuate the often costly norm of agent use. Cognitive shortcuts and 




A Spot in the Order:
Performances Unperformed: Culturally Proscribed Behaviors and Relationships
Roles Left Unplayed 
! I have focused so far on what I claim baseball culture encourages players to do. 
I’ve argued that the cultural status of agents, players’ own narrative identities, and the 
cultural fomentation of self-deception contribute to the perpetuation of a rule-breaking 
norm. In the last chapter, though, I began to shade from behaviors that are culturally 
required into behaviors and patterns that are systematically excluded by the identities 
players perform. When players deploy culturally practiced self-deception, they actively 
ignore or re-interpret information about their talent and professional prospects. These 
are psychological frames or states of mind that players cultivate as a matter of cultural 
participation and reproduction, but what ought not to be lost is that alternative frames or 
states of mind are crowded out and actively suppressed. 
! By “crowding out” I simply mean that the performance of one behavior is, 
necessarily, time spent not giving other performances, whether they are compatible or 
not. When straightforwardly put – that we can only give so many performances at any 
given time – crowding out proves to be both simple and conceptually not that 
interesting. It isn’t a cultural mechanism so much as an axiom. Suppression of 
alternative performances, on the other hand, can be built into a cultural apparatus and 
examined for the ways it entrenches and perpetuates existing practices. Some 
expressions or performances of identity are not simply dominated by others, but are 
targeted as incompatible and systematically excluded. 
! Searing’s call for attention to roles in political science urged comprehending the 
way adherence to roles affects behavior, the way “‘gestalts’ – patterns composed of sets 
of characteristics” suggested or commanded particular actions (1991: 1253). Politicians, 
when considering what action befits someone in their position, “think about [roles] as 
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patterns, as configurations of goals, attitudes, and behaviors that are characteristic of 
people in particular positions” (1253; emphasis in original). This articulation focuses on 
the positive commands of a social role, much like Ashforth, Keiner, and Fugate’s 
description of “role schema” as the “goals, values, beliefs, norms, interaction styles, and 
time horizons” that befit a social role, and Goffman’s definition of a “social place” as “a 
pattern of appropriate conduct, coherent, embellished, and well articulated” (Ashforth, 
Keiner, & Fugate 2000: 486; Goffman 1959: 75). The focus is on the behaviors a social 
role requires or encourages, the behaviors that define what it means to be a particular 
kind of person.87 
! Reversing the script suggests that performative identity is not simply about who 
one is, but ineradicably about who one is not. There is ample theorization of identity 
formation on the “self/other axis.” Charles Taylor asserts that we define ourselves (or, 
more accurately, our selves) through dialogical interactions with others (1994: 32-33). 
Marková, similarly, suggests that “One cannot meaningfully ask the question about 
identity without posing the question about self and other” (2007: 219; see also Marková 
2003). Mouffe stakes out a strong claim about groups when she says, “Collective 
identities can only be established on the mode of an us/them” (2000: 13). In amateur 
baseball, I will argue, players and coaches define their identities in part by the actions 
they do not perform. In particular, too much involvement with the business side of 
baseball is construed as incompatible with the social identities players and coaches 
inhabit. In this chapter, I want to look how cultural predispositions entrench the practice 
of illicit relationships with agents not just by encouraging it, but by discouraging 
alternatives. While the last chapter focused on how cultural prescriptions impact how 
players take and interpret informational cues (“it’s just a slump” wins out over “I’m not as 
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87 A section from Orwell’s “On Shooting an Elephant” is too trenchant to omit: “I perceived in this moment 
that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow, 
posing dummy, the conventionalized figure of the sahib. For it is the condition of his rule that he shall 
spend his life in trying to impress the ‘natives,’ and so in every crisis he has got to do what the ‘natives’ 
expect of him. He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it. I had got to shoot the elephant. I had 
committed myself to doing that when I sent for the rifle. A sahib has got to act like a sahib; he has got to 
appear resolute, to know his own mind and do definite things. To come all that way, rifle in hand, with two 
thousand people marching at my heels, and then to trail feebly away, having done nothing – no, that was 
impossible” (Orwell 1946). Orwell brilliantly captures the way in which the cultural pressure stemming 
from the role he plays dictates a course of action he would rather not follow. 
good as I thought”), I argue here that cultural proscriptions, too, influence how players 
receive and interpret informational cues, whom they receive them from, even whether 
they receive them at all. 
! Alternative behaviors, practices, and roles are targeted and suppressed by 
casting them as incompatible with a player’s dominant identity. Talk of contracts, agents, 
and the draft are banished from the bullpen, the dugout, the locker room, and between 
players. Conversations about what an agent does or doesn’t do never transpire, and 
players thus deny themselves opportunities to work out their plans with other (secretly) 
informed participants. Furthermore, because there is cultural pressure on players to limit 
their involvement in a process they cannot avoid (talking to scouts, fielding calls from 
teams, other agents, etc.), hiring someone –an agent – to do it for them becomes all the 
more appealing and culturally appropriate. There are likely real benefits to be had by 
having someone – anyone – to be a sounding board for you while you make a tricky 
transition to professional baseball, albeit non-material ones. Insofar as that’s true, it may 
not be surprising that players find someone to talk to, but we must wonder why they 
habitually use illicit agents for a monetary cost when talking to teammates or to coaches 
who are every bit as experienced as agents would be free. Perhaps at least part of the 
answer is that baseball culture dampens players’ desire or ability to turn to these 
alternatives. 
! I will show that behind players’ apparent naïvete, they actually possess 
surprisingly sophisticated knowledge of the draft, the transition to professional baseball, 
and the attendant economic realities. Their social roles, however, demand that they 
must suppress this sophistication. For coaches, too, I will argue that their “job” is about 
what transpires on the field, not the business transactions that take place off of it. 
Coaches describe their responsibilities as about players’ ability to hit, throw, and field, 
not negotiate or prepare for the draft. In fact, much like players, it’s more than simply not 
contemplated by their “job description,” but it is specifically suppressed by it. The 
relationship between players and coaches never covers this territory, and the 
information coaches possess about the process never crosses the gap between them 
and their players. The flow of information through this channel is blocked. Coaches try 
as much as they can to stay out of the relationships players develop with scouts and 
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agents, stepping in only to delegate it out of their clubhouse – not only aware of the illicit 
relationships players have with agents, but in some cases complicit in helping form 
them. 
! The suppression of discussions among players and between players and 
coaches starkly limits two other possibilities. Players cannot fully escape discussions of 
baseball-as-business, but because their culture limits opportunity to speak with coaches 
or teammates, only agents (and scouts) are left as informed conversational partners. 
For a player who wants someone to talk to about his transition to professional baseball, 
agents are the culturally favored route. The culture’s ability to channel and block the 
flow of information about the draft and a player’s future in baseball also limits players’ 
access to alternative ways of being baseball players. The image of the business-
disinterested player is entrenched and protected both by labeling participation in 
business as “not-baseball,” and by limiting discussion of exceptions. The suppression of 
access to alternative ways to conceptualize identity is a mechanism by which the culture 
entrenches existing rules and performances. Predispositions disfavoring certain 
behaviors can perpetuate cultural norms just like those that encourage, rather than 
discourage, behavior. 
“I Just Want to Play Baseball”: An Identity’s Dictates
! Culturally disfavored performances may be cast as the inverse of required 
performative behaviors. For players, the pressure not to overly involve themselves in 
the business of baseball is explicitly expressed (as I’ll show shortly), but it is also implicit 
in the ways they talk about what they do do. Players characterize baseball and business 
as in an inverse relationship; attention to business, in their minds, necessarily means 
less attention to baseball. It is un-baseball. 
! “I just want to play baseball and have fun,” Trent Iñez tells me. Pitcher Larry 
Kloves says, “I’m just trying to have fun playing baseball.” His teammate Tory Jimenez 
shrugs off a question about whether his draft stock is rising or falling: “I’m just focused 
on playing.” Host parent Janice Sattler describes the player staying with her in the same 
way: “He just wants to play baseball. He doesn’t want to do anything but play baseball.” 
Pitcher Calvin Kirkwood says almost exactly the same thing about himself: “I just want 
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to go play baseball. The financial and scout things... I don’t really want to deal with that.” 
In each case, the use of the word “just” serves to put the focus on playing and to 
exclude attention to the business of the sport. Top prospect Jerry Lee even uses it 
twice: “I’m just here to focus on baseball, and just baseball.”
! Pitcher Ricky Sheppard elaborates a little more, acknowledging that they grew up 
loving the game and the game alone, but that to continue playing, they have to deal with 
the challenge of the business side, which they perceive as a bait and switch: “The 
business side is the less appealing side of baseball, because you know, we love playing 
the game, and we just want to go out and play and not have to worry about that.” 
Prioritizing in this way becomes habit, according to his bullpen-mate Landon Escher: 
“You get used to just playing the game, trying to have fun, trying not to worry about the 
business side of it.” Len Clement simply says, “[baseball] is what I’m supposed to be 
doing... it’s what I’m best at.” 
! The game itself is what is familiar, what has defined their lives to this point, and 
what binds them together now. “When we get out here and we’re together, that’s when 
we talk about the game,” in the words of catcher Hal Olsen. “Like we’re talking about 
our swing, advice we can get from other guys, about what can maybe help us out here 
or there.” In the dugout, the bullpen, the locker room, and with other players, the topic is 
baseball. It may be peppered with discussion of music, movies, or relationships, but the 
sport is far and away the most frequent topic – and it is never business. “The 
camaraderie between the guys is more about the game, rather than the business,” as 
Hal Olsen puts it. While players perform their identity off the field all the time, the game 
itself is the locus for their identity, and the playing field the location for the activity that 
defines them. “When you come out here, you just play,” says his fellow catcher Kevin 
Timmons. “You don’t worry about anything else.” The diamond is a safe haven. Thrust 
from the element in which they are most comfortable into one with which they have no 
experience, players can be eager to retreat to the playing field. “You can’t control [the 
business],” says Ray Sheffield, “but on the field you can control your at bats, your 
emotions, how you go about the game, how you prepare.”
! The Crusader’s General Manager, Harold Sooney, doesn’t blame the players on 
his team for trying to keep business at bay for as long as they can:
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This is probably the last time they really get to enjoy the baseball 
experience thoroughly, before it becomes a business, before it 
becomes their job, with all the stresses and pressures associated 
with that. Not that there aren’t pressures on them right now, 
because there are. They have to prove themselves, they have to 
get better, they have to move on to the next level. But when they 
become professionals, it’s a lot tougher. A lot tougher.
! The irony is that players’ efforts to avoid the details of their looming professional 
career leads them to push those details onto a third party – agents. The efforts to 
escape from the business puts them directly in partnership with it, with agents at the 
fulcrum. 
! Part of players’ reluctance stems from a deeply ingrained belief that focusing on 
the business detracts not simply from the baseball identity, but from one’s playing ability. 
As Coach Jameson’s words will make clear later, there are examples of players 
handling their own business without a drop-off in production, but almost all of the 
players I interviewed firmly believe that attention to the details of the financial side will 
draw focus from the field. “I’m really trying not to think about it too much,” says Ray 
Sheffield. “I think it gets in the way of my abilities when I start thinking about that instead 
of playing the game.” Bullpen catcher Donyell Traynor agrees:
If I was worried about scouts and stuff, I probably wouldn’t be 
playing that well. If I was worried about how much I’m going to get 
paid, or how high I’m going to get drafted... it’s not about that. It’s 
about having fun and just playing the game you love.
! Pitcher Larry Kloves, too, ties the reluctance to engage too much with business 
to both a need to focus on the field, and to the trope of playing for “fun” and for love of 
the game, mixing in the tried-and-true “one game at a time” cliche as he does so: 
I just try to take it one game at a time. I don’t try to worry about 
that stuff off the field. I just come here and have fun. You can’t 
control what happens off the field. Just go up there and pitch your 
game and have fun. Everything else will take care of itself. You’re 
not gonna make it to the Major Leagues if you’re worried about the 
business side. It’s about your love of the game and how you play 
it. It’s not about the extracurricular activities.
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! Catcher Kevin Timmons characterizes it as a need to simplify, to keep his mind 
focused on the difficult act of hitting a round ball with a round stick: 
Thinking kills you. Especially when you’re hitting, if you’re thinking 
you’re – it’s so hard to hit. You just need to be relaxed – see ball, 
hit ball. When you have this other stuff going on, like unfinished 
business, calling people back, it’s just – it all adds up in your head. 
And so it can play games with you. It can really hurt you.
! Vlad Simon echoes his teammate on this, suggesting that thinking about 
business rather than baseball can be fatal to one’s ability to execute the tasks required 
on the diamond: 
If you start thinking about all these scouts watching you, you try 
and do too much. Or you’re thinking about something else. And 
you really need to keep one thought. You don’t want to be thinking 
too much. You want to simplify stuff. So just making stuff bigger, 
like scouts, “This pitcher is really good – he’s supposed to be a 
top-round pick” – that stuff can mess with you. It messes with a lot 
of people.
! But though he was adamant about this, Vlad couldn’t think of anyone he knew to 
whom this had happened. Nor, for that matter, could any of the other players I asked 
about it. Evidence aside, the belief that focus on business detracts from baseball is a 
deeply embedded cultural assumption. It is an instrumental explanatory buttress for the 
“anti-baseball” nature of the monetary side of the sport. Players are encouraged to 
focus on what they did to get to the Cape, rather than what will happen next. “It’s nice 
they want to come and talk to you and stuff, but it’s just about coming up here and 
playing baseball,” says Kevin Timmons. “I mean, that’s all just a side show. You need it, 
but it’s a side show.”
“I Try Not to Think About It”: Hiding Evidence of Savvy and Sophistication
! Players’ shared identity is built both with reference to their activities on the field 
and by explicit exclusion of the business that surrounds the game. This shared identity 
suppresses expression of economic savvy in two distinct ways. The first, as examined in 
the last section, has its roots in a cultural assumption that over-participation in the 
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economic realm necessarily detracts from ability on the field. This assumption stands in 
defiance of both a lack of evidence (players unable to name instances where it has 
happened), and stark counter-examples (one of which we will explore in depth later). 
! Whether true or (more likely) not, the belief that business detracts from the game 
proves deeply embedded and sticky, and keeps players on the periphery. A second 
mechanism prevents them from even discussing the roles they play – and don’t play – 
in their relationship with business. The identity players perform with each other excludes 
the business, and the spaces in which they perform together – the field, the dugout, the 
locker room, the bullpen, the team bus – shun the topic entirely. “I don’t hear the kids 
talk about it,” General Manager Harold Sooney notes. 
! I asked pitcher Calvin Kirkwood, for instance, whether he discusses his draft 
status or others’ draft status with teammates. “Not really,” he said. “You don’t really talk 
about that kind of stuff.” Outfielder Peter Wrass ratifies the sentiment: “We don’t talk 
about that stuff.” Infielder Jerry Lee follows the same pattern despite the fact the he, as 
a future first-round pick, has more reason than others to work with an agent/advisor:
We don’t ever talk about advisors. I mean, coaches will point to 
some guys who, you know, they know about, have really good 
advisors, but when it comes down to it, they’re just here to win, 
you know? That’s what you’re trying to do – you’re trying to just 
put up the best numbers that you can and, you know, help your 
team win.
! Jerry, like his teammates, won’t talk about his relationships on the business side, 
invoking in his explanation what he does share with them: a common goal to play and 
win baseball games. He reinforces the idea that what these young men forge together, 
they forge on the field. They and their coaches are here to play baseball games. That is 
their job, and what their roles and identities command them to do. 
! Bullpen catcher Donyell Traynor, too, ties the identity he and his teammates 
perform – including the exclusion of business – to the spaces in which they perform 
them:
In the bullpen, we just focus on the game, which is great. We 
focus on the game, or we just talk about random shit that, you 
know, that goes around. We don’t really talk about that, because 
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it’s obviously more of a personal issue. So we don’t really like to 
talk about it.
 
! In addition to tying together setting and performance, Donyell draws yet another 
line between being a baseball player and involving oneself in the business side of the 
sport. The business side is “personal”; more than that, it is “obviously” personal. Landon 
Escher agrees: “I don’t really talk to guys about that – that’s kind of personal stuff.” Host 
parents Jimi and Janice Sattler and Judy and Steven Wheeler all use the same word to 
explain why they don’t talk to players about their business: it’s “personal.”
! The “random” things that players talk about in the bullpen include many topics an 
outsider would class as personal (relationships, family, difficulties with school) and that 
are not constitutive elements of a baseball player’s identity as such. These topics, 
however, are not excluded from the bullpen. Host parents, too, will talk to their guests 
about school, family, or relationships. The business is excluded not because it’s 
“personal,” as we think about the term but, I argue, because – unlike those other topics 
– it is incompatible with the baseball identity. Nothing in the performance of this identity 
commands a player not to focus on or discuss his schoolwork, for example; but the 
performance does demand that a player limit his attention to business. 
! Pitcher Sal Killian uses a different word to describe the role business plays (or 
perhaps doesn’t play) in a player’s life: 
It’s pretty secretive in college ball. Like, you don’t truly hear unless 
you’re a Boras kind of guy.88 You don’t really hear of, uh, guys with 
agents or anything like that. They don’t try to flaunt it especially... 
they don’t really try to be like, “Oh, I’m better than you because I 
have an agent” or anything, but it’s still one of those things that 
you carry around that no one really knows if you don’t express it... 
so it’s pretty cool.
! Sal illustrates three phenomena that are worth isolating. First, he ratifies what his 
teammates have indicated about the absence of agents, contracts, and the draft from 
their conversations with each other. Second, he characterizes an agent as a status 
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88 Scott Boras is the most powerful agent in baseball, perhaps one of the most powerful people in the 
game. His clients are, almost as a rule, highly touted and sought-after prospects who sign enormous 
contracts. 
symbol, but not one that is broadcast to others. It is a self-directed signal, one that can 
(as I explained in the last chapter) boost a player’s confidence and confirm his self-
identity. It is a part of a performed identity, but one that is usually performed only to 
oneself. Finally, his use of the word “secretive” should remind us that operating in the 
background is the fact that agents are against NCAA rules, and that avoiding too much 
publicity serves an instrumental purpose as well as a cultural one.89 
! Given the explication in the last section, and so far in this one, one could be 
forgiven for assuming that these players are (intentionally) uninformed about how the 
business of baseball works. And, when asked broadly if they know much about these 
things, virtually all echo outfielder Vlad Simon: “I don’t really think about it.” But, as 
several host parents attest, this performance is exactly that; it is a show intended to hide 
a sophisticated understanding of the process and their place in it. As host parent and 
lifetime Cape Cod League fan Gareth Jones puts it with a smirk: “They have a pretty 
good idea of how things work.”
! Players’ answers to specific questions about how the process operates – and 
where they fit into it – give the lie to their more general professions of ignorance on the 
subject. “My goal is to go in the top three rounds,” Trent Añez tells me. When I ask how 
he knows that’s a realistic place to go, and whether he thinks others have similarly 
realistic understandings of their place in baseball’s economy, he assures me that they 
do: “Perfect Game puts out like a projection, like a mock draft. Baseball America does 
the same thing I’m sure... guys are all over it – they know where they’re projected to 
go.” Speaking to Trent’s teammates reveals that simply knowing where they are 
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89Lurking behind the phenomenon of illicit agent use is another apparent contradiction: how can 
something become common knowledge in a culture even while being hidden by practitioners? Some of 
the answer here is not that interesting; former amateur players can and do say with impunity that they had 
agents while still in college. For first-round picks especially, the process of the draft involves semi-public 
displays of an agent, reinforcing the attachment to elite status. It is no stretch, I think, to propose that 
much of the culture’s common knowledge begins with that fact and finds extension in slips of the tongue, 
offhand comments, and suppositions by teammates. Sal’s comments on secrecy above can’t be entirely 
right,as most players I talked to told me how many of their teammates had agents. Through guesswork 
and observation, players often do know how pervasive the practice is and who many of the rule-breakers 
are. In this sense, it is a secret, but one that everybody knows on some level. There is some overlap here 
to Segwick’s articulation of the “open secret,” though I am hesitant to draw too concise a comparison to 
her work on “the closet” and the lived experience of baseball players reluctant to “out” themselves as 
having an agent (1990). Nonetheless, I do want to note that the concept of willful ignorance and common 
knowledge that is only obliquely acknowledged find purchase both in Sedgwick’s examples and mine. 
projected to be drafted is only one facet of their economic sophistication. Outfielder 
Sean Flanagan, one of the few Crusaders who has already graduated, knows that his 
inability to return to school diminishes his leverage and will lower his draft status 
considerably. He predicts almost exactly where he will be taken, comparing himself to 
other former seniors with comparable statistics. “[It’s] just based on the past. After the 
draft, after a couple of weeks – everyone, what they signed for, everyone’s money 
comes out.” Tory Jimenez is a rising senior, but he anticipates joining the professional 
ranks rather than returning to school in part because he knows he will have far less 
leverage if he returns to school and re-enters the draft after his senior year. Landon 
Escher knows that it will be his size (he’s quite short for a pitcher) not his school status 
that keeps his stock low. How does he know? “Just looking at past history... just kinda 
common sense.”
! Players also know that vocally committing to staying in school can drop them 
down the draft boards; teams aren’t keen on spending a high-round draft pick on a 
player they think is unlikely to actually sign a contract, though they may offer money 
consistent with a high-round pick even while selecting a player late in the draft. Larry 
Kloves is a rising junior at a top academic university with every intention of getting his 
degree before beginning his professional career, but he’s quick to tell me he knows that 
this has caused his draft stock to fall. Jon Tufton, a teammate of Larry’s from both 
college and the Cape, had been projected to go in the fourth or fifth round of the draft 
before falling to the 29th. Jon, too, knows that his fall was precipitated by telling scouts 
that he intended to go back to school the following year. 
! Hal Olsen describes a similar phenomenon: “You can have guys that are fifth-
round talents not get drafted at all because they want a certain amount of money.” 
Players are often asked by scouts how much money they would need to be offered to 
leave school, and giving an answer too discordant with their perceived value may move 
them farther down the draft board. A projected seventh-round pick who won’t leave 
school for less than second-round money may find himself drafted far lower in the draft 
because teams don’t believe he’s likely to sign any contract at all and they won’t risk a 
high-value pick. But as Brett Johanssen tells me, it’s pretty easy to give a scout the 
“right” answer: “[The team] will call somebody – ‘We’ll take you between – or “We would 
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like to take him between the 10th and the 13th [rounds]. You just figure out what slot for 
that is.” Despite disparate incentives, Brett thinks there’s generally cooperation and 
open communication between teams and their draft picks. “No one’s going to rip you off. 
You kind of go in with an idea of how much you should sign for.”
! Pitcher Val Marcos’ draft stock has fallen for another reason: his performance 
between his sophomore and junior seasons simply declined. A year earlier, he had been 
projected as high as the second round, but had fallen out of the top ten by the time the 
2010 draft arrived – and he knows exactly why. He also knows that there was still a 
chance to salvage top-round money: if he could perform at a high level during the Cape 
season, the professional team that drafted him might offer a high signing bonus despite 
his comparatively low pick. This is called a “draft and follow,” and was described in 
detail by several players including both Val and outfielder Vlad Simon, for whom it was a 
reality in 2010. 
! The wealth of knowledge these players can display on the details and minutiae of 
draft economics makes it difficult for others to credit their protestations of ignorance. 
Few know the process or how players navigate it as well as Rory Jones, a former Cape 
League and college coach who now works as a scout for a Major League organization, 
and he’s more than a little skeptical of such claims:
That’s really stupid, no doubt about it. I’m looking at them, like, 
“Yeah, you could have told me that in the 80s.” By the time they 
come here, there’s not many kids who don’t know what’s going on. 
It’s not like the old days, where they didn’t know the money. They 
know every slot, what the round, what the pick is worth. When you 
hear guys say “We don’t have the information,” you can call the 
Major League office – you can get all the information. 
! There’s no doubt that the Internet is making it easier and easier for players to 
gather information about the process and about themselves; it’s a big reason Len 
Clement, who knew very little about it when I interviewed him in 2010, was a year later 
able to tell me about “draft and follow,” the results of asking for too much money or of 
stating an intention to stay in school, or the fact that, as a “soft-throwing lefty 
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specialist”90 his draft fortunes would be a bit more volatile, because not all teams are 
interested in someone with his particular talents. Len learned all this without having an 
agent/advisor (though he is looking to find one nonetheless) and without discussing it 
with his teammates. Much of this can be learned on the Internet (and is) but some is 
learned through exposure to the business that players simply can’t fully avoid – 
discussions that scouts and agents start with them; an exposure, by the way, that isn’t 
limited to the players themselves. “You have moms who understand slot money,” 
General Manager Harold Sooney notes. “It’s pretty fascinating.” 
! How can it be that so many Cape Crusaders tell me early in an interview that 
they “don’t know much” about the business and then go on to give detailed answers to 
my questions about it? It isn’t that they don’t think of such answers as related to the 
business – they understand that they are – but two other possibilities are harder to 
distinguish. It could be that they know they are informed, but feel obliged to deny it in 
order to maintain the appropriate front. It is more likely, I think, that players are taken in 
by their own performance and have genuinely come believe that they are uninformed 
despite the contradiction that is immediately apparent to an outsider. Either way, the 
result is the same. Players, despite no small degree of pragmatic sophistication, 
perform identities that declare such sophistication to be fundamentally incompatible with 
the image players project. An alternative formulation of player identity – the 
“economically savvy player who does his own negotiating” – is actively suppressed by 
existing cultural norms, which limit players’ access to different ways of performing, 
different ways of being a baseball player. This, in turn, limits the available and 
acceptable interpretations of phenomena that surround them. Their facility with the 
business, even if they should realize it exists, cannot mean that they should tackle the 
task themselves. Even though they can (and even if they wanted to) this interpretation 
of the signs, signals, and cues around them is suppressed by superceding cultural 
dictates about what it means to be a baseball player. 
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90 Len knows that his side-arm delivery and comparatively low pitch speed limit his professional options. It 
is unlikely that he will make a career as a starter (the pitcher who begins a game and typically plays six or 
more innings) or a closer (the pitcher who comes in at the end of a game for an inning to secure a win). 
Instead, he will probably make a career as a relief pitcher who comes in to face select batters who 
struggle with either lefty pitchers or sidearm pitchers. 
! I noted earlier that players learn to be who they are by accepting cultural 
definitions of what is acceptable behavior, of what is considered normal and what is 
considered aberrant. By acting according to prefabricated rules and norms, players both 
participate in and perpetuate cultural structures. Here, the culture has established a 
behavior (sophistication in business) as abnormal or aberrant, and the belief that it 
inhibits production on the field functions as mythology supporting its exclusion from 
culturally established normality. 
“That’s Not My Job”: Performing as “Coach” and Limits on the Flow of Information
! Players are, of course, not the only ones performing a social identity in the 
dugout, in the bullpen, in the locker room, and on the field. Playing “coach,” too, means 
marshaling and deploying “a pattern of appropriate conduct, coherent, embellished, and 
well articulated” (Goffman 1959: 75). There are, as one would expect, a number of 
similarities between the ways coaches build and perform their identities and the ways 
players build and perform theirs. In fact, because they played at high levels as well, 
almost all coaches have built their identity as a coach on a foundation of an identity as a 
player. However, in the years following their careers, those identities have been diluted 
and fragmented. Coaches Brake and Jameson played Triple-A baseball – just one step 
shy of the Major Leagues – but have worked a series of odd jobs (sales, construction, 
maintenance, etc.) since their time as players. Coaching, for them, is a part-time 
occupation, though one that they fully inhabit during these summer months. Head 
Coach Nathan Kimmel is a full-time coach – he coaches a high school team as well as 
his Cape Team – but is a professional teacher as well (a separate but compatible 
identity). 
! In part because coaches have more diluted and diversified identities, they have 
both more experience with and more perspectives on the transition from amateur to 
professional. Many of them, including coaches Brake and Jameson, have played at a  
high professional level; they have gone through the transition themselves and can now 
reflect on the experience from a new perspective. They are also, in their role as 
coaches, a resource for scouts who want an inside perspective on players’ work ethic, 
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attitude, confidence, and “make-up”: they are participants in the process, not just 
observers of it. 
! Which is to say coaches know a great deal about it. They know even more ins 
and outs of how it works than their players do, having been through it once themselves 
and having seen many other players go through it before. They could be incredible 
repositories for information and advice for players, and players know it. “My coaches 
really know a lot about that,” Len Clement says, and eight of his teammates agree that 
their coaches have tremendous expertise about the draft and the economics entailed by  
relationships with agents. By contrast, no Crusaders indicated that they thought their 
coaches did not know about the process. Trent Iñez almost scoffs when I ask whether 
he thinks his coaches know much about it before answering: “College coaches know.”
! However, no Crusader – not a single one of the 26 interviewed – uses either his 
college’s coaching staff or his Crusaders’ coaches as a resource to help work through 
the process. I attribute this to the scant interest players have in taking the initiative to 
navigate this process themselves. Players are encouraged to use an agent for their 
transition regardless of their material incentives, and actively discouraged from taking a 
more participatory role. As it turns out, though, coaches are as reluctant to reach out 
from their side as players are from theirs, and for symmetrical reasons. Coach Brake 
describes his hesitation in involving himself with the business side of the sport, and the 
faint exception he is willing to make:
I don’t talk to them a lot about it because I think my priority is to 
handle the hitting. However, I do think if a kid was stressed out or 
is getting it too much, I’d just say “Hey, that’s a good thing that 
they’re coming to you, but don’t be afraid to speak up for yourself 
and tell them, ‘Hey, give me your card, give me your phone 
number, I will keep in touch with you. I’ll call you at the end of the 
season.” I’m out here to put up numbers and get to the field and 
do work.
! Coach Brake dismisses involvement with business because it isn’t his job, which 
is to say it isn’t part of the role he plays as a coach for the Crusaders. Consider too the 
advice he is willing to give, minimal as it is. His suggestion for a player struggling with 
the attention from the professional side is to avoid too much involvement, to put it off 
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until the end of the season. While perhaps sound, players often resort to a middleman 
instead, someone to act as a shield between them and the business thrust on them, 
between them and the scouts and agents who seek them out. For a select few, this can 
be a family member, often one who has experience with the game and the business. 
For most, however, it means an agent who can answer scouts’ questions about whether 
a player intends to go back to school, how much money they are seeking, where they 
hope to go in the draft, etc. These are all questions that scouts pepper players with after 
games, and – as I argue above – they are equipped to answer themselves. However, 
limiting their involvement with the business by not tackling these issues themselves 
somewhat paradoxically requires them to become entangled with a professional who 
will do it for them. 
! Coach Brake also describes the influence of the role he plays not just as 
“Coach,” but as a member of a coaching staff where Coach Kimmel does his best to 
manage divisions of labor: 
[Coach Kimmel] does a good job with that. Nathan – that’s really, 
um, Nathan’s job, you know? For me to try and do seven, ten, 20 
things – Nathan is really good about telling us, “Hey, you’re doing 
the hitting, you’re doing the pitching, you’re doing the defense, I’ll 
handle this, I’ll handle that.” 
! But while Coach Brake handles the hitting and Coach Jameson the pitching, 
Coach Kimmel doesn’t arrogate to himself the responsibility of educating or training his 
players for the future of their business. Furthermore, the reasons he gives for demurring 
on that count are remarkably similar to those given by his assistants: 
That’s not my job to interfere with that. I don’t get involved with it. 
It’s not my job. That’s their decision. That’s going to be his advisor, 
his agent. That’s the family’s decision. I will only give them advice 
if they ask me.
! Though he doesn’t use the word “personal” to describe the topic (as his players 
do) the concept is the same: draft and professional economics are not part of the 
substance of his relationship with players. It isn’t his “job”; it doesn’t fit his pattern of 
appropriate conduct. He says he will give them advice if his players ask, though they 
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are unlikely to ask him. In those rare cases where he does dispense advice, it is almost 
always limited to suggesting a few agents who can answer the questions a player might 
have, enabling Coach Kimmel to avoid mixing business with baseball. 
! All five coaches I interviewed (six, including an ex-Cape League coach) felt that 
players went to agents when they shouldn’t, but because the agent cannot do anything 
for them, not because it’s against the rules. The coaches certainly know the rules, but 
especially on the Cape away from college campuses, have little incentive to ensure 
players follow them. The coaches don’t think of themselves as NCAA eligibility 
enforcers, and if a player wants to have an agent, that’s his business. But despite their 
feeling that agents are unnecessary for almost all their players, coaches’ reluctance to 
involve themselves in the business side of the sport ends up pushing those same 
players towards the illicit relationship with an agent. Their own desire to avoid 
“business” creates very real business for agents. 
! Cape League coaches get players for only ten weeks and are careful not to step 
on relationships players may already have with family members, college coaches, 
professional scouts, or agents. The short time horizon is part of the reason that, as 
Coach Jameson puts it, “As coaches we are careful to try to stay out of that as much as 
possible.” By saying “as coaches,” Jameson highlights the relationship between the 
roles that they play and the prohibition on participating in a player’s business 
relationships. He repeats the phrase when I ask him to elaborate:
 As coaches, we’re there to advise these kids if they come to us 
and have questions, but it’s more of, “Hey, this is something to 
consider,” “This is something to think about.” We don’t want to get 
in the way of guys that have advisors, that are under the control of 
the team, you know? That’s something we let the player and 
advisor and... how they want to deal with the team. At the same 
time, we try to stay out of the scouts coming to us, “Hey, what do 
you think?” “Do you think he’s going to sign?” “Does he want to go 
back to school?” We, I think, try to stay out of the middle of it and 
be there for the kids, for the players. If they have questions and 
want to come to us and ask, and we’d like to – and we’re happy to 
be there for them – but we try to stay out of the middle of the 
scouts, and agents, and that whole mix.
147
! Coach Jameson places his role as a coach in a cultural matrix alongside other 
roles performed by players, by scouts, and by agents. Each pairing has particular topics 
germane to the relationship and others that are either typically outside of the 
relationship’s scope, or even incompatible with it. Coaches and players talk about the 
game itself; scouts and coaches talk about a player’s psychological “make-up”; players 
and scouts talk about draft possibilities; and agents and players talk about how to keep 
scouts at bay. Coaches and players don’t talk about much about the draft or about a 
player’s economic realities; those are the province of players’ relationships with scouts 
and agents, and coaches fear to tread on others’ cultural territory. Coach Jameson says, 
“We try to stay out of the middle of the scouts and agents,” mirroring Coach Kimmel’s 
comment that it isn’t for him to make these decisions for players – it’s between them, 
their families, and their agents. It is because those conversations “belong” to other 
cultural participants that coaches feel they are incompatible with their identities as 
“Coach.”
! A former player reflects on his journey through the draft, and notes in retrospect 
that he could have done it without an agent if he’d called on his coach for help 
answering the questions about money, round, and school that scouts so often ask: “A 
player could do it for himself. It’s just getting – like, coaches could help you out with that. 
A good coach knows a ton, a ton of scouts, and they get your name out there.” But this 
alternative way to perform as a baseball player is suppressed, in part, by the fact that 
such collaboration between players and coaches is considered contrary to the 
relationship they inhabit. Information that could lead players to at least consider different 
ways to be players never bridges the divide between coaches and players because 
players don’t ask, and coaches don’t tell.
Bill Jameson’s Avant Garde Performance
! Pitching Coach Bill Jameson is of special note, and for more than his comments 
on his role as a coach. Jameson proves to be an interesting cultural artifact because he 
is the exception: that exceedingly rare player who overcame the cultural pressure to 
ignore business and to hide it behind an agent. He eschewed an agent not simply as a 
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top prospect – a rarity in itself – but throughout his professional career.91 His story is 
worth recounting at length, because he has lived out an alternative way to be a baseball 
player; he has given an unusual performance of that identity. In effect, he has imagined 
a new way of being, a new conceptualization – and rejection – of a set of cultural 
expectations. He says:
I never had an agent. I was my own agent. And you know, I never 
had – I never wanted one, to tell you the truth. Getting equipment 
and all that was never a real problem for me. I didn’t really need 
somebody for that, and I always felt like I had a good enough 
relationship with the team that I was with, where if I wanted to 
know something, or had a question, or had something to say, I 
could go to the people that were there and speak for myself. I 
never trusted somebody – I never knew somebody and trusted 
them well enough to turn that over to him, you know? 
! Jameson, unlike either his contemporaries or the players he now coaches, felt 
that he could and should engage himself in both the game and the business. He didn’t 
trust an agent to be a perfect representative; he would be his own best advocate. In 
part, this is because he saw first-hand that having an agent sometimes creates more 
problems than it solves, and that always pressing for the biggest possible contract can 
backfire. 
I saw a lot of cases where guys’ agents got them in trouble, where 
the guy’s agent is bugging the hell out of the farm director and 
pisses the wrong person off, and then all of a sudden it becomes 
the player’s problem because his agent’s a jackass. You see that 
sometimes, that definitely happens. So, I don’t know. The 
equipment deal was never a factor, contract negotiation when I 
was a free agent, it was pretty straightforward, it was – you know, I 
might not be the best negotiator but, that part of it, I felt like I was 
handled well. As far as contracts and all goes, signing as a free 
agent, I saw a lot of guys getting themselves into trouble by asking 
for more money, more money, more money and then they get it. 
Well, that put you in kind of a – it put you in a corner a little bit. 
With that more money comes more responsibilities. You know, if 
you’re not performing, you’re not producing, you’re not viewed as 
a guy who can go to the big leagues and help the big league team 
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91 Miami Heat guard Ray Allen – one of the NBA’s all-time great’s, a perennial All-Star, a sure-fire Hall of 
Fame inductee, and perhaps the greatest three-point shooter ever – has also acted as his own agent 
throughout his career. 
out, if something were to happen there, and you’re making 
whatever it is, x amount of dollars a month, and you’re not 
producing, you’re gone, you know? Because they can get four or 
five players in their own organization to do the same thing you’re 
doing, why are they going to pay you that money? So, as far as 
contract negotiation went, I never tried to put myself in [that 
position].
! Jameson developed his own objectives and his own strategies to achieve them. 
Wanting to maximize his playing time and exposure rather than his contract size, he had 
little trouble negotiating with teams that he felt respected his work ethic and good faith 
effort to simply remain on the field. Jameson found that cutting out the middleman and 
communicating directly with his teams was not only workable but preferable in many 
ways. Once Jameson was released from the team that drafted him, he found that he 
was more than able to contact teams on his own as a free agent, and work the 
connections he had developed in the sport to find out which organizations had openings 
and were interested. 
A guy has something to say, [teams] would rather hear it from the 
player than an agent. So I kind of – I always felt like I was in a 
position to do that with the team I was with. And then after a few 
years, after getting kicked around a little bit and, you know, when I 
was in a position where I was looking for a job – I was a free 
agent. I got released. I found out pretty quick it’s who you know. I 
remember the first time it happened, I thought, “Well, I had an 
okay season last year in Double A and people took notice,” so the 
first time I got released I sent out kind of like a fax to all these 
teams and just – “Hey, here’s my situation, here’s what I did last 
year” – and then followed that up with a bunch of phone calls 
starting with the people that I had some history with. And that 
experience made me realize, it’s really – it’s who you know. It’s 
kind of a small world, and you get to know people in different 
places and so after a while I felt like I didn’t need somebody for 
the connections. If something happened, I just started calling 
people. And I was fortunate in that it seemed to always work out 
for me, you know, until the end. Now I can’t get a job, but before 
that, it seemed to work out and I just stuck with it. 
! While acknowledging that this entailed no small amount of work – faxing 30 
organizations and calling all of your connections takes time – Jameson still feels that the 
payoff of controlling his own destiny was worth it. When he was looking for his next job 
in baseball, he was his own best agent.
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I mean, you kind of – you’re putting yourself out there, you know? 
Lot of rejection, lot of no’s, lot of no callbacks, lot of just non-
responses… but that’s it, you know? How bad do you want a job? 
When I was looking for a job, there was nobody in the world that 
wanted one more than me. And no one was going to work harder 
to make calls and find something than I was. I felt like, you know, I 
mean, maybe there are some agents out there that do that, but I 
just always felt like it was more important to me than it was going 
to be for somebody else, and so when it did happen – and I was in 
that position, you know, quite a few times – nobody was making 
phone calls or working harder than I was to find myself a spot 
somewhere.
! Bill Jameson took a path all but untraveled by players like him who have risen 
through the ranks of elite NCAA baseball and high-level professional ball. He is the 
exception that proves the rule. In bucking the dominant cultural trends and pressures, 
he imagined his own different identity as a baseball player. But, ironically perhaps, he is 
now loath to share too much of his story because he feels his cultural role as a coach 
constrains him. 
! We should not assume that if baseball culture encouraged Jameson to discuss 
his choices with his players that they would discard their agents once and for all. Surely 
there are many players who, even knowing that this alternative was both plausible and 
with precedent, would still prefer to leave it to an agent rather than to have to field all the 
questions from scouts themselves. Agents are still that secret status symbol (as Sal 
Killian indicated), still envisioned as a “reward for the hard work,” as Steve Mott put it. 
! Nonetheless, the cultural norms that guide players, coaches, and their 
interactions deny players access to this alternative vision of their identity. Bill Jameson 
could be an instructive counter-example to the image so firmly etched in players’ 
imaginations. Recall how Housing Coordinator Irene Isaac described the connection 
that players draw between professionalism and agents:
[Pros] have got their agent, or whatever. So I think it’s kind of like 
they see that, and that’s like, “Okay, well, then, that’s what I’m 
supposed to do. I’m supposed to have an agent – that’s what they 
do.” That’s part of being a professional player, is having other 
people deal with this for you. That’s what professional players do – 
they play, and people take care of all the other stuff. I think it’s kind 
of ingrained in them.
151
! But Coach Jameson shows that this isn’t strictly true: there are other ways 
players could conduct their business, but a glaring lack of role models or exemplars for 
those alternatives. The cultural norms of performance and interaction conspire against 
the reproduction or proliferation of this alternative identity. Players’ performances 
discourage them from examining such possibilities, and coaches’ roles prevent them 
from reaching out from the other side to help explore alternative ways to be a baseball 
player. Baseball culture manages in these ways to suppress the emergence of identities 
that challenge hegemonic and dominant norms. Bill Jameson’s imagining of a new 
identity is, in a manner of speaking, a threat to existing performed identities, but one 
that is quelled by suppressing mechanisms for its communication. 
Cultural Suppression and the Interpretation of Information
! In the last chapter, I showed how cultural predispositions in the world of amateur 
baseball – namely players’ predilections for confidence and self-deception – encourage 
particular interpretations of available information. Even though the most likely reason a 
player struggles during a summer on the Cape is that he isn’t as good as he believes, 
his psychological predispositions recast those facts in a more comfortable light: “It’s just 
a slump.” The mindset baseball inculcates in its participants encourages predictable 
reinterpretation of data; put differently, it changes what an informational cue means to a 
player. The connection between cue theory and legal consciousness that this explores 
stems from cue theory’s silence on how we arrive at the beliefs and preferences that are 
related but conceptually prior to an actor’s taking a cue. When we take cues as Lupia 
and McCubbins (and others) describe them, those predispositions are brought into play, 
and legal consciousness’ attention to how they serve cultural reproduction helps us to 
understand the subtle ways that information is inflected by our psychological tendencies 
(Lupia 1994a; Lupia & McCubbins 1998; see Silbey 1992, 2005). 
! The cultural predisposition to avoid over-involvement in the business of baseball 
encourages players to work with an agent, even if that involvement isn’t in their material 
interest. Like confidence and self-deception, it serves to perpetuate a hegemonic 
system of norms that not only puts the athlete in a situation violative of NCAA rules, but 
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that appears to materially mis-serve him. Furthermore, when these players observe the 
growing encroachment from the money side, there are multiple interpretations of that 
fact – multiple ways they could interpret that cue. But as before, their social psychology 
favors one interpretation (“I should get an agent/advisor to shield me from it”) over 
others. The cue players take is refracted through the lens of their social predispositions. 
! But this chapter makes another different point as well. Cultural norms entrench 
and perpetuate themselves both through encouraging participants to act in ways that 
reproduce them, and though the active suppression of alternatives. Norms change the 
ways we receive information, but they can also prevent information from reaching us in 
the first place. Players do not fail to follow in Coach Jameson’s self-directed footsteps 
simply because they are predisposed to favor other possibilities (though they are), but 
because their identities, their coaches’ identities, and their relationships with their 
coaches preclude the transmission of this alternative way of being who they are (or 
could be). The culture conspires to prevent them from taking that cue from their coach. 
! Cultural paths of least resistance are certainly not exclusive to baseball. 
Physicians sometimes “turf” risky cases; they send them to another department to 
resolved rather than execute a procedure that might put them at risk of a lawsuit 
(Summerton 1995; Studdert, et al, 2005). Part of the reason for this is physicians’ 
tendency to dramatically overestimate their risk of being sued (Elmore, et al, 2005), but 
it is at least plausible that hospital culture not only encourages this practice, but 
suppresses the performance of alternatives. Doctors might consider it “not my job” to 
treat a patient who could be adequately treated in another department. Or, if physicians 
who resolve to treat risky patients rather than turf them are frequently questioned by 
higher-ups, or frequently required to account for themselves at Mortality and Morbidity 
panels, the practice would be discouraged. One possible result is a lack of role models 
on which other doctors who might be encouraged to take that route could model 
themselves. Either way, there are rich analytical possibilities available for those who 
would use role theory and suppressed alternative identities to address the questions 
about malpractice and treatment decisions. 
! The informational cues that we take from others are, certainly, subject to the 
predispositions and predilections that affect how we interpret them. When we ask why a 
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person reaches a certain legal or political conclusion based on cues from others, we 
should be aware that the identities they bring to the table can affect what those cues 
mean. Our inquiry, though, should not end there: we need also to ask if those same 
cultural predispositions are closing off alternative cues our actors don’t imagine in the 
first place. It isn’t just about why actors choose one path over another; it’s about the 
alternative paths that remain hidden from them.  
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Conclusion
Bottom of the Ninth
! Political heuristics and legal consciousness may seem strange bedfellows but, in 
the proper context, each can offer the other something to broaden and enrich its 
application. Cue theory has remained largely unconcerned with the ways a cue might be 
constructed in the first place, how our pre-existing identities foreground particular cues, 
how cultural forces influence the interpretation of cues, or how cultural roles might 
exclude taking certain cues, or even knowledge of certain cues. Legal consciousness, 
on the other hand, continues to search for specific explanations of how individuals 
interact with and reproduce hegemonic structures. For cue theory, the legal 
consciousness approach can provide new sets of questions with which the former can 
address analytically prior questions (how does a cue come to exist?) and strike out into 
more convoluted territory (how does someone use informational cues to navigate a 
complex socio-legal framework such as the welfare system?). Using legal 
consciousness to loosen some of cue theory’s strictures facilitates its deployment in 
more culturally or sociologically oriented queries. Conversely, cue theory provides legal 
consciousness with a new toolbox to interrogate individuals’ behavior towards law and 
legal structures. We tend not to move through or relate to such structures as rational 
maximizers, or by exhaustively researching our possibilities. Rather, we take social and 
cognitive shortcuts. We see how people “like us” do something, and then do what we 
can to replicate others’ perceived successes. The habits we mimic are constructed and 
inflected by social structures that surround us, and when we look to others within them 
to mold our behavior, we replicate them. 
! This dialog between heuristics and legal consciousness provides a different 
approach to the age-old agency/structure debate. Debates about the primacy of one or 
the other are stale; instead, we now direct our energies towards analysis of the 
relationship between the two and the manner in which individuals work within both 
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frames at the same time. What cue theory and legal consciousness together give us is a 
toolbox with which to examine how cultural structures shape the options available to an 
individual actor, and how that actor’s cognitive tendencies themselves reproduce those 
options. 
! Though I have selected four particular phenomena to substantiate this dialog – 
elite norm formation, narrative identity, self-deception, and cultural roles – there is no 
reason to think that the conversation must be so limited. In theory, any cultural/cognitive 
predisposition can ground the conversation. The interplay is, I have argued, of much 
use to those of us who are curious about patterns of law or rule-breaking, but ought to 
be of interest in many other scholarly curiosities. Whether legal, economic, political, or 
social structures find themselves in the crosshairs, we move through them with roughly 
the same cognitive hardware, and each possess existing hegemonic practices that 
manage to entrench and replicate themselves. So while I have argued that this 
analytical frame explains the actions of amateur baseball players, and suggested that it 
might help explain dress-code controversies, Catholic consciousness, the practices of 
street-level crack dealers, and defensive medicine, it conceivably extends even further 
than those examples indicate. 
! I would like to conclude, however, not simply with this recap but with some more 
specific suggestions about how both the aims and findings of this work might be fruitfully  
extended or expanded. To begin, I urge readers to consider my methodology as a call to 
take seriously the power even micro-level cultural structures have to fundamentally alter 
perceptions of costs and benefits. Some scholarship in law and society has closely 
interrogated these effects. In cultures with a more forceful shame mechanism, those 
cultural proscriptions and definitions of shame affect how those within the culture 
evaluate the costs and benefits of drunk driving. When arrests are considered 
particularly shameful, fewer people run the risks of drunk driving though the official 
sanctions remain the same (Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev 1993). Similarly, differences 
in culturally defined gender roles make the social costs of criminal sanctions different; 
women perceive arrests and convictions differently because their culture tells them that 
to be arrested or convicted is “unwomanly” (Grasmick, Blackwell, & Bursik 1993). Even 
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one’s relationship status can influence perceptions of the the costs and benefits 
attached to law-breaking (Grasmick & Bursik 1990).
! Neither these specific studies nor the general approach I advocate ought to be 
construed as frontal attacks on rational-choice methodology or formal modeling. Indeed, 
I have nothing in particular against the axiom that people will do what they think will 
maximize their preferences. My worry, rather, is that it begs the question. There are two 
suggestions I believe this study makes that are relevant here. First, the value an 
amateur baseball player puts in an agent is not one that would be readily identified 
(much less defined) by an outsider; baseball’s culture constructs the value, and it 
means something only to participants in that culture. Cultures construct the shame 
mechanism that mitigates against drunk driving; cultures construct the gender roles and 
archetypes that suggest criminal behavior is “worse” for women then for men; cultures 
construct the meanings of relationships in ways that affect how those in them think 
about laws and breaking them. 
! What we value is always at least in part a product of what our culture(s) construct 
as valuable, and what we perceive as costs are always at least in part considered costly 
because that’s how our culture defines them. When we think about what we want and 
what that says about us as individuals we are also expressing our interpretations of and 
participation in our culture(s). We inexorably express our membership in these cultures 
(and micro-cultures) by accepting and internalizing the values they inculcate. The 
process of learning how to be a member of a culture entails learning what that culture 
values and what it discredits. What “fair” means, what “justice” means, what the relevant 
rules and laws are, and when exceptions to them can be made are all culturally 
influenced or defined. When, as Greenblatt suggests, we build our individual identities 
from the bricks and mortar our culture supplies we simultaneously learn what our culture 
deems valuable or admirable (and what it does not) (1980). By situating ourselves 
within that culture we learn what it means to participate in it, what it means to be 
“someone like me” in it. 
! A second phenomenon investigated here is worth considering as well. The 
possibilities of self-deception (and of culturally inculcated self-deception at that) should 
indicate that even in cases where an outsider has evidence that individuals “ought” to 
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put a particular value on something, there may be internal structures that cloud 
information for those in a culture. Simply put, we should resist temptations to think of 
values as either objective or self-evident; often they are neither, but rather socially 
constructed and/or obscured. 
! All of which is to say that even the most sophisticated rational-choice models will 
only be as predictive or as good as their understanding of what the subjects they model 
conceive of as in their interest. Where seemingly unusual or idiosyncratic values are 
regularly construed as meaningful and desired, models that fail to take stock of such 
socio-cultural constructions will miss the mark. Where seemingly objective costs or 
benefits are shaded or blocked by cultural forms, models that fail to understand this will 
lack the power they otherwise might possess. Models, and the rational-choice paradigm 
from which they often stem, must account for the cultural constructions that constitute 
costs and benefits in the first place. Often the best — perhaps the only — way to access 
this information will be the sort of ethnographic approach I have used here. Immersion 
in a culture and the attempt to understand it on its own terms may be needed to 
discover what its participants conceive of as valuable, just, fair, worthwhile, admirable, 
and desired. 
! Culture affects how individuals weigh, value, and evaluate rules, but rules can in 
turn influence cultural practices. The culture of amateur baseball constructs agents as 
valuable, but the complex of rules and practices stemming from the NCAA and the 
economics of the baseball draft create a situation allowing for that construction. Were 
the rules different, were the rules enforced differently, or were the transition from 
amateur to professional organized differently, baseball culture might have interacted 
with these formal rules and institutions differently. 
! Future research might be able to isolate some of these processes through 
examination of contrast cases. NCAA football and NCAA basketball are governed by the 
same bylaws as NCAA baseball, but there are reasons to believe that the relationships 
with agents will be constructed differently. For one, both the professional football draft 
and the professional basketball draft are significantly smaller than baseball’s; the 
National Football League (NFL) drafts fewer than 250 new players each year and the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) only about 60 (compared to over 1,500 baseball 
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players). While I suspect that norms of confidence and even self-deception are at play 
in these other sports as well, the numbers might suggest that — with far fewer 
opportunities to move to the professional ranks — relationships with agents to help with 
the transition might not be so highly valued. 
! Conducting research with collegiate basketball and football teams could shed 
quite a bit of light on the impact these formal structures have on the cultural meaning of 
agents. The same interviews and ethnographic observation that underwrote this study 
would investigate what differences exist between amateur sports, and how those 
cultural differences are impacted by pragmatic realities. If, as I suspect, an agent does 
not have the same cultural status in basketball or football as in baseball, to what extent 
are those differences underwritten by formal rules and attendant economic realities?
! Other pragmatic considerations could affect the cultural construction of agent 
relationships as well. In the NFL and NBA, players must declare for the draft, which 
baseball players do not — this brings a measure of publicity absent for many baseball 
players. When taken stock of alongside the larger popularity of collegiate basketball and 
football and the significantly smaller size of the draft, a much brighter spotlight shines on 
elite basketball and football players than on most of their baseball-playing counterparts. 
This implicates not only reasons to expect cultural differences in the meaning of agents, 
but the possibility of studying the role of rule-enforcement in identity formation. 
! I believe that a baseball player’s low risk of being caught breaking NCAA Bylaw 
12.3.2.1 is part of what allows a cultural identity to be constructed against it. The under-
enforcement of the provision creates a space where identity can grow. Were the rule 
more frequently enforced — were the risk of being caught higher — it is possible that 
identities arrayed against it would be transformed or eliminated. Does the higher 
possibility of enforcement in basketball or football play a role in preventing the rise of 
agent use as a symbol? Further ethnographic research might be able to answer this 
question.
! The role enforcement or under-enforcement may play in creating space for 
identity formation may have much wider purchase and warrants investigation in a 
variety of fields. Gang membership continues to be one identity formed against the law 
despite no small degree of attention paid by police. Clearly there are forces here 
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working against the role of enforcement. Conversely, there are historical instances of 
under-enforcement that indicate that the concept might be expanded in new, rich 
directions. 
! Prohibition and the Volstead Act are often examined as proof of the difficulty of 
legislating against and preventing social behavior with broad support, but under-
enforcement and identity offer another lens through which to view the era. Between the 
18th and 21st Amendments American citizens constructed not just identities in defiance 
of the law, but an entire subculture. The Volstead Act and the difficulties enforcing it 
created opportunities for both individuals and groups to define and perform social 
identities in the shadow of the law. Prohibition gave rise to identifies we still recognize 
— and even use — today: “bootlegger,” “moonshiner,” “speakeasy,” and “hooch,” 
among much else. The battle between gangsters and Federal agents is still being 
played out on the big screen almost a century later. Volstead created opportunities for 
the bartender impresario with the police in his pocket, the gangster who believes he’s 
just giving the people what they want, and the fun-loving flapper whose identity is 
wrapped up in the speakeasy scene: individual identities in a culture built against a 
constitutional provision. The Act’s uneven enforcement allowed an entire subculture to 
flourish in the space between the law on the books and the law on the street. While the 
debate on Prohibition played out in constitutional law and politics, new identities and a 
new culture grew in the shadow of an Amendment.
! Let me finish by echoing Standen (2009) and Eckstein, Ross, and Delaney 
(2010) in arguing that sports are an important and untapped site for the examination of 
social power structures, and that our understanding of our culture deepens when we 
taken sports seriously as a measure of our society. Sports can be used as a lens for 
society, as a way of discussing racism (Hartmann 2003; 2012), classism (Bourdieu 
1991; Wilson 2002), nationalism/exceptionalism (Markovits & Hellerman 2001), and 
sexism (Markovits & Albertson 2012), among much else. While the specific rules and 
constraints facing amateur baseball players are ones the rest of us are likely never to 
encounter, the methods and practices with which they approach their decisions and the 
ways in which they internalize their culture’s patterns have application for the rest of us. 
What we learn through an examination of players’ use of social cues, informational 
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cues, and the interaction of cues with legal consciousness can guide inquiries much 
further afield (if the reader will pardon one final play on words). Players on the Cape 
have used social cues over a lifetime to learn who they are; by thinking about how that 
alters their lives today, we all learn something about ourselves. 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions
Interview Questions 1 (Pilot Project)
Note: Many of the questions in this section aim to investigate how players learn about 
negotiation strategy from informal sources like family, friends, coaches, and former 
teammates. These concepts find little purchase in the dissertation because the pilot 
project revealed them to be based on a false premise: that a player would go through 
the process in compliance with Bylaw 12.3.2.1. After the pilot revealed that the vast 
majority of players in fact break this rule – and that they do so without material benefit – 
the project’s focus changed dramatically. 
For Coaches
Tell me about how an amateur player might prepare for the draft or contract negotiation.
How do the NCAA restrictions affect a player preparation?
! - How do they affect the negotiation itself?
What are some ways that preparation differs from non-amateurs?
Do your players come to you for advice before they start the negotiation process?
Tell me how that works. When would a player typically first come to you?
When a player comes to you to ask about whether he should keep his amateur status, 
what kinds of advice do you give him?
What sort of advice do you give to a player asking about negotiating a contract?
How does your advice differ when a player is an amateur?
Do you talk to other people when a player asks you for advice?
! -Who might you talk to?
! -What sort of advice might they give?
How does the athletic department help a player through a process like this?
What other resources might a player use?
! - Tell me about what they can do to help a player. 
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How did you learn about negotiations?
Who helped you learn the most about negotiations?
! ! -What did you learn from them that was so helpful?
Who else helped you learn about the process?
Have you ever spoken to a lawyer about the negotiation process?
! ! -What sort of advice did they give about the process?
! ! -Was their advice helpful?
! ! -What made it (un)helpful?
Do you think it is helpful for players to talk to a lawyer before they negotiate?
Tell me about what lawyer does to help a player negotiate.
Do you think the NCAA restrictions on amateur athletes make the negotiation process 
more difficult?
How common is it – as far as you know – for a player to ignore or sidestep the NCAA 
Bylaws?
- How might a player try to do that?
How do you think the Oliver case from Oklahoma State will change the process?
Is there anything else about the negotiations you think it would be helpful for me to 
know?
Is there anyone else you think I should talk to about the negotiation process? I will not 
reveal that you suggested that I speak to them. 
For Drafted Players
Tell me about draft week. What were you feeling when you were drafted by (team 
name)?
Had you thought about how you would negotiate a contract before you were drafted?
! -When did you start thinking about contract negotiations?
! -When did you start planning for them?
What was the first thing you did to start preparing for the contract negotiations?
What else did you do to prepare?
- Did you feel at the time that you were going to be well prepared?
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- Looking back, do you wish you had prepared differently? What would you have 
done differently?
How do you feel your contract negotiations went?
! -Why do you feel that way?
! -What could have made them go more smoothly?
At any point, did you ask for advice about the process from your high school or college 
coach?
- Tell me how that went. 
- Was their advice helpful? What was helpful about their advice?
- Describe your impression of how familiar your coach was with the process. 
Did he seem to know a lot about it?
Did you ever talk to a teammate or old teammate about the negotiations?
! - Tell me about that. What did they tell you?
! - Was their advice helpful?
Did you ever talk to family member about the negotiations?
! -Was their advice helpful?
-What was helpful about their advice?
Did you ever talk to family friends about the negotiations?
! -How did you decide which friends to talk to?
! -Was their advice helpful?
Did you ever talk to a lawyer about your negotiations?
! -How did you go about finding a lawyer?
! -What advice did the lawyer give you?
! -Was the advice helpful?
! -What was helpful about the advice?
What else did you do to prepare for the negotiations?
How detailed a strategy would you say you had going into the negotiations?
As the negotiations went on, what did you find to be good about your advice/
preparation/strategy?
! ! -What did you find to be bad about your advice/preparation/strategy?
What – if anything – do you wish you had known before you started negotiations?
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What – if anything – would have made the negotiation process easier for you?
Do you feel you had adequate access to attorneys?
-If not, why not? What advantages do you think more access to attorneys would 
have given you?
(At this point, I may remind the player that all information is confidential).
At any point, did your attorney consult directly with the major league club?
! -What, to the best of your knowledge, was the nature of those conversations?
Did anyone else besides you consult directly with the major league club?
! -Who?
! -Why that person specifically?
! -What, to the best of your knowledge, was the nature of those conversations?
How familiar do you feel with the NCAA bylaw restrictions on agents and amateur 
status?
As far as you know, did your negotiation process follow NCAA Bylaws?
What happened that did not follow those bylaws?
Do you think your experience was typical?
How did other players prepare? How did they approach negotiating with major league 
clubs?
Do you know of any players who broke the NCAA Bylaws? 
- How? What did they do?!
How do you think the Oliver case from Oklahoma State will affect this process?
Is there anything else about the negotiations you think it would be helpful for me to 
know?
Is there anyone else you think I should talk to about the negotiation process? I will not 
reveal that you suggested I speak to them.
For Undrafted Players
How did/will you make the decision to enter the draft?
- Who did you speak to about making this decision?
- What did they tell you?
Will you maintain your amateur status through the draft?
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- How did/will you decide to make that decision?
- Who did you talk to before making that decision? 
Have you started thinking about how you will handle the draft and negotiations?
How familiar do you feel with the NCAA bylaw restrictions on agents and amateur 
status?
! - Tell me a little bit about how you think you’ll deal with those restrictions. 
Track A
Who have you spoken to about the draft and playing professional baseball?
- Tell me about that conversation. 
Who else have you spoken to?
Have you had any conversations with your coach about the draft? Amateur status?
Negotiations?
- Tell me about that. Did they have suggestions? Do you think these 
conversations were helpful? Why or why not?
Have you talked with your mom or dad about the draft? Amateur status? Negotiations?  
 - Tell me about that. Did they make suggestions? Do you think these 
conversations were helpful? Why or why not?
Have you talked with any family friends?
- Tell me about that. Did they make suggestions? Do you think these 
conversations were helpful? Why or why not?
Have you talked with former teammates?
What sorts of experiences have past teammates had with this process?
Do you talk with past teammates about how they approached the draft?
- What do they say helped in navigating the process?
- What obstacles or difficulties have they mentioned?
Have you talked to a lawyer about the process?
- Why or why not?
- What did he/she tell you?
- Was/do you think the lawyer’s advice (would be) helpful?
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Tell me how you think you’ll plan for the draft. What will you do in the weeks and days 
before the draft?
Do you have an idea of how you’ll approach sitting down with a professional club?
- How do you think that will go?
- Tell me how you think you will prepare. 
How do you think NCAA Bylaws and restrictions will affect that process?
How do you think the Oliver case from Oklahoma State will change the process? 
Do you think it’s common for players to ignore the NCAA restrictions and have others 
represent them?
! - How does that work? How would someone go about that?
Is there anything else about the negotiations you think it would be helpful for me to 
know?
Is there anyone else you think I should talk to about the negotiation process? I will not 
reveal that you suggested that I speak to them. 
Track B
Who do you think you’ll talk to about the draft and negotiation?
- Why him or her? 
- What do you think he or she will tell you?
Do you think you’ll speak to your coach about the draft and negotiating with a 
professional team?
- Why or why not?
- What do you think he’ll tell you?
Do you think you’ll speak to your parents?
- Why or why not?
- What do you think they will say?
Do you think you’ll talk to teammates or past teammates?
- Why or why not?
- What do you think they’ll say?
What sort of experiences have teammates had about the draft and negotiations?
- What do they say helped in navigating this process?
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- What obstacles or difficulties have they mentioned?
Do you think you’ll talk to a lawyer?
- Why or why not?
- What do you think they’ll say?
Tell me how you think you’ll plan for the draft. What will you do in the weeks and days 
before the draft?
Do you have an idea of how you’ll approach sitting down with a professional club?
- How do you think that will go?
- Tell me how you think you will prepare. 
How do you think NCAA Bylaws and restrictions will affect that process?
How do you think the Oliver case from Oklahoma State will change the process?
Is there anything else about the negotiations you think it would be helpful for me to 
know?
Is there anyone else you think I should talk to about the negotiation process? I will not 
reveal that you suggested that I speak to them. 
Interview Questions 2 (Summer 2010)
For Players
Where are you from? When did you start playing baseball? When did you know you 
might be a professional-quality player? When did you first meet an MLB scout? Tell me 
about high school baseball. Were you drafted out of high school? Tell me about that. Did 
you find the process confusing? How did you try to figure it out? 
Will you be drafted next year? Where do you think you will go? How sure do you feel 
about that? How did you figure that out? How do you know?
What can you tell me about “slot money?” About where in the draft order does it start?
So, if you expect to be drafted (WHEN), what kind of contract would you get? And will 
there be any negotiation of that contract?
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What do you know about the NCAA rules about agents or advisors? What else? How 
did you learn about NCAA rules? What do you think about the rules? Do you think 
they’re fair? What’s fair/unfair about them?
Do you have an advisor? Why? What does your advisor do for you? What else?
How important are those things for you?
Does your advisor do anything that might be against the NCAA rules? (Do you think he 
might?) (Do you care if he does?) What sorts of things might your advisor – or another 
advisor – do that are against the rules? Does your advisor ever talk to MLB reps, 
scouts, or teams for you? Will he represent you in the draft next year? Who will he 
represent you to?
You said your advisor (does X). Are those things you could do if you had to? Does your 
advisor do things you couldn’t do? (Like what? You couldn’t do that? Why not?) Or does 
your advisor do things you don’t want to do, or would rather not do? (Like what? Why 
don’t you want to do that?)
Do you think having an advisor will get you a bigger contract in the future? How? What 
will he do? How much bigger? Do you think you’ll go higher in the draft because you 
have an advisor? How much higher? Why? What will he do for you? How big a 
difference will that make in your contract?
What does your advisor get out of this arrangement?
When/how did you decide to have an advisor? Who did you talk to about the decision? 
Your parents? Your coaches? Other players? (Background questions on the parents/
coaches/players: what do they do, how did you meet them, how long have you known 
them, etc.)
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How does having an advisor make you feel? More accomplished/confident/ 
professional/relaxed? How/why?
When you got to college, how many guys on the team had advisors? How many of them 
had been drafted in high school? Did you have an advisor at the time? Did their having 
advisors make you want to have one? What did you do?
Do you think the fact that most elite players have advisors affects who decides to have 
an advisor? How? Are there players who use advisors because that’s what the best 
players do? 
How did you meet your advisor? Were there other advisors who wanted to work with 
you? How did you decide who to work with?
How do advisors get to know players? Are there ways of approaching players that are 
frowned upon? Do players ever change advisors? Why? Are there ways of leaving an 
advisor that are frowned upon? 
How many guys on your college team are likely to be drafted next year?92 How many of 
them have advisors? How many of them were drafted out of high school? How many 
guys who are going to be drafted next year have advisors? 
Do you think everyone needs an advisor? How might a player try to get through this 
process without an advisor? Would they be at a disadvantage? Why? Would it depend 
on how good the player is?
Imagine a player who’s figured out he’s, say, about a 40th-rounder next year. Do you 
think he needs, or ought to have, an advisor? What could an advisor do for him? Could 
he do that himself? Why not?
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92 In 2011 follow-ups, be sure to ask how many WERE drafted and how many DID 
HAVE advisors.
Repeat Qs with a top-rated player as an example.
BE SURE TO GET ADVISOR CONTACT INFORMATION
BE SURE TO GET CONTACT INFORMATION FOR 2011 FOLLOW UPS
For Hosts
How long have you been hosting players? How did you get involved in it at the 
beginning? What do you like about it? So you’ve hosted (X) players…
How many of them went on to be drafted? Did they have an idea of where in the draft 
they were likely to go? Were they about right? How did they (try to) figure out where 
they would be drafted?
What can you tell me about slot money? Do players seem to know pretty much how slot 
money works?
Do you know how many of the players you hosted had advisors when they were in the 
Cape League? Did any develop a relationship with an advisor while here on the Cape? 
What, as far as you know, do advisors do for players? Are those things that players 
could hypothetically do for themselves? Why not (OR) why don’t they? Do you think 
players need advisors to do these things for them? All players, or just some? Why 
those?
What do advisors typically get for their services? Do players know how that works?
Have you hosted players who represented themselves to Major League scouts and 
clubs instead of using an advisor? Did they seem confident in that? Do you think other 
players could have done the same? 
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Do you think players like having advisors? Why do you think that is? Do you think 
having an advisor makes them feel confident? Like a better baseball player? Do you 
think having an advisor makes them feel more professional? Like they “belong” more? 
What impact do you think the most elite athletes have on this process? Do you think 




How do you determine which players to approach? How many players do you work 
with? What do you do for players? What do you do in the build-up to the draft? 
Immediately before and during the draft? After the draft? During the contract 
negotiations?
How does what you do vary by the player’s quality? Do you do different things for a top-
five-rounder than for players in slot money positions? 
How do you go about determining where a player will be drafted in the coming year? Do 
players generally have a good idea where they will be drafted? How do they figure that 
out? Are there other ways a player could figure that out?
Tell me about slot money. How exactly does that work? Do players generally know how 
that works?
Are there things you do for players that they could do for themselves (give an 
example)? Why don’t they, would they just rather not, or rather focus on baseball?
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Are there ways of approaching players that are frowned upon? Do players ever change 
advisors? Why? Are there ways of leaving an advisor that are frowned upon?
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Appendix B: Concept Memos
Combined Concept Memo 3/19/12
As I’ve open-coded between 10 and 20 interviews, four themes have emerged, all of 
which are products of the data reflected through a few different analytical lenses. In the 
most recent writing (January 2012), I suggested four analytic approaches (habitus, 
Althusserian subjects, narrative identity, and role-playing); here I develop four as well, 
but rather than drawing primarily on theory, they grow out of the interviews themselves. 
To be sure, the ways in which I think about these categories are impacted by attendant 
social theory, but I have tried to let the data speak, and to let the patterns emerge 
organically. 
What Baseball Players Do
! The players in this study have spent most of their lives learning what it means to 
be a baseball player. By the time they arrive at the Cape Cod League, they have 
learned and continue to learn not just how to play the game, but how to look and act like 
professionals, how to carry themselves, and how to talk.
! The coaches for this team show pictures of Major League players’ batting 
stances and talk about emulating a “Major League ‘lower half.’” It’s instructive, I think, 
that not only do the coaches use the language of emulation to teach these players how 
to be professionals, but that it is as much about look, bearing, and attitude as it is about 
on-field performance. 
At one practice session, an assistant coach spent 20 minutes instructing hitters 
not on their swings, not on looking for the right pitch, and not on how to work the pitch 
count, but rather on how to look “right” while warming up in the on-deck circle or taking 
practice swings in the batter’s box. It was all about looking like a baseball player, and in 
particular looking right for the scouts and agents behind the backstop and in the stands. 
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The point is that having spent the entirety of their conscious lives learning what it 
means to be a baseball player, these players have now reached something of a “master 
class.” It’s no longer just about how to hold the bat, how to look right in the ready 
position, how to spit. For these young men, it’s now about how to do these things in 
front of professional baseball’s decision-makers. 
It would be easy to think that this would require a greater familiarity with the ins 
and outs of the business of baseball: how much money different draft picks make, what 
an agent can and cannot do for a player, what their current draft projection and market 
value is, etc. Though players are more sophisticated than they think (or than they let 
one), this is undercut by a powerful norm against being involved in the business side of 
the game. Business, agents, and the draft are virtually never discussed in the locker 
room; it’s “not what baseball players do.” Players and coaches are reluctant to broach 
the topic and do so in only limited ways. For the most part, players and coaches 
consider their roles to be teaching and playing baseball. Money, business, and the draft 
are more properly “someone else’s job.”
This division of labor is partially tied to the widespread belief that over-attention 
to the business of baseball will lead to deteriorating field performance; even this 
instrumental explanation is intimately and inextricably intertwined with the conception of 
a “real” baseball player as one who focuses exclusively on the game.  
Becoming a Baseball Player
! In almost every case, these players have played baseball for literally as long as 
they can remember. As far as they know, there was no time before they were baseball 
players. This certainly contributes to the dominant place “baseball player” takes in their 
constellation of identities. But it also structures how these players think about their life 
stories, their personal narratives. 
! Two metaphors kept cropping up in my interviews. First, players constantly 
referred to “steps,” meaning stages of their development that carried them closer to their 
long-term goal of professional baseball. Part of this is built into baseball’s structure – 
Pony League, Mustang League, High School, College, Cape, Minors, Majors – but it’s 
also about players’ goals. In some cases, these players have been aiming at the Major 
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Leagues for almost as long as they’ve been playing, and consider each step towards 
that goal a step in an almost inevitable direction (see below on the manufacture of 
player confidence). Importantly – crucially – working with an agent/advisor is also seen 
as a step along the path they feel almost destined to walk. It too is a step that those 
aiming for professional baseball take as a matter of course. It is the conditioned 
response to the opportunity. 
! This fits with another common metaphor, the “puzzle.” Players often 
characterized new developments in their baseball careers as new pieces of the puzzle, 
with one player giving voice to the fact that the completed picture is of him in Major 
League Baseball. The draw to put pieces you assume are part of the end product must 
make one feel as if they are closer to their goal. Just as you would find an edge or 
corner with the appropriate coloring and put it in the proper place even if it didn’t yet fit 
with anything else, these players pick up agents before they “need” to in part because 
they see it as fitting with a future image of themselves. 
! In short, the stories these players tell about themselves point to a certain vision 
of their futures, one that they dream of and hold very dear and that has come to make 
up a dominant part of their identity. The identity that takes the central role in these 
stories, and that shapes and is shaped by these stories, suggests an agent as an 
accoutrement appropriate to someone in their (future) position. It is consistent with the 
image of themselves that they have spent a lifetime building. They have always played 
baseball, and most of them have always been the best player on any team they’ve ever 
played on. And literally all of them have been one of the best players on any team, no 
matter how high-caliber. (I address the potentially jarring fact of their Cape League 
position below in the section on confidence). !
Being a Baseball Player
! Everyone has multiple facets of their personalities, of their identities, but these 
young men have identities dominated by a particular facet. Even as student-athletes, 
you hear them minimize and diminish their lives as students (“class sucks,” “I hate 
school,” “homework is the worst,” etc). As baseball players, they are appropriate 
subjects for the patterns and practices of, well, of baseball players. Any situation has a 
176
variety of possible responses or reactions; how is it that players “choose” the response 
that suits them qua baseball player? How is that part of their identity triggered?
! Interactions with coaches not only set out the “rules” for appropriate baseball 
player behavior, but identify the players in this study as appropriate subjects for those 
rules. When a coach tells a player to work out a particular hiccup in his warm-up swing, 
and does so by saying, “They’re going to tell you to get rid of it when you’re in pro ball 
anyway,” the player is simultaneously instructed on how a professional player looks or 
acts and told he is someone to whom those norms apply. 
! The Cape League abounds with instances of this facet of identity being 
specifically triggered. After the games, when kids ask these 20- and 21-year-olds for 
autographs, they want them only as baseball players, not as sons/students/hobbyists 
etc. Their identity is – in that moment – reduced to their name inscribed on a baseball. 
Much more important for this project’s puzzle, a similar phenomenon happens when 
agents approach players. Often, an agent lists the Major Leaguers with whom he works, 
and either implicitly or explicitly suggests that the player’s name ought to be added to 
the list. As with the warm-up swing example above, this not only suggests that having 
an agent is one of the signs and signals that accompany professional baseball players, 
but further suggests that the player to whom the agent is speaking is an appropriate 
subject for those signs and signals. 
Confidence and Self-Deception
! Part of being a baseball player, I’m told over and over, is having confidence, 
having swagger. Players say that to succeed, they need to believe that they are always 
better than the person they are facing. Batters must believe they can get a hit off the 
pitcher they are facing, no matter how good that pitcher is; pitchers that if they “bring 
their best stuff,” no one can hit them. A very common trope: “Baseball is a game of 
failure,” “a game where the very best players fail seven times out of ten.” 
! Players inure themselves against the grind of constant failure because 
confidence, cockiness, and swagger are part and parcel of their identities as players. 
Often this requires no small level of conscious self-deception. Baseball, more than 
maybe any other sport, is in love with statistics. As a result, measuring players against 
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each other is easier in baseball than in many other contexts. There is no shortage of 
evidence of a player’s quality (or want of quality). But players can avoid the potentially 
terrifying nature of poor statistics by casting it as a call to work harder. There are no 
insurmountable obstacles – just opportunities to learn, to fine-tune, to make an 
adjustment. It’s always a slump, never a talent disparity. 
A similar phenomenon occurs when players inevitably realize they can’t all be at 
the top of the Cape League. As noted above, these players have, for as long as they 
can remember, been the star on every team for which they have ever played (a fact 
made clear not just by statistics, but by team honors, All-Star teams, and being lauded 
more generally). Since they can’t all be on the Cape League All-Star teams, you find 
players leveling the playing field by grouping all players in the league together. They say 
things like, “Everyone in this league is a pro prospect,” or “Everyone in this league is a 
top college talent,” while simultaneously including themselves in that group (along with 
players who are statistically better, more elite) and ignoring the more fine-grained 
distinctions within that group. 
Players believe that you can’t make the next step, find the next piece the puzzle, 
unless you assume/believe that you belong there. As a result, players come to believe 
their own manufactured confidence. When every setback is cast with an overarching 
narrative that ends in success, they need not disrupt an identity that is confident in its 
ability to reach its goals. This is one way in which players’ confidence itself comes to be 
a constitutive factor of their identity. Self-deception becomes entrenched, and walls a 
player off from indicators that they may not be up to the task of professional ball. Their 
belief that they are good enough has a long personal history, is itself part of who they 
are, and is considered crucial to their success.
Identity, Culture, and Information Shortcuts, 4/7/12
! Political science has always been concerned with the lack of political knowledge 
among most political actors: 
“In the common people there is no wisdom, no penetration, no power of judgment.”
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  – Cicero
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! Voting study after voting study over the last 50 years has shown that the typical 
or “common” voter often knows stunningly little about the issues or candidates among 
which he or she is choosing. Lupia and McCubbins (1998) summarize the common 
theme among such studies – “Reasoned choice does not govern delegation” – and cites 
Schumpeter’s articulation of the problem this presents for democratic governance: “The 
typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters 
the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as 
infantile within the sphere of his real interests” (Schumpeter 1942).
! Schumpeter worries that this may prove “fatal to the nation”; Dahl frets that it 
runs the risk of creating a “tyranny of experts” (Dahl 1967). Nor is the concern limited to 
overtly political decisions on campaigns or policy issues; Posner (1995) argues that the 
problem of political ignorance pervades the jurors’ box as well. 
! Lupia, though, has demonstrated that voters may not actually need much 
information in order to make decisions that are actually in line with their preferences. In 
his 1994 work, he empirically demonstrated that badly informed voters could use access 
to widely available information shortcuts to emulate the behavior of well-informed 
voters.  Building on this idea of information shortcuts, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) 
argue that “cue theory” can explain when, how, and why people take simple 
informational cues to make reasoned political choices without having to process 
information themselves. 
! The theory is elegant and explanatory, but its authors are careful to tightly 
circumscribe its application and are explicit about the assumptions required for its 
operation. Put rather crudely, cue theory is mostly applied to binary political decisions 
(vote for A or B) for an actor with known, explicit preferences. The subjects in Lupia’s 
1994 experiment are acting on known preferences and are faced with a choice between 
voting for a ballot measure or against it. 
! However, cue theory is ripe for expansion. I argue that the bones of cue theory 
can be used to explain not just how a political actor makes a binary decision, but how a 
legal actor navigates a complex legalistic framework. This expands the implications of 
cue theory in two important ways. First, it builds on Lupia and McCubbin’s brief 
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suggestions for the theory’s implication for legal institutions by richly describing how 
actors make decisions in a legalistic institution rather than a strictly political one. 
Second, and much more important, it shows and describes how these actors use cues 
and shortcuts to navigate a far more complex institution that a binary voting choice.
! Elite baseball players are faced with decisions about using the services of an 
agent that are bounded by state laws, NCAA rules and regulations, economic realities, 
social perceptions, and sub-cultural norms. The situation, therefore, is far more complex 
than an attempt to model and apply one’s policy preference in the voting booth. 
Nonetheless, these players plainly use shortcuts analogous to those Lupia details. By 
modeling the behavior of those they perceive to be similarly situated (and thus adequate 
representations of their own interests), players actively use cues and shortcuts to make 
decisions while navigating this complex legal structure. 
! Expanding the theory to cover more complex situations, however, requires a 
richer, more complex set of explanations. It is not enough merely to say that players 
follow cues from other players; the richness and complexity of the institutions and 
cultural norms at play require a deeper look at how individuals interact with those norms 
and institutions. How do people determine who the appropriate models for their 
behavior are? How do they figure out their own preferences prior to doing so? How 
does a culture or subculture influence and impact the ways we construct and take cues? 
How does it alter or restrict the flow of information or impact which information is 
deemed relevant? How does it construct the cues themselves?
! Cues are necessarily influenced by and embedded in a set of cultural norms and 
practices that affect how they are constructed and how they are taken. I use thick 
description of a qualitative case study to illustrate the ways in which culture influences 
the use of cues in legal and political decision making. To be specific, I use the case of 
elite amateur baseball players to show how a cultural practice structures a cue, how 
individuals come to identify as a person to whom that cue applies, and how cultural 
practice structures, channels, restrict the flow of information and alter the perception of 
that information’s content. 
! At the very top of college baseball, the creme de la creme of the amateur elite 
garners enormous attention from agents whose services deliver substantial monetary 
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gains, and virtually all professional players have agents (though there are some 
instructive exceptions). But more than economic benefit embeds the practice in the 
cultural of amateur baseball. The widespread practice among the best professional 
prospects serves to cement agent use as a status symbol: “Elite prospects have 
agents.” Though the practice may have originated as an economic reality – with the 
material benefits outweighing the monetary costs and risk of NCAA sanctions – it has 
emerged as a feature of eliteness itself. Baseball thus creates a cue: if you are an elite 
prospect, use an agent. 
! But the story is much richer than simply the cultural creation of a cue. Also at play 
is how the culture of baseball structures how players come to take the cue. Here is 
where we depart from the world of constrained and explicit policy preferences. The 
ways in which baseball culture constructs player preferences is crucial. It is not merely 
that a player deciding how to navigate the world of agents and the professional draft 
looks to another player for a cue. There is a complex set of cultural norms, roles, and 
practices through which a player builds his identity as a baseball player. These 
structures inflect a player’s perception of who an appropriate model for their behavior is. 
! A few examples: Players at this level have, almost always, played baseball for 
literally as long as they can remember, have almost always been the best player on 
every team for which they have ever played, and have built a narrative identity as an 
elite and future professional. Despite the fact that the monetary benefits an agent can 
provide evaporate between the fifth and tenth rounds of a 50-round draft, players 
outside of those top ten rounds still identify with the very top players as fellow elites and 
fellow future professionals. Agent use, therefore, does not track the attendant monetary 
benefits, but a player’s self-identification as an elite and as a future professional. 
!
! When an agent approaches a player, when a scout raises his radar gun to track 
his pitch, when a coach tells him to work on something that will help him when (not if) he 
is in pro ball, when a child asks for an autograph, a player is identified as an elite, as 
someone to whom elite practices apply. The particular facet of his identity that is 
wrapped up in idea of himself as an elite player – a dominant, sometimes overwhelming 
facet – is triggered and he is “called forth,” to borrow Althusser’s phrase, as an 
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appropriate subject for those practices. These triggers, too, are culturally constructed 
and impact the type of “cue” a player finds appropriate. 
! There are several other cultural norms that flatten the very real distinctions 
between the top professional prospects and the many other players who take their cue 
from them. In addition to the narrative reasons articulated above, the culture of 
confidence and active self-deception in baseball influences the way players receive and 
evaluate information. A cold streak at the plate isn’t – can’t be – evidence that a player 
isn’t cut out for professional baseball, or that other players are better than he is. Players 
say again and again that you must really believe that you are better than the pitcher 
facing you, or the others against whom you are competing. In order to make it to the 
next level, you must really believe that you belong there. Where outsiders see evidence 
of a lack of talent, players see room for improvement, a temporary setback on their road 
to professional baseball. Where others see a 48th-round pick, they see themselves as 
someone whose potential hasn’t been realized or recognized. The culture of confidence 
and self-deception repackages information relevant to a player’s cue-taking. 
! The culture even restricts the type of information available to a player. Former 
players, former teammates, the players’ college coaches, and their Cape League 
coaches almost all believe that most players do not need an agent and should not get 
one. Yet even as players deliberate on this decision, they do not, as a rule, discuss the 
decision with any of these readily available sources of information. Here the roles and 
identities within the culture of baseball cut off the information. Coaches perceive their 
job, their role, to be educating and teaching a player about the game of baseball, not the 
business. Players see the locker room and the diamond as a place to discuss and 
practice baseball, not its business. It’s simply not done; it’s “not what baseball players 
do.” 
! Culture influences what signals count as cues, how a person comes to think that 
a cue applies to them, what information is available to them to make that decision, and 
how the information they do get is interpreted. Cue theory can be applied to rich, 
complex legal situations, but to do so we need to attend more concretely to the cultural 
forces that construct those cues and the field in which those cues are taken.
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! Importantly, none of this analysis requires the assumption that a player who risks 
his eligibility to work with an agent and actually incurs a monetary cost to do so is 
somehow acting irrationally. It doesn’t matter if we think such a player is right or wrong, 
acting sensibly or stupidly. What matters is the illustration of cultural factors that 
influence which cues a player takes and which cues he does not. Here, I can explain 
why players take cues from players rather than coaches, and from some players rather 
than others. Whether anyone thinks they are right to do so or not is immaterial. 
! The lessons from this particular case study can be readily applied to other 
political and legal situations as well. How does a welfare recipient navigate the 
complexities of the welfare system? Why does he decide to spend the money on some 
things rather than others? How do engaged couples decide whether to author a 
prenuptial agreement or not, or what to include in such an agreement? How do doctors 
gather information about malpractice suits and insurance? In any situation where a 
person is faced with a complex political or legal structure, the questions this study asks 
and answers may help explain political and legal behavior. What cues has the culture 
itself constructed, and which individuals are therefore highlighted as sources? 
! Furthermore, it should be of interest to both political science and law and society. 
Much as it takes cue theory as a starting point and expands and complicates that 
account, it could also be described as an extension of law and society’s work on identity 
and legal consciousness. Engel and Munger, Ewick and Silbey, and many others have 
described how a person’s identity influences their relationship with law and legal 
structures. This account enriches our understanding of how individual identity and 
cultural norms interact to guide or influence how we navigate legal structures. 
! Ewick and Silbey, for instance, describe Rita, and how her identity as a Catholic 
and her relationship with her community structure how she approaches the legal 
dimensions of her divorce. What that study doesn’t ask is how (given those identities) 
Rita gathers and evaluates legal information. In extending Ewick and Silbey’s work, we 
could hypothesize that Rita, when faced with a legal situation about which she knew 
little, would look to individuals she took to be similarly situated and take cues on how to 
make decisions from them. Again, it would not matter if Rita was “right” in her 
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assumptions about who an appropriate model was, only that we could examine why she 
made such assumptions and how they affected her legal decisions and behavior. 
! Framing the study as a case of legal and political decision making without perfect 
information both simplifies and enriches the approach. It engages the literature and 
persistent questions of identity and legal consciousness and the political science on 
information shortcuts and political behavior. It allows rich analysis of the ways in which 
individuals come to identify as baseball players and what that means for their behavior, 
as well as the ways in which the culture of baseball channels and restricts information, 
influences legal decisions, and structures the cues players take well before they decide 
to take them. It bridges the gap between analysis of individual behavior and group 
norms and makes original contributions to study of the interplay between the two. 
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Appendix C: Codebook
Series 0: Basics of the Puzzle
000: Catch-all Puzzle
001: Agents are helpful for top-ten-rounders
002: Agents are not helpful for the rest
003: Agents take 4% to 10% of salary
004: Agents are against the rules
010: Players know where they will be drafted
011: Players could easily find out where they will be drafted
012: Players know an agent is not helpful for most 
013: Players know an agent takes 4% to 10% of bonus
014: Players know having an agent is against the rules
Series 1: Agent Use as an Elite Cue
100: Catch-all Chapter 3
(001): The very elite players get benefits from agent use
101: Elite players use agents
102: Players mimic elite player behavior
103: Identifies player(s) as elite or professional
104: Flattens differences between Cape Players
204: Uses “when” to describe player’s professional career
205: Longstanding professional aspirations
208: Implies professional career
209: Compares player to a Major League figure
Series 2: Narrative and Storytelling
200: Catch-all Chapter 4
201: Doesn’t remember when first played baseball
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202: Puzzle metaphor
203: Pathway or steps metaphor
204: Uses “when” to describe player’s professional career
205: Longstanding professional aspirations
206: Talks about what “being a baseball player” means
207: Talks about “feeling like a baseball player”
208: Implies professional career
209: Compares player to a Major League figure
210: Says being a baseball player is “part of identity” 
Series 3: Confidence and Self-Deception
206: Talks about what “being a baseball player” means
207: Talks about “feeling like a baseball player”
300: Catch-all Chapter 5
301: Confidence as part of the game
302: Dealing with a slump or bad stats
303: Confidence outside the game
304: Discusses self-deception
305: Talks about building confidence
Series 4: Roles
206: Talks about what “being a baseball player” means
207: Talks about “feeling like a baseball player”
400: Catch-all Chapter 6
401: Says something is a player’s job
402: Says something is NOT a player’s job
403: Says something is a coach’s job
404: Says something is NOT a coach’s job
405: Says something is an agent/advisor’s job
406: Says something is NOT an agent/advisor’s job
407: Says X is something I don’t do
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